RALPH EDELSTEIN, APPELLANT,
v.
DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A property owner appealed the denial of his petition for certiorari challenging a county zoning change that rezoned his property from business use back to residential use. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the property owner had no vested right in the business zoning and that the rezoning was a valid exercise of the county's legislative authority to prevent strip zoning.
The county was not estopped because a property owner does not have a vested right in a particular zoning without expenditure of money in compliance with existing zoning. The rezoning was valid as a reasonable exercise of the county's legislative authority to prevent strip zoning and protect the area.
“a property owner does not have a vested right in a particular zoning in the absence of the expenditure of money on the land in compliance with existing zoning”
Establishes the standard for when a property owner can claim estoppel against rezoning
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1960, a previous owner obtained rezoning of the property from residential to business use. The appellant purchased the property after this rezoning…
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The appellant filed two separate petitions for writ of certiorari seeking to have reviewed a zoning resolution of Metropolitan Dade County which resulted in the appellant’s property being rezoned from business use to residential use. The appellant on this appeal seeks reversal of a single order denying certiorari on both petitions.
*612In 1960 a previous owner of the land involved obtained rezoning of the property from residential use to business use. Objectors to this previous rezoning brought two separate actions which proved of no avail. Kelly v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1961, 129 So.2d 714, and McCreary v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1962, 144 So.2d 337.
Subsequently, the appellant purchased the property. Thereafter, the County Planning Department recommended that the property should again be rezoned for residential use. This was done in an attempt to bring it into compliance with overall general plans for the area. Upon application of the Zoning Director, the property was rezoned for residential use.
On this appeal the appellant contends that the County was estopped to make the change because he had relied upon the business zoning when he purchased the property. He further contends that the rezoning is invalid because it restricts the use of the property without a relation to the public welfare, health or morals.
Appellant’s contention that the County is estopped cannot be sustained inasmuch as a property owner does not have a vested right in a particular zoning in the absence of the expenditure of money on the land in compliance with existing zoning. Sarasota County v. Walker, Fla.App. 1962, 144 So.2d 345; City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., Fla.1954, 77 So.2d 428.
On appellant’s second point we hold that he has failed to demonstrate a departure by the circuit court from established principles of law. The record reveals that the resolution under consideration in this case, changing the zoning, was enacted in order to protect the area from strip zoning. Authority to do so is within the legislative capacity of the County. See Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.1963, 68 So.2d 570. Furthermore, the change of zoning was not unreasonable under the circumstances and at the most, the question of the reasonableness of the resolution is debatable in which instance the legislative will must prevail. See Chadwick v. Layton, Fla. App.1963, 150 So.2d 485.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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City OF Hollywood v. The Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)…n good faith made some substantial change in position or incurred extensive obligations in reliance of the zoning law) does the landowner have a vested property right and the permit may not be revoked by a change of zoning. Edelstein v. Dade County, 171 So. 2d 611 (Fla.App.1965). In most cases the equitable estoppel doctrine has been applied to limit the municipality’s power to revoke a building permit by a change of zoning when the landowner has actually begun physical construction on the proper [*870] ty in…
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City OF Gainesville v. Cone, 365 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…ch v. 8701 Collins Avenue, 77 So. 2d 428 (Fla.1954). An estoppel cannot arise so as to create a vested right in a particular zoning category in the absence of the expenditure of money in compliance with the existing zoning. Edelstein v. Dade County, 171 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). There is no suggestion of estoppel in the record before us. It appears to be quite incongruous to suggest that while the law is clear that one may not acquire any vested right in the continuation of an existing zoning category, h…
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Shaughnessy v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 238 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)…competent, substantial evidence that the granting of the unusual or special use was at least fairly debatable and, therefore, the trial court correctly refused to disturb the action of the County authorities. Edelstein v. Dade County, Fla. App.1965, 171 So. 2d 611; Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App.1968, 213 So. 2d 281; City of St. Petersburg v. Aiken, Fla.1968, 217 So. 2d 315; Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, Fla.App.1969, 224 So. 2d 781. We further note that there is a serious question as to wheth…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- The City OF Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins AVE., Inc., 77 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1954)
- Sarasota Cnty. v. Walker, 144 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Barney McCREARY and Betty McCreary v. Metro. Dade Cnty. (not a Mun. corporation), 144 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Chadwick v. Layton, 150 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 68 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1953)
- Country Club Ests. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Miami Springs Baptist Church, 129 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- Kelly v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 129 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)