PHILIPPIDES
v.
DAY, COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

U.S. | 1931-03-23
No. 92
283 U.S. 48 Supreme Court of the United States (1931) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 75 L. Ed. 833 · 51 S. Ct. 358 · 1931 U.S. LEXIS 124 · SCDB 1930-028
Cited by 76 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Philippides, a Greek seaman who deserted his ship and remained unlawfully in the United States for over three years, challenged his deportation order by arguing that the three-year statute of limitations in the 1917 Immigration Act protected him from removal. The Supreme Court held that the broader 1924 Immigration Act, which permits deportation of any alien found to have remained longer than permitted regardless of when entry occurred, superseded the earlier Act's three-year limitation and therefore authorized his deportation. The Court rejected the argument that deserting seamen should receive more favorable treatment than other deportable aliens under federal immigration law.


© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Me. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was arrested in New York on December 19, 1928, and after a hearing was ordered to be deported to Greece, on the ground that he had remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted under the Immigration Act of 1924 or the regulations made under it. He is a native of Greece; shipped from that country as a seaman and arrived at New York on September 10, 1925, when he deserted, and has remained in this country ever since, that is, for more than three years before the arrest. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus, setting up the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, § 34, 39 Stat. 874, 896, as a statute of limitation entitling him to remain. The writ was ordered to be dismissed by the District Court and the order was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 37 F. (2d) 1015, citing United States ex rel. Piccolella v. Commissioner of Immigration, 36 F. (2d) 1022, which in turn cites United States ex rel. Rios v. Day, 24 F. (2d) 654. A contrary decision was reached by the Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit in Carr, Director of Immigration, v. Zaja, 37 F. (2d) 1016, and writs of certiorari were granted by this Court.

Section 34 of the Act of 1917 provides that “ any alien seaman who shall land in a port of the United States contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be unlawfully in the United States, and shall, at any time within three years thereafter, ... be taken into custody ” and upon the conditions there stated shall be deported. It may be assumed that under this statute the time within which a seaman can be arrested for deportation is limited to three years from the date of entry. But by the Immigration Ac.t of May 26, 1924, c. 190, § 14, 43 Stat. 153, 162, “Any alien who at any time after entering the United States is found to have been at the time of entry not entitled under this Act to enter the United States, or to have remained therein for a longer time than permitted under this Act, or regulations made thereunder,” is to be deported in the same manner as provided for in §§ 19, 20, of the Immigration Act of 1917. It is argued elaborately for the petitioner, and is conceded by the Government, that § 34 of the earlier Act is not repealed by the later one. See § 25 of the latter. For the purposes of this case we may assume this to be true, and that, in accordance with this § 25, the earlier Act § 34 is in force if not inapplicable. But we cannot accept the conclusion that deserting alien seamen are thereby made a favored class to be retained in this country when other aliens would be compelled to leave. “Any alien ” in § 14 of the Act of 1924 includes alien seamen on its face and by the definition in § 28, ibid. It is obvious that the petitioner, whether he entered rightfully or wrongfully, remained in the United States longer than he was permitted to by the law. He deserted after the Act of 1924 was in effect. The regulations under §§ 15 and 19 allowed only sixty days to alien seamen permitted to enter. If he entered without permission he was not entitled to more. It seems to us too clear to need argument that the limitation of three years in § 34 of the Act of 1917 does not override or qualify the clear and definite terms of § 14 of the Act of 1924. Those terms must prevail. Zurbrick v. Trinkoff, 38 F. (2d) 811. United States ex rel. Cateches v. Day, 45 F. (2d) 142.

Judgment affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (22 total)

  • United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129 (U.S. 1932)
    …the status of one who had unlawfully entered the country or remained after the passage of the act of 1917,3 but abolished the three year period of [*132] limitation only as to those entering after 1924. Section 14, quoted supra; Philippides v. Day, 283 U. S. 48. The petitioner was therefore entitled to invoke immunity under the act of 1917 unless he lost it by making the voyage to Germany in 1929. The question is whether by so doing he made a new entry into the United States which left him amenable to the…
  • United States v. Prince Line, Ltd., 189 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1951)
    …the time of your arrival on January 22, 1941 was it your intention to remain permanently in the United States ? A. Yes I had intentions to remain and stay here.” . 8 U.S.C.A. § 166. . 8 U.S.C.A. § 156. . 8 U.S.C.A. § 214. See Philippides v. Day, 283 U.S. 48, 51 S.Ct. 358, 75 F.Ed. 833; United States ex rel. Tsevdos v. Reimer, 2 Cir., 108 F. 2d 860, 861; .United States ex rel. Vounas v. Hughes, 3 Cir., 116 F. 2d 171. . 8 C.F.R. § 120.37(a) (1). . 8 C.F.R. § 120.21(a). . It is interesting to note that…
  • Vincenzo Anselmo v. Hardin, 253 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1958)
    …S.Ct. 326, 85 L.Ed. 297; United States v. Oppenheimer, 1916, 242 U.S. 85, 88, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161; United States v. De Angelo, 3 Cir., 1943, 138 F. 2d 466, 468. . See Note 4, supra. . 8 U.S.C. Sec. 214 (1940 od.) . Philippides v. Day, 1931, 283 U.S. 48, 51 S.Ct. 358, 75 L.Ed. 833; United States v. Vanbiervliet, 1931, 284 U.S. 590, 52 S.Ct. 132, 76 L.Ed. 509; see also United States v. Prince Line, 2 Cir., 1951, 189 F. 2d 386, 389; United States ex rel. Vounas v. Hughes, 3 Cir., 1940, 116 F. 2d 171,…

Previewing 3 of 22 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw