FLYNN, EXECUTOR,
v.
NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN, & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY

U.S. | 1931-03-23
No. 235
283 U.S. 53 Supreme Court of the United States (1931) Caution
Also reported at: 51 S. Ct. 357 · 75 L. Ed. 837 · 1931 U.S. LEXIS 127 · SCDB 1930-031
Cited by 38 cases

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Synopsis

Under the Employers' Liability Act, the Supreme Court held that a personal representative's right to sue on behalf of a deceased employee's widow and children is derivative and dependent upon the employee's own right of action, such that the two-year statute of limitations begins to run from when the employee's cause of action accrued, not from the date of death. The Court affirmed that Flynn's executor's suit, filed more than five years after the employee's 1923 injury despite occurring within two years of his 1928 death, was barred by the statutory limitations period.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of • the Court.

This is a suit under the Employers’ Liability Act for negligently causing the death of Edward L. Flynn, brought on May 15, 1929, by Flynn’s executor for the benefit of Flynn’s dependent widow and children. It is alleged that the injury was suffered on December 4, 1923, and that it caused Flynn’s death on September 1, 1928. The defendant, respondent here, demurred to the declaration on the ground that, more than two years having elapsed since the date when Flynn’s cause of action accrued, his right to sue was barred, and that therefore the suit could not be maintained. Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, §§1, 6, 35 Stat. 65, 66. Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, § 1, 36 Stat. 291. Code, Tit. 45, §§ 51, 56. The demurrer, and judgment for the defendant, were sustained by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. Ill Conn. 196; 149 Atl. 682. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 282 U. S. 821.

The Act of 1908 gives a right of action to the employee or, in case of his death, to his personal representative for the benefit of the widow and children, and provides that no action shall be maintained “ unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.” § 6. Obviously Flynn’s right of action was barred, but it is argued that the right on behalf of the widow and children is distinct; that their cause of action could not arise until Flynn’s death, and that therefore the two years did not begin to run until September 1, 1928. But the argument comes too late. It is established that the present right, although not strictly representative, is derivative and dependent upon the continuance of a right in the injured employee at the time of his death. Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 70. On this ground an effective release by the employee makes it impossible for his administrator to recover. Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335, 344. The running of the two years from the time when his cause of action accrued extinguishes it as effectively as a release, Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 38, and the same consequence follows. Our conclusion that this action could not be brought is required by the former decisions of this Court.

Judgment affirmed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1974)
    …m to settlement or judgment prior to his death, or otherwise extinguishes his right to pursue the claim, no subsequent wrongful-death action may be brought. See, e. g., Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335 (1928); Flynn v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 283 U. S. 53 (1931); Walrod v. Southern Pacific Co., 447 F. 2d 930 (CA9 1971); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Oliver, 261 F. 1 (CA5 1919); Gilmore v. Southern R. Co., 229 F. Supp. 198 (ED La. 1964); Purvis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 93 F. Supp. 271 (SDNY 1949). Mel…
  • Scarborough v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949)
    …7 U.S. 788, 66 S.Ct. 808 [90 L.Ed. 1015], Section 6 of the Act in question, since its enactment in slightly different form, has been construed to be in this category. Central Vermont R. Co. v. White (supra); Flynn [*258] v. New York, etc., R., 1931, 283 U.S. 53, 56, 51 S.Ct. 357, 75 L.Ed. 837, 72 A.L.R. 1311. Being in this category it cannot be tolled by fraud or concealment. Bell v. Wabash R. Co., 8 Cir., 1932, 58 F. 2d 569, 572.” And, see, also Flynn v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 283 U…
    1 / 3
  • Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 162 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1947)
    …, 24 S.Ct. 408, 48 L.Ed. 513; Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417, Ann.Cas.l914C, 176; Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335, 48 S.Ct. 541, 72 L.Ed. 906; Flynn v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 283 U.S. 53, 51 S.Ct. 357, 75 L.Ed. 837, 72 A.L.R. 1311. At the time of the fatal accident, the father of the plaintiffs was using the pass issued to him in transportation in interstate commerce. The pass had been issued under the provisions of the Hepburn Act…

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