UNITED STATES
v.
BLAND

U.S. | 1931-05-25
No. 505
Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandéis and Mr. Justice Stone concur in this opinion.
283 U.S. 636 Supreme Court of the United States (1931) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 75 L. Ed. 1319 · 51 S. Ct. 569 · 1931 U.S. LEXIS 171 · SCDB 1930-080
Cited by 40 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A Canadian woman applying for U.S. citizenship refused to take the standard oath of allegiance unless she could modify it with the phrase "as far as my conscience as a Christian will allow," reflecting her pacifist beliefs and refusal to bear arms in defense of the country. The Supreme Court held that applicants for citizenship must take the oath of allegiance exactly as prescribed by Congress without qualification or modification, and that allowing such changes would constitute judicial usurpation of legislative power.


© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice~'Sutherland

Mr. Justice~'Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case is ruled by the decision just announced in United States v. Macintosh, ante, p. 605.

The respondent, an applicant for citizenship, was a native of Canada and came to the United States in 1914. She had duly declared her intention to become a citizen. She refused to take the oath of allegiance prescribed by the statute to defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against ail enemies, etc., except with the written interpolation of the words, “as far as.my conscience as a Christian will allow.” It is unnecessary to review her testimony. The only difference between the position she took, and that taken by the respondent in the Macintosh case, is that in addition to refusing positively to bear arms in defense of the United States under any circumstances, she required an actual amendment of the oath as already stated, instead of reserving the point by parol. As we said in. the Macintosh case, this is a circumstance which has no distinguishing effect. The substance of the oath has been definitely prescribed by Congress. The words of the statute do not admit of the qualification upon which the applicant insists. For the court to allow it to be made is to amend the act and thereby usurp the power of legislation vested in another, department of the government.

The examiner reported against the applicant, and the court of first instance, after a full hearing, denied the application. We think its decree was right.

The decree of the court of appeals is reversed and that of the district court is affirmed.

Dissent
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,

Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,

dissenting.

What I have said in the case of United States v. Macintosh, with respect to the interpretation of the provisions of the naturalization act and of the prescribed oath, I think applies also to this case. The petitioner is a nurse who spent nine months in the service of our Government in France, nursing United States soldiers and aiding in psychiatric work. She has religious scruples against bearing arms. I think that it sufficiently appears that her unwillingness to take the oath was merely because of the interpretation that had been placed upon it as amounting to a promise that she would bear arms despite her religious convictions. It was the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals that the appellant may properly take the oath according to its true significance and should be permitted to take it. 42 F. (2d) 842, 844, 845. I think that the judgment below should be affirmed.

Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandéis and Mr. Justice Stone concur in this opinion.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (U.S. 1961)
    …which Congress has persuasively declined to overrule, have been overruled here. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, overruling United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, and United States v. Bland, 283 U. S. 636; see also Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632, overruling May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238. And with regard to the Civil Rights Acts there are reasons of particular urgency which authorize the Court— indeed, which make it the Court’s respon…
  • Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (U.S. 1974)
    …r inability to expel them because they believe more than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.” That dissent by Holmes became the law when Schwimmer, supra, United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, and United States v. Bland, 283 U. S. 636, were overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61. Article 133 provides: “Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”…
  • Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (U.S. 1946)
    …moral support to the government in any war which they did not believe to be morally justified or in the best interests of the country. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644; United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605; United States v. Bland, 283 U. S. 636. In each of these cases this Court held that the applicant had failed to meet the conditions which Congress had made prerequisite to naturalization by § 4 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3592, 34 Stat. 596, the provisions of which, h…
    1 / 2

Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw