ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. ET AL.
v.
UNITED STATES ET AL.

U.S. | 1932-01-04
No. 88
284 U.S. 288 Supreme Court of the United States (1932) Caution
Also reported at: 76 L. Ed. 298 · 52 S. Ct. 171 · SCDB 1931-149 · 1932 U.S. LEXIS 982
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad and Louisville & Nashville Railroad challenged an Interstate Commerce Commission order requiring them to cancel restrictive tariff provisions that excluded the Georgia & Florida Railroad from participating in through routes over the Clinchfield Railway, which they had leased subject to conditions preserving competitive access. The Supreme Court affirmed the order, holding that the restrictive schedules violated the lease conditions requiring the Clinchfield to remain an open route available to all connecting carriers, including those connecting indirectly and those established after the lease authorization, and that the Commission had authority to impose such conditions as a prerequisite to approving the lease acquisition.


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Opinion of the Court
Me. Justice Brandéis

Mr. Justice Brandéis delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit, under the Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 220, was brought in the federal court for western South Carolina, to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dated June 9, 1930. Restriction in Routing in Connection with the Georgia & Florida Railr road, 165 I.

C. C.

3. The plaintiffs are the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad and the Charleston & Western Railroad. The defendants are the United States and, by intervention, the Commission, the Piedmont & Northern Railway and the Georgia & Florida Railroad. The order assailed was entered under § 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act. It requires the cancellation of provisions in tariff schedules by which the plaintiffs seek to exclude the Georgia & Florida from participating as connecting carrier in through routes established over the Carolina, Clinchfield § 15 (4) in respect to their then existing lines. It was not an order establishing a through route within the'meaning of § 15 (3).

In respect to the Clinchfield, which the carriers sought to acquire, the Commission gave them the option of either consenting to certain through routing over that road or abandoning their plan to lease the road. In effect, the Commission found that without such a condition the proposed lease was not in the public interest. With that condition it was. Compare Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 265. It was within the powers of the Commission to make such a condition.6 Obviously the condition was not arbitrary. The provision was requested by the carriers interested; and it was required in .oyder that competition, which the Commission deemed to be in the public interest, be preserved. Compare Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 35, 42. The limitation imposed by § 15 (4) of the Act upon the Commission’s power under i§ 15 (3) to establish through routes is designed to protect the existing long-haul routes of carriers. Compare United States v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 278 U. S. 269, 277. It applies only when the Commission is exercising the power conferred by that paragraph. It is not a limitation upon the power of the Commission to approve new combinations of carriers.

Affirmed.

The order of the Commission entered June 3, 1924, provided: “ That the, making of said lease and exercise of any of the rights conferred by this order shall in all future proceedings, judicial as weE as administrative, to which the carriers above named or’ any of them may be parties, be deemed and taken as conclusive evidence of their acceptance of, and agreement to abide, by, the conditions enumerated in said report, . . .” 90 I. C. C. at 139. Compare Control of Alabama & Vicksburg Railway, 111 I. C. C. 161, 182

"3. So far as lies within the power of the applicants, existing routes arid channels of trade and commerce heretofore established by other carriers in connection with the Clinchfield shah be preserved, existing gateways for the interchange of traffic with such other carriers shall be maintained, and the present neutrality of handling traffic inbound and outbound by the Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio Railway and its subsidiary, the Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio Railway of South Carolina, shall be continued so as to permit equal opportunity for service and routing-or movement of traffic which is competitive with traffic of the applicants, or either of them, to and from all connecting lines reached by the line of the Clinchfield companies, without discrimination in service against such competitive traffic.”

“ 4. The applicants shall permit the line of the Clinchfield and its subsidiaries to be used as a link for through traffic, via existing gateways of interchange, or via such gateways as may hereafter be established under authority of the commission by means of the connecting lines which the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company proposes to build, equally available to such other carriers, now connecting, or which may hereafter connect, with the line of the Clinchfield and its subsidiaries, as may desire to participate in through routes and joint rates between points in territory north and west of the line of the Clinchfield. and points at and beyond the Ohio River on the one hand and points in the southeastern and Carolina territory on the other, under divisions to be agreed upon by the applicants, or either of them, and/or the Clinchfield organization, on the one hand, and by the other participating earner or carriers on the other,' and shall not discriminate as to rates, fares, and charges against such participating carrier or carriers as compared with the applicants, or either of them; the intention of this provision being that the line of the Clinchfield' and its subsidiaries shall be maintained as an -open route equally available to all carriers connecting with the Clinchfield for traffic between the points designated.”

Compare cases under the Carmack Amendment. Act of January 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 595; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 489; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Woodbury, 254 U. S. 357, 358.

“(4) In establishing any . . . through route the commission shall not . . . require any carrier by railroad, without its consent, to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed through route, unless such inclusion of lines would make the through route unreasonably long as compared with another practicable through route which could otherwise be established. . . .” Act of June 19, 1910, c. 309, § 12, 36 Stat. 539, 552, amended by Act of February 28, 1920, c. 91, § 418, 41 Stat. 456, 485.

The Commission has frequently attached similar conditions to orders authorizing acquisitions of control. See, e. g., Chicago Junction Case, 71 I. C. C. 631, 639; Control of Alabama & Vicksburg Railway, 111 I. C. C. 161, 178, 179; Control of Columbia, Newberry & Laurens, 117 I. C. C. 219, 227; Control of Chicago Heights Terminal Transfer R. R. Co., 124 I. C. C. 753, 760; Acquisition of Control by Illinois Terminal Co., 138 I. C. C. 487, 498; Acquisition of Control by Wabash Ry. Co., 154 I. C. C. 155, 162, 163.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …carload freight with steam railroads of the territory is approximately 6,000 cars per month. The petitioner now has a connection at its southern terminus with the Georgia & Florida, a steam railroad. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 288, 291. If the proposed extensions were built it would have a similar connection at its northern terminus with the Norfolk & Western. Thus it would become a connecting link in a new through route and effective line of connecting carriers which would b…
  • …ic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 48 F. 2d 239, 244 (W.D.S.C. 4th Cir. 1931) (3-judge court) (“It is not only the right but the duty of the commission to impose such conditions as will make the acquisition in the public interest .... ”), aff’d, 284 U.S. 288, 52 S.Ct. 171, 76 L.Ed. 298 (1932). See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F. 2d 608, 620-21 (2d Cir.1965), cert, denied, 384 U.S. 941, 86 S.Ct. 1462, 16 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966).55 The ICC can probably design conditions that will pre…
  • W. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 237 (U.S. 1965)
    …ne railroad company. It may also be interpreted reasonably to include a functional railroad unit such as the Bieber through route involved here. Moreover, all parties in this litigation recognize that in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 288, this Court rejected the contention that “connecting line” is a term limited to the meaning that the statutory language might initially suggest. Mr. Justice Brandéis, speaking for a unanimous Court, wrote, “There is no warrant for limiting the meani…
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