PORTER, AUDITOR,
v.
INVESTORS SYNDICATE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Supreme Court affirmed its earlier decision that a federal court lacked equity jurisdiction to enjoin a state auditor's order because the plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedy provided by Montana law. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Montana's statute violated the state constitution's separation of powers provision, finding that Montana courts had indicated the constitution does not prohibit state district courts from exercising administrative powers ancillary to their judicial functions.
© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this cause, reversing the decree of the United States District Court, we held [286 U. S. 461] that the appellee had failed to exhaust the administrative remedy afforded by the Montana statute, and that the federal court was therefore without jurisdiction as a court of equity to enjoin enforcement of the State Auditor’s order. The appellee has presented a petition for rehearing which concedes the correctness of our ruling that the statute gives a remedy partly administrative in character, by suit in the state district court, but contends that by this grant the act violates Article IV, § 1, of the Montana Constitution, which is:
“ The powers of the government of' this State are divided into three distinct departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.”
As this question was not briefed or argued when the ease was first heard we granted a reargument; and the cause has again been presented on this point.
The statute plainly affords a remedy which, though in certain respects judicial, is in others administrative. The courts of Montana have not passed upon its constitutionality as affected by the quoted section of the fundamental law of the State. Such expressions of the Supreme Court as have been brought to our attention indicate that Article IV, § 1, does not forbid the conference on the state district courts of administrative powers in connection with and ancillary to their judicial functions. O’Neill v. Yellowstone Irrigation Dist., 44 Mont. 492; 121 Pac. 283; State v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 240, 249; 243 Pac. 1073. Compare State ex rel. Kellogg v. District Court, 13 Mont. 370; 34 Pac. 298; Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320; 137 Pac. 392.
An adjudication of the question by the state supreme court would bind us, Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503. In the absence of such decision we are reluctant to construe a state constitution, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298; but as our decision requires that the alleged conflict of state statute and state constitution be resolved we must pass upon it. Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 522. In view of the Montana cases to which reference has been made, we are not convinced that the statute is offensive to the Montana Constitution, and adhere to the judgment heretofore entered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (U.S. 1944)…s without available administrative remedies, resort to which, when available, is prerequisite [*214] to equitable relief in the federal courts. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, 123; Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 471; 287 U. S. 346; Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 309; Atlas Ins. Co. v. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563. We hold, as in the Steele case, that the bill of complaint states a cause of action entitling plaintiff to relief. As other jurisdictional questions…
-
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1933)…own uncertainties are scattered when pierced by this authentic evidence of the law of the locality. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Risty, 276 U. S. 567, 570; Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U. S. 238; cf. Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 287 U. S. 346. We are urged by the respondents to exert a power of independent judgment though the law to.be interpreted be a constitution or a statute, and not merely the form of [*58] law which has come, to be spoken of as general. Cf. Burgess v. Seligman, 107…
-
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (U.S. 1937)…the commission was without authority to suspend or postpone [*310] the date of the effective operation of the order so as to avoid the running of penalties, pending application for its modification. Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 470; 287 U. S. 346. As the Act imposes penalties of from $500 to $2,000 a day for failure to comply with the order, any application of the statute subjecting appellant to the risk of the cumulative penalties pending an attempt to test the validity of the order in the…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 (U.S. 1913)
- Porter v. Invs. Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (U.S. 1932)
- Gulf v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503 (U.S. 1912)
- S. Ry. Co. v. Watts and Watts, 260 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1923)