JOHN C. CLEMONS, APPELLANT,
v.
PEARL CLARK, APPELLEE
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This case addresses whether a plaintiff's recovery for personal injuries in an automobile collision should be limited by the amount already received from her insurance carrier, and whether a release for property damage constitutes a splitting of causes of action. The court affirmed the trial court's decisions, finding no reversible error.
1. The plaintiff's recovery for personal injuries is not limited to the amount received from her insurance carrier. 2. The release of property damage claims did not constitute a splitting of causes of action.
“The defendant contends that there was a splitting of causes of action. The trial court properly struck this defense.”
Establishes the trial court's ruling on the splitting of causes of action defense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff sued for personal injuries from an automobile collision after signing a release for property damage. She had already received $650.00 from h…
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Plaintiff sued the defendant claiming damages for personal injuries received in an automobile collision. The action was instituted after she had signed a release for the property damage she had suffered. The defendant contends that there was a splitting of causes of action. The trial court properly struck this defense. Rosenthal v. Scott, Fla. 1963, 150 So.2d 433.
The plaintiff had received $650.00 from her insurance carrier for her personal injuries because the defendant was uninsured. In the suit against the uninsured motorist to recover for personal injuries, the defendant contended that plaintiff’s recovery should be limited to that amount. This contention was properly denied by the trial court. Finley P. Smith, Inc. v. Schectman, Fla.App.1961, 132 So.2d 460.
No reversible error having been made to appear, the judgment appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Ryan v. Gladwell, 265 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…n. The court properly held that the execution of this agreement did not constitute a splitting of the cause of action. See Fla.Stat. § 768.041, F.S.A.; Jacksonville Terminal Company v. Misak, Fla.1958, 102 So. 2d 295; Clemons v. Clark, Fla.App.1965, 172 So. 2d 242. Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Murray Rosenthal and Joseph Rosenthal v. Scott, 150 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1961)
- Finley P. Smith, Inc. v. Schectman, 132 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)