VANCOUVER STEAMSHIP CO., LTD.,
v.
RICE, ADMINISTRATRIX

U.S. | 1933-03-13
No. 469
288 U.S. 445 Supreme Court of the United States (1933) Caution
Also reported at: 77 L. Ed. 885 · 53 S. Ct. 420 · 1933 U.S. LEXIS 942 · SCDB 1932-139
Cited by 43 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A stevedore was struck by falling cargo while loading lumber onto a steamship in navigable waters of the Columbia River and died after being taken ashore; the Supreme Court held that admiralty jurisdiction attached because the negligent act causing the injury occurred on the vessel in navigable waters, even though death occurred on land, and therefore the ship was subject to a maritime lien under Oregon's wrongful death statute.


© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
. Mr. Justice Butler

. Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner is the owner of the steamship City of Vancouver. December 1, 1929, she was at Westport, Oregon, in navigable waters of the Columbia taking on. a cargo of lumber. Respondent’s intestate was employed by contracting stevedores who were loading her. While upon the deck of the ship helping in that work he was struck by a falling sling-load of lumber and mortally injured. He was taken ashore where he died an hour later. Respondent was appointed his administratrix and, electing under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (33 U.

S. C., § 933) to assert her claim against a third party, filed a libel in admiralty in the district court of Oregon against the ship, claiming on behalf of his estate damages in the sum of $10,000. The libel alleged in substance that intestate’s death was caused by reason of petitioner’s negligence in respect of the ship’s winch which was being used to hoist the lumber. Petitioner excepted to the libel, asserting that the cause of action arose on land and not upon the water and that therefore the case is not within the admiralty jurisdiction.

The district court so held and dismissed the libel. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 60 F. (2d) 793.

The Oregon statute creating a cause of action for death by wrongful act provides: “When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or orpission of another, the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action at law therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter, for an injury done by the same act or omission.” Oregon Code (1930), § 5-703. And the Oregon Boat Lien Law declares that every boat or vessel shall be subject to a lien “ for damages or injuries [done] by such boat or vessel resulting in the death of any person.” § 51-601. Admiralty courts have jurisdiction to enforce such liens. The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335, 347. The Anglo-Patagonian, 235 Fed. 92, 94.

The libel alleges no cause of action that accrued to the deceased. The only cause of action here involved is that created by the Oregon statute and it did not arise until the intestate died. The sole question is whether the happening of the fatal event upon navigable waters gave the admiralty court jurisdiction notwithstanding, death occurred on land. The right to recover for death depends upon the law of the place of the act or omission that caused it and not upon that of the place where death occurred. Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 93 Fed. 260, 264. De Harn v. Mexican National Ry. Co., 86 Tex. 68; 23 S. W.

381. Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 94 Wis. 191, 194; 68 N. W.

661. Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 38 Vt. 294, 311, Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Williams, 113 Ala. 402, 405; 21 So.

938. Where a longshoreman working upon the land assisting in the unloading of a ship was struck by a sling of cargo and knocked into the water where he died, this court, held that the state, compensation act and not the maritime law governed. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S.

179. Defendant conceded that the state law would apply if the deceased had been killed on the land. But it argued that as no claim was made for injuries there sustained and as the suit was solely for death, the case was exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction. We said (p. 182): “ But this is a partial view that cannot be . sustained. Thé blow by the sling was what gave .rise to thé cause of action. t It was given and took effect while deceased was upon the land-It was the sole, immediate and'proximate cause of his death.” Mutatis mutandis, what was there said is applicable here.

The substance and consummation of the occurrence which resulted in intestate’s death and so gave rise to respondent’s cause .of action took place on the deck of the ship lying in navigable waters. The damages allowed by the Oregon statute are those resulting solely from the death. The foundation of the right to recover is a wrongful act or omission taking effect aboard the ship and resulting in death upon the. land. This is a maritime tort, and . upon it the respondent’s claim rests. The admiralty court, has jurisdiction. The Chiswick, 231 Fed. 452. The Anglo-Patagonian, supra, 94. The Samnanger, 298 Fed. 620, 624. Shipping Board v. Greenwald, 16 F. (2d) 948, 951. Decree affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (15 total)

  • Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (U.S. 1959)
    …o., 264 U. S. 109.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239; Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U. S. 409. Vancouver S. S. Co., Ltd., v. Rice, 288 U. S. 445; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. 324. See also Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532. The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199. “Death is a composer of strife by the general law of the sea as it was for many centuries by the common law of the land.” Cardozo, J., in Cort…
  • …on the wharf; accidents affecting persons loading vessels while on the vessel; accidents affecting persons standing on either the vessel or the wharf who are knocked into the water. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179; Vancouver S. S. Co. v. Rice, 288 U. S. 445; Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U. S. 647. For this expression of federal policy, see the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, S. R. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 16. For…
  • Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (U.S. 1941)
    …aracteristic features of the maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation. The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 242; Great Lakes Dredge Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479; Vancouver Steamship Co. v. Rice, 288 U. S. 445.* *7 This is illustrated, in the cases cited, by the effect given in admiralty to state legislation creating liability for wrongful death. The leading continental States of Europe, whose jurisprudence was developed from the civil law, have given a…

Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw