DUPONT
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

U.S. | 1933-05-29
No. 791
Mr'. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Butler concur upon the reasons stated in the last paragraph.
289 U.S. 685 Supreme Court of the United States (1933) Caution
Also reported at: 77 L. Ed. 1447 · 53 S. Ct. 766 · 1933 U.S. LEXIS 198 · SCDB 1932-095
Cited by 51 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Du Pont created irrevocable trusts for three-year terms to hold insurance policies and stock, with the policies going to named beneficiaries and the stock reverting to him if the trusts terminated early, and the Commissioner taxed the trust income used to maintain the policies to Du Pont under Revenue Act § 219(h). The Supreme Court upheld the tax assessment, holding that because Du Pont retained substantial attributes of ownership—including potential recovery of the principal and the ability to extend the trusts—he could be treated as the owner for tax purposes despite the formal creation of the trusts, consistent with the Fifth Amendment.


© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Me. Justice Caedozo

Mr. Justice Caedozo delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case, like Burnet v. Wells, decided today, ante, p. 670, requires us to determine whether § 219 (h) of the Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926 is consistent with the Fifth Amendment in its application to trusts for the payment of premiums on policies of insurance.

On September 18,1923, the petitioner, Du Pont, created nine trusts for the benefit of his, wife and children, transferring to the trustee thereby two policies of insurance on his life, and shares of stock in a corporation, the income to be used to keep the policies in force. The trusts were to last for three years, during which term they were to be irrevocable. At the end of the term, they might be extended for a like period at the option of the settlor, and successively thereafter. Two such notices were given, with the result that in 1924, 1925, and 1926, the taxable years involved in this proceeding, the trusts were still in being.

The deeds make provision for the disposition of the policies and separate provision fór the disposition of the shares.

As to the policies, the provision is that if the trusts shall be terminated before the petitioner’s death, all interest in the policies shall vest in .certain named beneficiaries. The petitioner is not one of these, nor has he any power to change them. If the petitioner shall die while the trusts are still in force, the trustee is to collect the insurance, »nd to hold the proceeds in trust for the use of the beneficiaries named in the agreements. As to the shares of stock, the provision is that if the trusts shall be terminated before the petitioner’s death, the shares and any income not paid out shall be transferred to the petitioner. If, however, he shall die while the trusts are still in force, the shares are to be divided among the children or their issue.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, following the command of § 219 (h) of the applicable statutes (Revenue Acts of .1924 and 1926; c. '234, 43 Stat. 253; 26 U.S. Code, § 960; c. 27, 44 Stat. 9; 26 U.S. Code App., § 960) made a deficiency assessment by adding to the taxpayer’s income the amount expended by the trustee in the preservation of the policies. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the assessment, '20 B.T.A. 482, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 63 F. (2d) 44. A writ of certiorari was granted by this court.

The case is ruled by our judgment in Burnet v. Wells, ante, p. 670, upholding the validity of the contested stat-' ute. If the income of such a trust may be taxed to the grantor though he has retained to himself no reversionary interest in the principal of the trust, a fortiori that result must follow where he has made a grant of the estate for a short term of years, reserving the reversion when the term is at an end.

The provisions of these deeds would require a determination in favor of the Government, though Burnet v. Wells had been .decided the other way. “A statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.” Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289. Here the grantor did not divest himself of title in any permanent or definitive way, did not strip himself of every interest in the subject matter of. the trust estate. During a term of three years, the trustee was to apply the income to the preservation of the policies, and while thus applying the income was to hold the principal intact for return to the grantor unless instructed to retain it longer. The situation in its legal effect would not be-greatly different if the trusts had been' created for a month or from day to day. One who retains for himself so many of the attributes of ownership is not the victim of despotic power when for the purpose of taxation he is treated as owner altogether. The judgment is Affirmed.

Mr'. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Butler concur upon the reasons stated in the last paragraph.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (15 total)

  • Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (U.S. 1940)
    …ements. The bundle of rights which he retained was so substantial that respondent cannot be heard, to complain that he is the “victim of despotic power when for the purpose of taxation he is treated as owner altogether.” See DuPont v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 685, 689. We should add that liability under § 22 (a) is not foreclosed by reason of the fact that Congress made specific provision in § 166 for revocable trusts, but failed to adopt the Treasury recommendation in 1934, Helvering v. Wood, post, p. 344,…
  • Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1934)
    …absence. Enough for present purposes .that they have not arisen here. “A statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied [*116] to another.” Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289; DuPont v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 685, 688. If this is true of the action of the legislative department of the state laying down a general rule, it is even more plainly true of the action of judicial or administrative officers dealing only with the instance. Cf. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277…
  • Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1936)
    …ffected may show that the Act to that extent is invalid as to them. Such partial invalidity is plainly an insufficient basis for a declaration that the Act is invalid as a whole. Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, supra, p. 289; DuPont v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 685, 688. What has been said in this regard is said with added certitude when complainants’ business is considered in the light of the statistics exhibited in the several records. In No. 636, the Carter case, the complainant has admitted that “substant…

Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw