JOHN FRANKLIN JORDAN AND LOIS C. JORDAN, HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFFS,
v.
AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT

Fla. 1st DCA | 1965-03-09
No. G-148
CARROLL, DONALD, -K., Acting Chief Judge, WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ., concur.
172 So. 2d 483 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1965) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

The court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the plaintiff's claims for breach of employment contract and negligence barred by the statute of limitations.


Holding

The court held that the plaintiff's claims for breach of the employment contract were barred by the three-year statute of limitations for actions upon a contract not founded upon an instrument of writing.


Facts & Procedural History

The plaintiff sued a law firm for errors in a title opinion and insurance policy, alleging the opinion failed to reveal an undisclosed interest in the…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

A judge of the Third Judicial Circuit of Florida has, pursuant to Rule 4.6, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A., certified to this court the following questions:

“I.
"IS THE FOLLOWING POLICY EXCLUSION IN AN UNINSURED MOTORIST’S ENDORSEMENT TO AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY VALID AND EFFECTIVE?
“ ‘Exclusions.
This endorsement does not ápply: * * * (b) to bodily injury to an insured, or care or loss of service recoverable by an insured, with respect to which such insured, his legal representative or any person entitled to payment under this endorsement shall, without written consent of the company, make any settlement with or prosecute to judgment any action against any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor;’
"II.
“DOES THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, TO-WIT:
“ ‘ * * * 6. Arbitration: If any person making claim hereunder and the company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing under this endorsement, then, upon written demand of either, the matter or matters upon which such person and the company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators *484may be entered in any court having' jurisdiction thereof. Such person and the company each agree to consider itself bound and to be bound by any award made by the arbitrators pursuant to this endorsement.’
“IN AN UNINSURED MOTORIST’S ENDORSEMENT TO AN INSURANCE POLICY PRECLUDE RECOVERY AGAINST THE INSURER OF DAMAGES PREVIOUSLY ASSESSED AGAINST THE UNINSURED MOTORIST IN AN ACTION AT LAW AGAINST SUCH UNINSURED MOTORIST WHEN THE INSURER HAS DENIED COVERAGE ON THE BASIS OF A POLICY EXCLUSION?
“III.
“DOES A PROVISION IN AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY, WHICH INCLUDED UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, TO THE EFFECT THAT INSURANCE SHOULD NOT APPLY TO ANY INJURY WITH RESPECT TO WHICH INSURED SHOULD, WITHOUT WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE INSURER, MAKE SETTLEMENT OR PROSECUTE ACTION TO JUDGMENT PREVENT THE INSURED FROM PROSECUTING A SUIT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGES AS THE RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT AGAINST UNINSURED AUTOMOBILE OWNER?
"IV.
“IS THE PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER FLORIDA STATUTES, SECTION 627.0127, OVER AND ABOVE THE RECOVERY WHEN THE PLAINTIFF IS INSURED UNDER THE UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE OF AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY AND COVERAGE IS DENIED SO THAT SUIT IS REQUIRED ?”

It is noted that the appellate courts of this state have recently rendered several decisions upon the subject matter contained in the questions so certified.

It is our opinion that the foregoing “Certified Question” is too long and complicated and does not come within the purview of the quoted rule.1 Appellate jurisdiction cannot be invoked and a cause bodily transferred to an appellate court except from a determination of a court having original jurisdiction, notwithstanding the rule providing for certification of questions of law.2 The trial court under Section 6 of Article V of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., has the power to adjudicate the instant cause and its decision may be reviewed on appeal if desired. This Court therefore respectfully declines to answer the question as certified.3

CARROLL, DONALD, -K., Acting Chief Judge, WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • AETNA Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 189 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
    …ch strike from defendant’s answer the third defense which interposes the “no suit” clause as a bar to the action. The validity of the standard “no suit” clause contained in the uninsured motorist . Jordan v. Aetna Insurance Company, (Fla.App.1065) 172 So. 2d 483. . § 59.45, F.S.A., Misconception of remedy: •'“If an appeal be improvidently taken where tlie remedy might have been more properly sought by certiorari, this alone shall not be a ground for dismissal; but the notice of appeal and the record there…
  • Rosen v. Hunter, 227 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
    …s certified the question to us for resolution. At the onset, we note that we cannot answer the certified question since there has been no prior judicial determination by the court certifying it to us. Jordan v. Aetna Insurance Company, Fla.App.1968, 172 So. 2d 483; Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., Fla.App.1964, 159 So. 2d 873. However, the appellant’s motion, framing the issues for our resolution, will suffice to invoke this court’s jurisdiction for purposes of settling the issue regarding equity of redempti…
  • The First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
    …n conferred upon Circuit Courts by Art. V, § 6 of the Constitution, F.S.A., cannot be transferred to the District Courts of Appeal by F.A.R. 4.6. Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., Fla.App.1964, 159 So. 2d 873; Jordan v. Aetna Ins. Co., Fla.App.1965, 172 So. 2d 483; Sieverts v. Loffer, Fla.1950, 45 So. 2d 483. The Circuit Court cannot divest itself of its original jurisdiction which is prescribed and ordained by the Constitution. Nor, by the same token, can this appellate Court preempt that trial jurisdiction…

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