IRVIN GAINES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A defendant sought post-conviction relief under Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 1, alleging he entered a guilty plea without counsel and without competently waiving that right. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief, but on different grounds—the defendant failed to allege or prove he was unable to employ counsel, an essential element of such a claim.
Although the trial court's reasoning was erroneous in focusing on whether the defendant understood the charges and his guilt, the order denying relief was affirmed because the defendant failed to allege or prove the essential fact that he was unable to employ counsel when he entered his plea. This deficiency was fatal to his Rule 1 petition.
“The question of the guilt or innocence of the appellant can be resolved only after he has been accorded every right guaranteed to him by due process of law and therefore that question is immaterial in a Rule No. 1 proceeding involving the denial of counsel.”
Establishes that guilt/innocence is immaterial in right-to-counsel claims; trial court erred in relying on this factor
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGaines entered a guilty plea and was adjudged guilty without the benefit of counsel. He filed a post-conviction petition claiming he did not competent…
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The appellant filed his petition in the trial court, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix, alleging that he entered a plea of guilty and was adjudged guilty without benefit of counsel and that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. The record confirms these allegations. The trial court conducted a hearing after which it found that the appellant was not entitled to any relief because he thoroughly understood the nature of the charges against him and freely and voluntarily detailed the circumstances clearly indicating his guilt.
The trial court’s reasons for denying the motion were erroneous. The question of the guilt or innocence of the appellant can be resolved only after he has been accorded every right guaranteed to him by due process of law and therefore that question is immaterial in a Rule No. 1 proceeding involving the denial of counsel. Dickens v. State, Fla.App.1964, 165 So.2d 811. Even though the reasoning of the trial court was erroneous, we must nevertheless affirm the order denying relief because the conclusion was correct for an entirely different reason evidenced by this record. The motion did not allege, and neither does the record otherwise supply, the crucial allegation or fact that when the appellant entered his plea he was unable to employ counsel. Since there was neither allegation nor proof of that essential element we affirm the order appealed without prejudice to appellant’s right to file a further motion in the trial court. See King v. State, Fla. App.1963, 157 So.2d 440, and Turner v. State, Fla.App.1964, 161 So.2d 11.
SMITH, C. J., and ALLEN and ANDREWS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Whitney v. State, 184 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…r discussed, and therefore, under the doctrine that even if the wrong reasons were given the right result is obtained, the order here under review should be affirmed. See: Savage v. State, Fla.App.1963, 156 So. 2d 566; Gaines v. State, Fla.App.1965, 172 So. 2d 887. Turning to reasons 1, 4 and 5, which were first raised in the petition, these are not appropriately the subject matter of a collateral attack. As to the first reason, lack of due process of law because of excessive publicity, see: Simpson v. Stat…
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Garland Leeds v. State, 187 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)…t insolvent. However, there is no allegation of insolvency at time of arraignment, and this makes the motion defective. Stacey v. State, Fla.App.1964, 165 So. 2d 222; Savage v. State, Fla.App.1963, 156 So. 2d 566; and Gaines v. State, Fla.App. 1965, 172 So. 2d 887. The usual procedure in this type case is to affirm, without prejudice to file a sufficient motion. Gaines v. State, supra; Armstrong v. State, Fla.App.1964, 165 So. 2d 233; and Turner v. State, Fla.App.1964, 161 So. 2d 11. Accordingly, the order i…
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Henzel v. State, 365 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Owens v. State, 354 So. 2d 118 (Fla 3d DCA 1978); Gaines v. State, 172 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Hendley v. State, 163 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); and Savage v. State, 156 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).…
Authorities Cited
- King v. State, 157 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Bell v. State, 161 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Dickens v. State, 165 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)