MCCREA
v.
UNITED STATES ET AL.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A merchant seaman sought reargument in a wage dispute, contending that the Supreme Court had misread the evidence regarding when he departed his vessel in London. The Court denied the reargument motion, affirming that the seaman's own testimony established he had abandoned the ship two days after arrival without informing the captain, which provided sufficient cause for the employer's failure to pay his wages.
© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner has moved for reargument of the question whether the failure to pay his wages was “ without sufficient cause,” on the ground that this Court “ misapprehended the facts shown by the record ” in accepting the finding of the district court that petitioner “ departed the ship without seeing the captain ” on the second day after her arrival at the port of London.
In support of this contention petitioner, for the first time, invites our attention to an excerpt from the vessel’s log, an exhibit in the case, which states that he was “aboard ship from 3:20 PM Feb. 29th to 9:00 AM March 1st, 1928 ” and that he was “ last . . . seen aboard ship at 9:00 AM March 1st, 1928'.” It is conceded that the vessel arrived in port on Sunday, February 26, 1928, and sailed the following Friday, March 2nd. As the year was a leap year, petitioner argues that he is thus shown to have been on board on the morning of the fourth calendar day after arrival; that, as the vessel sailed the following day, it may be inferred that he did not leave until the cargo was discharged; and that the failure to pay wages before his departure on March 1st was therefore without sufficient cause.
The details of petitioner’s leaving the vessel were not considered by the Circuit Court of Appeals, presumably because its decision was placed on other grounds. But in this Court respondent properly sought to sustain the. decision below on the ground that the failure to pay wages was not without sufficient cause. In its brief it specifically relied on the finding of the district court that petitioner had abandoned the vessel two days after arrival, and cited the record in support of the finding. Petitioner in this Court neither challenged the finding of the district court nor assailed the sufficiency of the evidence to support it, and we are now asked, for the first time, by a motion for reargument, to weigh the evidence.
The petitioner, in his testimony in his own behalf, both on direct and cross-examination, testified at four different points in the record that he abandoned the vessel on February 28th, which was on Tuesday, two days after arrival. He identified the day of abandonment by its date, as being on Tuesday, and as being the day after his visit to the Consul’s office, which was on Monday, February 27th. He was equally specific in his testimony that when he left the vessel he did not intend to return and did not in fact return. We accept his testimony as correct and as abundantly supporting the finding of the district court.
We also think, as the opinion indicates, that petitioner’s departure from the vessel, whenever it occurred, without informing the master whether he persisted in his demand, precludes the inference that, in the circumstances, the failure to pay wages was “ without sufficient cause.” The motion is
Denied.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
The Ernest H. Meyer. the Eureka. Broughton & Wiggins Nav. Co. v. Hammond Lumber Co., 84 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1936)…rationally may '.be drawn the particular inference embodied -in the finding, and to ignore any other -.rational inferences, then we must affirm. Since this is a possible interpretation of -the recent decision of the Supreme Court in McCrea v. U. S., 294 U.S. 382, 383, 55 S.Ct. 443, 79 L.Ed. 933, it is proper that we review the cases determining the character •of trials of fact in admiralty appeals. The last case considered by the Supreme Court which arose prior to the effective date of Rule 46% is Brooklyn…1 / 4
-
S. Cross S.S. Co., Inc. v. Georgios Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960)…od. It would seem that the shipowner has no cause to complain of this, and the seaman does not appeal from such action. The shipowner’s reliance is upon McCrea v. United States, 1935, 294 U.S. 23, 55 S.Ct. 291, 79 L.Ed. 735, reargument denied 1935, 294 U.S. 382, 55 S.Ct. 443, 79 L.Ed. 933. There, the libellant, a seaman on the S.S. American Shipper, demanded, when the ship was in a foreign port, that he be given his discharge and the wages due him. He cited to the master certain statutes dealing with the f…
-
Aro Equip. Corp. v. Herring-Wissler Co., 84 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1936)…ing the witnesses; from that, we make such disposition of the cause as accords with equity and good conscience.” And for a discussion of Equity Rule 46% in admiralty cases which is analogous to Rule 70% in equity cases, see McCrea v. United States, 294 U.S. 382, 383, 55 S.Ct. 443, 79 L.Ed. 933, and the very recent case in the Ninth Circuit, Broughton & Wiggins Navigation Co. v. Hammond Lumber Co. (C.C.A.) 84 F.(2d) 496, decided June 10, 1936. [*622] We are at liberty, therefore, to take up for consideratio…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence