GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM T. STROUD, APPELLEE
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Grange Mutual Casualty Company appealed a garnishment judgment entered against it as the insurer of a judgment debtor. The court held that an insurer becomes liable for garnishment immediately upon entry of a final judgment against the insured, regardless of whether an appeal of the original judgment is pending, and dismissed the insurer's appeal as frivolous.
An insurer becomes liable for garnishment immediately upon entry of a final judgment against the insured, regardless of whether an appeal of the original judgment is pending, as long as the judgment is not superseded by a supersedeas bond. The insurer's appeal from the garnishment judgment was frivolous and is dismissed.
“It is well settled in Florida that a plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against a defendant may proceed in garnishment against the defendant's insurer immediately upon the entry of a final judgment by the trial court, regardless of whether an appeal is taken, where the judgment is not superseded.”
Establishes the core legal principle that garnishment may proceed despite pending appeals when no supersedeas bond exists.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA plaintiff obtained a judgment against a defendant who appealed without posting a supersedeas bond. While the original appeal was pending, the plaint…
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The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant who appealed without superseding the judgment. While the appeal was pending the plaintiff filed a writ of garnishment against the defendant’s insurer. The insurer filed an answer admitting liability to the defendant by virtue of an insurance policy, and also moved to quash the writ of garnishment on the grounds that it was premature because the appeal of the original judgment was still pending. The lower court granted a summary judgment in favor *172of the plaintiff in the garnishment proceedings and the insurer has appealed the garnishment judgment. Thus, at this time there are two appeals pending, one from the original judgment and one from the garnishment proceedings. The plaintiff-appellee has now moved to quash the appeal from the garnishment proceedings on the ground that it is frivolous and taken only for purposes of delay.
It is well settled in Florida that a plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against a defendant may proceed in garnishment against the defendant’s insurer immediately upon the entry of a final judgment by the trial court, regardless of whether an appeal is taken, where the judgment is not superseded. This doctrine is a construction of the standard type of no-action clause found in most policies, including the cases cited below, which provides:
“No action shall be filed against the company * * * until the amount of the insured’s obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company.”
See General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Harris, Fla.App.1960, 117 So.2d 44; Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Company v. Wilson, Fla.App.1960, 118 So.2d 230; and Travelers Insurance Co. v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., Fla.App.1960, 120 So.2d 448.
In Conley v. Singleton, Fla.App.1965, 171 So.2d 65, the first district granted a motion to quash and dismissed the appeal in a case which is on all fours with the case on review.
The garnishee-insurer contends, in opposing the motion to quash, that although no supersedeas bond was filed in the original action, there has been a supersedeas bond filed in the garnishment proceedings. Whether the garnishment has been superseded is irrelevant, the question being whether the appeal from the garnishment is frivolous. The law, as stated above, is that the insurer becomes liable when judgment is entered in the lower court, regardless of whether an appeal is taken, if the judgment is not superseded. In its answer to the writ of garnishment the insurer admits the liability under the policy and its only opposing argument is that the appeal in the original case has not been decided. It is not contended that the policy is invalid or that the particular situation is not covered by the policy. Since the insurer’s only opposing argument is without merit, and since it admits liability on the policy, the motion to quash is well-founded. The motion to quash is granted and the appeal is hereby dismissed.
SMITH, C. J., and WHITE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…federal district court permits him to seek mandamus or garnishment to collect against the Fund. See Hattaway, 859 F.Supp. at 564-566; see also Pippin v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 845 F.Supp. 849, 851 (M.D.Fla. 1994); Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Stroud, 173 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). However, either remedy is subject, in the context of a Coblentz agreement, to the requirements set forth in Ahem, 788 So. 2d at 371-372, and Steil, 448 So. 2d at 591-592. The trial court did not reach these issues, and this…
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Fitzgerald v. Addison, 287 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)…y the judgment before the appeal has been concluded. Absent supersedeas, a successful plaintiff can garnish a defendant’s insurer even though the insurer was not originally a party to the suit. Grange Mutual Casualty Company v. Stroud, Fla.App.1965, 173 So. 2d 171. If the judgment is reversed, the judgment debtor must seek restitution for his prior payment. Hazen v. Smith, 1931, 101 Fla. 767, 135 So. 813. [*153] The purpose of an order relating to supersedeas is simply to specify an amount in which a bond may…
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Fla. Steel Corp. v. A. G. Spanos Enters., Inc., 332 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…he instant case. On the other hand, there are several Florida cases involving garnishments against liability insurance carriers which suggest that our state has accepted the minority view. Grange Mutual Casualty Company v. Stroud, Fla.App.2d, 1965, 173 So. 2d 171; Conley v. Singleton, Fla.App.1st, 1965, 171 So. 2d 65; American Southern Insurance Co. v. Driscoll, Fla.App.1st, 1960, 125 So. 2d 105. In Grange Mutual [*665] Casualty Company v. Stroud, supra, this court said: “It is well settled in Florida that…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Harris, 117 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., Inc., 120 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 118 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Conley v. Getchrill Singleton, 171 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)