VIOLET TRAPPING CO., INC.
v.
GRACE, REGISTER STATE LAND OFFICE, ET AL.
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Violet Trapping Company, a sub-lessee of Louisiana state lands, challenged a 1934 state statute that allowed the original owner to redeem the lands on more favorable installment-based terms, arguing the law impaired its lease contract and violated due process and equal protection rights. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against the company, holding that the original lease clause permitting redemption was unambiguous and not limited as to redemption conditions, and that the due process and equal protection claims lacked merit.
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Per Curiam.
Appellant is a sub-lessee of lands leased by the State of Louisiana in 1924 to the Terre aux Boeufs Drainage District. The lands had become the property of the State by an adjudication for unpaid taxes of 1911 to 1923. The lease by the State contained a clause that the lease would, end in case the lands were redeemed by the former owner or sold by the State. At the time the lease and sub-lease were made, the lands could be redeemed only by payment of all taxes, penalties and interest due at the date of redemption. By á subsequent statute, Act No. 161 of 1934, the. legislature of Louisiana permitted redemption on different and less onerous terms, that is, by the payment, on ah installment basis, of the actual taxes for which the property had been adjudicated to the State. Under that statute, certificates for the redemption of the lands in question were issued by the Register of the State Land Office. Appellant then sought mandamus to compel the cancellation of the certificates, upon the ground that the Act of 1934 violated the Constitution of the United States in that the act impaired the obligation of appellant’s contract of lease, deprived appellant of its property without due process of law, and denied to appellant the equal protection of the laws. Judgment against the appellant was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. That court decided that there was no impairment of the contract as the clause in the original lease, making it subject to redemption, was “free of ambiguity and without limitation as'to the conditions under'which the properties embraced in the lease might be redeemed or sold, or the price to be paid therefor.” State ex rel. Violet Trapping Co. v. Grace, 182 La. 405; 162 So. 26.
While this Court, when the contract clause of the Federal Constitution is invoked, may determine for itself the meaning and effect of the contract (Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U. S. 429, 433; United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 293 U. S. 232, 236), we find no reason for disagreeing with the conclusion reached by the state court. The questions sought to be raised under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment áre without merit. Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36, 41; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 357; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 396. The judgment is
Affirmed.
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Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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State v. Draughon, 127 Fla. 528 (Fla. 1937)…make the involved contract right inherent therein of value to the grantee as part of his enjoyment of it. Worthen v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 55 Sup. Ct. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1298, 97 A. L. R. 906. Compare: Violet Trapping Co. v. Grace, 297, U. S. 119, 56 Sup. Ct. 386, 80 L. Ed. 518; Ingraham v. Hanson, 197 U. S. 378, 56 Sup. Ct. 511, 80 L. Ed. 728. The purpose of the eight per cent, flat exaction which is imposed upon the delinquent land owner by Section 1002 C. G. L., 778 R. G. S., only if his application for…
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N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of N.Y., 303 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1938)…he existence and meaning of the contract as well as the relation of the parties and the circumstances of its execution. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U. S. 364, 379-380; Funkhouser v. Preston Co., 290 U. S. 163, 167; Violet Trapping Co. v. Grace, 297 U. S. 119, 120. But of course in so doing we “lean toward agreement with the courts of the state, and accept their judgments as to such matters unless manifestly wrong,” Hale v. State Board, 302 U. S. 95, 101; Tampa Water Works Co. v. Tampa, 199 U. S. 241, 24…
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Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment & Review, 302 U.S. 95 (U.S. 1937)…eston Co., 290 U. S. 163, 167. Even so, we lean toward agreement with the courts of the state, and accept their judgment as to such matters unless manifestly wrong. Phelps v. Board of Education, 300 U. S. 319, 322, 323; Violet Trapping Co. v. Grace, 297 U. S. 119, 120; Tampa Water Works Co. v. Tampa, 199 U. S. 241, 243, 244; Dodge v. Board of Education, supra. For reasons to be developed, obvious error is not discernible in the ruling of the highest court of Iowa that the statutory exemptions invoked by the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342 (U.S. 1916)
- Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (U.S. 1932)
- Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36 (U.S. 1907)
- Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429 (U.S. 1929)
- United States Mortg. Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232 (U.S. 1934)