JOHN T. OKSTEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John Oksten was acquitted of first-degree murder by reason of insanity and committed to a state hospital. After less than one year in maximum security, the hospital recommended his release, but the trial judge found him still manifestly dangerous to the public and denied his discharge motion. The appellate court affirmed, finding substantial competent evidence supported the judge's dangerousness determination.
The trial judge's finding that Oksten was still manifestly dangerous to the public is supported by substantial competent evidence and therefore the commitment order must be affirmed. The conflicting psychiatric testimony regarding his danger to the public, with two psychiatrists testifying he would likely react violently in similar circumstances, constituted sufficient evidence to support the dangerousness finding.
“The find [*490] ing of the trial judge that the appellant is still manifestly dangerous is supported by substantial competent evidence, and therefore must be affirmed.”
The court's holding affirming the lower court's determination that Oksten remained dangerous despite conflicting psychiatric testimony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOksten was tried for first-degree murder and acquitted by reason of insanity under Florida law, then committed to the South Florida State Hospital as …
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The appellant was tried for first degree murder and, having been acquitted by reason of insanity, was committed to the South Florida State Hospital under Fla.Stat. Sec. 919.11, F.S.A., as being manifestly dangerous to the public. After the appellant had been in the maximum security section of the hospital for slightly less than one year, the hospital disposition board advised the appellant’s attorney that they thought the appellant was “non-psychotic and should be returned to court for final disposition.” A motion for final discharge was filed, and a hearing was held at which five psychiatrists testified as to whether the appellant should be released, the trial judge concluding that the appellant is still manifestly dangerous to the public and should remain in confinement.
The psychiatrists, all of whom examined the appellant, agreed that the appellant could not receive any personal benefit from remaining in the maximum security section of the hospital. They all further agreed that the appellant was suffering from a “socio-pathic personality disturbance, antisocial reaction,” and, from the standpoint of what would be best for the appellant, they thought that he could benefit the most by receiving psychiatric treatment as an out-patient.
Two of the psychiatrists testified, however, that there had been no improvement in his condition, that if he were confronted with a similar situation he would be likely to again react in the same violent manner which resulted in the crime for which he was tried, and that he should not be released from the hospital. The other three psychiatrists thought that the appellant should be released to the care of his parents, who also testified.
One of the psychiatrists testified that if the appellant remained in the hospital it would be beneficial to him to not be confined in the maximum security section, however, this point was not pursued at the hearing or raised on appeal.
The evidence in this case was conflicting, presenting a close question, and we have studied the testimony extensively. The find*490ing of the trial judge that the appellant is still manifestly dangerous is supported by substantial competent evidence, and therefore must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
WHITE and ANDREWS, JJ., concur.
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Powell v. Genung, 306 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1974)…Petitioner in the trial court if there was none prior to the amendment. The trial court was bound to follow the law as it existed at the time of Petitioner’s committal for treatment. Respondents rely alternatively on Oksten v. State, Fla.App.1965, 173 So. 2d 489, and State v. Eaton, Fla.App.1964, 161 So. 2d 549, as authority for continuing jurisdiction over Petitioner prior to amendment of the Rule. In both cases cited, the Second District Court held that where petitioners were committed under Section 919.1…1 / 2
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In re Connors, 332 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1976)…is state to allow continuing jurisdiction over petitioner in the trial court to determine by subsequent hearing and order whether defendant was still manifestly dangerous to the public. State v. Eaton, 161 So. 2d 549 (Fla.App.1964), Oksten v. State, 173 So. 2d 489 (Fla.App.1965), cert. den. 177 So. 2d 11 (Fla.1965), U.S. cert. den. 382 U.S. 867, 86 S.Ct. 138, 15 L.Ed.2d 105.” The instant cause is controlled by our decision in Powell v. Genung, supra.2 The material questions of law argued, sub ju-dice, were d…
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Oksten v. State, 177 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1965)…Certiorari denied without opinion. 173 So. 2d 489.…
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