BINGHAM, PLAINTIFF IN ERR. VERSUS CABBOT ET AL.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Bingham brought suit against Cabot and others to recover the proceeds of captured cargo that Bingham held as an alleged agent, and the trial court ruled against Bingham, excluding certain evidence including letters, a governor's certificate, and Congressional resolutions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, finding that Bingham was entitled to present evidence of his status as a public agent of Congress rather than as agent for the captors, though the Justices were divided on whether to award a new trial. The decision established principles regarding the admissibility of official documents and Congressional resolutions as evidence, and the distinction between admiralty jurisdiction and common law jurisdiction over prize-related disputes.
© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
[By the Court. It is exceedingly clear, that the bill of exceptions is conclusive upon this Court. We cannot presume, or suspect, that any material part of the evidence is omitted. On this objection, therefore, nothing now need be added*.]
2. It is objected, that the papers from the office of the Secretary of State, were not proper evidence ; and that though some were good, they could not be received, as the whole were offered en masse. The Act of Congress however, (15th Sept. 1789) makes copies under the official seal of the Secretary as valid in proof as the originals ; and it is no reason for rejecting the papers, when offered by the Defendant, that they, or a part of them, had been previously given in evidence by the Plaintiffs. The Court, too, might have separated those that were evidence from the rest. As to the contents of the papers : The letters of Mr. Bingham were material to shew that he acted as the public Agent of Congress ; that, as such, he had taken depositions and transmitted the ship’s papers, and that, he had accounted to Congress for the property. The correspondence with his counsel, shews, that his effects had been attached on account of this demand ; and, under particular circumstances, the party’s own acts are, evidence in his favour. 12 Vin. Abr. 54. p. 34, 35. 2 Eq. Abr. 409. The Marquis de Bouille’s order, given in evidence by the Plaintiffs, was only a translation, while the French original, offered by the Defendant, was rejected. The certificate of a Chief Executive Magistrate, is good evidence without an oath. 3 Bl. Com. 333. The certificate would prove, that the cause was entirely of Admiralty jurisdiction ; and whether the certificate was ex posi facto, or not, the Jury ought to decide. The 17th article of the French Treaty relates to captures from Enemies ; but this was a capture from a Neutral; so the Governor had a right to interfere. The Resolutions of Congress are stated in the Bill of Exceptions to be concerning the subject matter of the cause ; and it must be presumed that the Resolutions were sufficiently proved. The Record of Carlton versus Bingham, (when Carlton sued as Bailiff to the owners) ought certainly to have been admitted in mitigation of damages, as it shews that Mr. Bingham could not have paid the money with safety to the present claimants, till the question of prize was determined. 4 Co. 94. b.
The Judges, after some advisement, delivered their opinions, seriatim.
Patterson, Justice.
I am clearly of opinion, that the certificate of the Marquis de Bouille, registered in the Admiralty of Martinique, ought to have been admitted as evidence upon the trial of this cause. He was Governor of the Island, possessing a high executive and superintending controul ; and we must presume, that he acted, on this occasion, with legitimate authority.
Those letters which were written to Congress by Mr. Bingham, at the time of the transaction, should, likewise, in my opinion, have been submitted to the Jury. On the arrival of the captured vessel, the Governor might have awarded absolute restitution: but, chusing to adopt a middle course, he directed the cargo to be sold, and the proceeds to remain in the hands of Mr. Bingham, as the Agent of Congress, till Congress should instruct him how to act. In the character of a public agent, therefore, Mr. Bingham received the property; and his cotemporaneous correspondence on the subject, in that character, with the American government, was, certainly, proper evidence, to shew the original nature, and complexion of the facts in controversy. I have more doubts on the admissibility of the other letters referred to in the Bill of Exceptions ; but, in relation to them, it is unnecessary to give a decided opinion.
With respect to the Resolutions of Congress, two questions may be proposed, in order to determine, whether they ought to have been admitted as evidence : I. Had Congress authority to pass such Resolutions ? and 2. Did the Resolutions relate to the subject of the controversy ? I have lately had occasion, in the case of Doane versus Penhallow*, to express my sentiments at large on the authority of Congress (of which, in its application to the present object, I do not entertain the slightest doubt) And no man of common candour can hesitate, for a moment, to pronounce, that the Resolutions have an immediate and necessary connection with the merits of the cause. They ought, then, to have been admitted ; but what should be their force and operation, is another point, not, at present, before the Court.
I am, also, of opinion, that it was improper to reject the Depositions, which Mr. Bingham had taken, in his public, official, character, to ascertain the circumtances of the capture, and the property of the vessel and cargo, at the time the supposed prize was carried into Martinique.
IREDELL, Justice.
It appears satisfactorily to me, that many of the documents offered in evidence, have been improperly rejected. From an inspection of all the papers, which are attached to the Record, the nature of the dispute may be easily ascertained. The Plaintiffs alledge that Mr. Bingham received, on their account, as their agent, property which had been captured by them as prize ; and that, whether the capture was lawful, or not, he was bound to account to them, though they might be responsible to the original owners, if any wrong had been committed. To this charge, Mr. Binghatn answers, that he never was the Agent of the Plaintiffs, but a Public Agent ; and that he did not receive the property from them on their account ; but from the Marquis de Bouille, on account of the true owners. Admitting either of these positions, a direct and certain consequence will insue. If the Plaintiffs are right, the consequence is, that Mr. Bingham ought to surrender the prize property, or account for its proceeds, to them; and though they, as captors, may be sued by the neutral claimants, the existence of a neutral claim will not justify his refusal so to surrender, or account.. But, if the Defendant is right, the consequence is, that he ought not to deliver up the property to the Plaintiffs until it has been ascertained that the capture was lawful, which must be done through the medium of a Prize Court, not by a Judgment in a Court of common law. From this view of the controversy, therefore, it must be of great moment that Mr. Bingham should have an opportunity to shew, that he had acted, throughout the business, as the Public Agent of the United States; and that his communications to Congress were open, fair, and faithful. If, indeed, he had given parol testimony on these points, his opponents might have called for the records of the appointment and correspondence, as affording higher proof. I am, therefore, of opinion, that Mr. Bingham’s official letters, (some of which were written before any dispute existed, or could reasonably be anticipated) ought not to have been rejected.
The Resolutions of Congress, likewise, were proper evidence ;-not, indeed, to prove, that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the money in question, but to prove that the Defendant was recognized in the transaction as the Agent of Congress. The Resolutions are not to be considered as the mere expression of a Congressionail opinion, but as an acknowledgment that Mr. Bingham was a public agent, and that the public, as his principal, was accountable for the money.
The certificate of the Marquis de Bouille, whether regarded as an original order, or as the evidence of a parol order, previously given, ought to have been laid before the jury. The Marquis acted officially, as Governor and Commander in Chief; and we must presume, that he exercised a lawful authority, in a lawful manner. Under these circumstances it only remains to consider, what course should be "pursued by the Court, in order to give the Defendant the benefit of a trial, upon a full view of his legal proofs. I think, for that purpose, that a Venire Facias de novo ought to issue. For, although a Court of common law has no jurisdiction of the question of prize ; yet, whether it is necessary in the present case to determine that question, must depend upon the facts, which are established at the trial. On a Count for money had and received, &c. the Court below has, prima facie, jurisdiction; and if the jury shall think Mr. Bingham was merely the agent of the Plaintiffs, the validity of the capture, as prize, can form no ingredient in deciding the issue. If, on the contrary, the jury shall think Mr. Bingham acted as a public agent, their verdict must be in his favour; as he was bound to keep the property for the real owners ; and the captors can never shew that they are the real owners, until the vessel and cargo have been condemned as prize, by a competent tribunal. The captors may then proceed against Mr. Bingham in a Court of Admiralty, whose decree of condemnation, operating against all the world, would entitle the captors to receive the money, and justify Mr. Bingham, or Congress, in paying it.
Wilson, Justice.
In several instances, I concur in the sentiments, that have been delivered by the Judges, who have preceded me ; but, I think, it is unnecessary to specify the particulars or to amplify the reasons, since I continue clearly in my opinion on the point, which was separately argued, that this cause is exclusively of Admiralty jurisdiction. On that ground I chuse entirely to rest the judgment that I give : but it leads inevitably, also, to another conclusion, that, the Court not having jurisdiction, a Venire Facias de novo (which, in effect, directs the exercise of jurisdiction) ought not to issue. I am, therefore, for pronouncing, simply, a judgment of reversal.
Paterson, Justice.
I cannot agree to send a Venire Facias de novo to a Court, which, in my opinion, has no jurisdiction to try, or to decide, the cause.
Cushing, Justice.
I shall give no opinion upon the question of affirming, or reversing, the Judgment of the Court below. My brethren think there is error in the proceedings; and they are right to rectify it. On the question, however, of awarding a Venire Facias de novo, I agree with Judge Iredell : But, as the Court are equally divided, the Writ cannot, issue.
Judgment reversed ; but no writ of Venire Facias de novo was awarded.
*
jtatterson, JuJiice, Does not'the Aibfcquent approbation of Con-gr.efs amount to the lame-thing as if they had iifued a precedent order ? . Dexter. In fome cafes that principle operates. But Congrefs had not competent authority to protect Mr. Bingham in the prefent inftance, either by ifiulng a previous order, or by expreifing a iubfequent approbation. If an aft, originally wrong, gave a party the.right to recover damages., uo refolution of Congrefs could, retrbfpeftivclyy afí'eft that right.
*
Cushing, Jrf'cs, did not feem to coincide in this opinion, but the other three Judges were decided.
*
See the Cafe referred tó, po/l. I have not thought it material to preferve the'ordcr of time, in which the Cafes occurred, any'further than by deiignating the-refpeiftive Terms,
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (U.S. 1895)…ufficient, that the court might char’ge the jury to find for the defendant; because, though the jury will generally respect the sentiments of the court on points of law, they are not bound to deliver a verdict conformably to them.” Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. 19, 33 [see Appendix]. Mr. Justice Wilson, in his lectures on law at the Philadelphia [*159] College in 1790 and 1791, discussing the maxim that the judges determine the law and the jury determine the fact, made the following observations: “ This wel…
-
Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 634 (U.S. 1833)
-
United States v. McCOY, 193 U.S. 593 (U.S. 1904)
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence