BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO. ET AL.
v.
UNITED STATES ET AL.

U.S. | 1938-04-25
No. 638
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Cardozo. took so part in the consideration or decision of this cause.
304 U.S. 58 Supreme Court of the United States (1938) Caution
Also reported at: 82 L. Ed. 1148 · 58 S. Ct. 767 · SCDB 1937-061 · 1938 U.S. LEXIS 1089
Cited by 11 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Nineteen railroads challenged two Interstate Commerce Commission orders that established maximum reasonable rates for coke moving into Central Territory from southern points, arguing the orders lacked proper notice and hearing and were unsupported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal, holding that the railroads' jurisdictional challenge rested on an incorrect construction of the order and that the Commission's findings were adequately supported by the record.


© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice McReynolds

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellants, nineteen railroads operating within what is known as Central Territory — Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan — by their bill filed iii the District Court, Northern District of Illinois, July 22,1936, challenged the validity of two Interstate Commerce Commission orders affecting the rate structure on coke moving into that territory from southern points. Questions in respect of these rates have often been before the Commission. The court made findings of fact upon the evidence and dismissed the bill without opinion.

The first challenged order, dated March 11, 1935, followed an earlier suspension of certain proposed schedules and an investigation. It cancelled these schedules and determined what thereafter would be maximum reasonable rates upon a mileage basis. Subsequently, the proceedings having been reopened, this order was modified and reaffirmed. In the circumstances, we think the court below properly declined to pass upon its validity.

The second challenged order, April 30, 1936, followed one entered April 15, 1936, which upon petition and replies reopened the proceedings for reconsideration on the record as it then stood. The later order affirmed former findings that the schedules suspended by the one of March 11, 1935, had not been justified, and prescribed future maximum rates upon a mileage basis. These were lower (some ten per cent.) than those authorized prior to 1935.

Here, counsel specially insist this second order exceeded the jurisdiction of the Commission since it undertook to determine rates concerning which there 'had been, no proper notice or opportunity for hearing. But this contention rests upon an assumed construction of the order not obviously correct. The Commission has not so construed it, nor has that body been asked so to do, or for any further action in respect of it. Another construction brings the-order clearly within the jurisdiction assumed by the Commission. In the circumstances appellants canno.t prevail on this point.

Appellants further urge that the order is -contrary to the weight of the evidence, not supported by substantial evidence, disregards ordinary standards for determining reasonableness of rates, is not supported by necessary findings, and represents a mere attempt to equalize geographical and transportation disadvantages, fortune and opportunities. The findings by the court below we think are adequately supported by the record. They negative these claims and leave no sufficient basis for our interference with the action there taken.

The challenged judgment must be

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Cardozo. took so part in the consideration or decision of this cause.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Vocelle, 159 Fla. 88 (Fla. 1947)
    …then these statutory rules, regulations, terms and conditions become binding obligations between the State and the licensee upon the acceptance of a license and under which the licensee engages in the sale of whiskey. Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 58 S. [*93] Ct. 952, 82 L. Ed. 1424; Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U.S. 226, 56 S.Ct. 754, 80 L.Ed. 1155; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205; State ex rel. First Presbyterian Church v. Fuller, 133 Fla. 554, 182 So. 888…
  • United States v. Cohen, 419 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1969)
  • Stephenson v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co. (two cases), 110 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1940)

Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw