ANNE TURNER, APPELLANT,
v.
PAUL TURNER, APPELLEE
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In a divorce action between spouses operating tie stores through separate corporations, the trial court ordered transfer of inventory between the two corporate entities. The appellate court reversed, holding that the court lacked authority to order such transfers when the corporations were not parties to the litigation and had not been served with process.
The court held that such an order was improper. A corporation is a legal person entitled to due process protection, and a court cannot enter an order affecting a corporation's property rights when the corporation is not a party to the action and has not been served with process, even if its principal stockholder is a party to the litigation.
“a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth. Amendment of the federal constitution, at least insofar as property rights are concerned”
Establishes the constitutional protection of corporations' property rights and the requirement for due process
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnne and Paul Turner were parties to a divorce action. The parties operated various tie stores in Dade County, Florida through separate corporations t…
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This is an interlocutory appeal by appellant, plaintiff below, seeking to review an order of the trial court which granted the defendant’s motion to transfer inventory from a store which plaintiff was operating to one which defendant was operating. The parties will be referred to as in the trial court.
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking an absolute divorce from defendant on various grounds, and requested an adjudication of property rights between the parties. The defendant filed his answer denying the material allegations contained in the complaint, together with a counterclaim for divorce which sought a determination of the property rights of the parties and contained a prayer for the appointment of a receiver of certain businesses which the parties operated.-
The parties operated various tie stores in Dade County, Florida, and formed separate corporations which actually owned the assets located in the various stores.
A motion was made by the defendant in the trial court to add the corporations as party defendants in this cause, but there is nothing in the record showing that the corporations were ever added as party defendants or served with process.
The defendant subsequently filed a motion to transfer certain merchandise from one tie store in Miami Beach to another store in Miami. The court granted defendant’s motion to transfer the merchandise listed in an inventory, and plaintiff has properly appealed the order to this court.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court was in error in ordering the transfer of an inventory from one store to another, when the corporations which owned and operated the two separate tie stores were distinct legal entitles and were not parties to the litigation. We agree with this contention.
In Friedus v. Friedus, Fla.1956, 89 So. 2d 604, the trial court in a divorce case *48entered a money judgment against a corporation which was not a party to the action, on the ground that the corporation “was constructively a party to this suit, as its rights were fully represented by the defendant, its sole owner.”
The Supreme Court, in reversing, held that “a corporation is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth. Amendment of the federal constitution, at least insofar as property rights are concerned”, and that an ordinary money judgment could not be entered against a corporation not made a party to the cause nor served with process, simply because its principal stockholder was a party to the cause.
It is our opinion that the order requiring the transfer of inventory from one corporation to another, neither of which were parties to the cause or had been served with process, was improper.
The decision of the trial court is therefore
Reversed.
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Shelow v. Shelow, 550 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…, cert, denied, 364 So. 2d 887 (Fla.1978). A trial court may not adjudicate the rights of those not parties to the divorce action, see Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So. 2d 604 (Fla.1956); Cook v. Cook, 512 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Turner v. Turner, 175 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), or decree relief that has not been requested nor tried by consent. Miceli v. Gilmac Developers, Inc., 467 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Finally, the court erred in ordering that the husband’s parents be reimbursed for their $50…
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Browder v. State, 375 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…he individual who was protesting throughout the proceeding that he was not liable. This is probably additional fundamental error in this case. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County v. Feller, 219 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Turner v. Turner, 175 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Coral Realty Co. v. Peacock Holding Co., 103 Fla. 916, 138 So. 622 (1931). . We have not overlooked Escambia Mid-County Development Corporation v. State Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, 356 So. 2d 855 (Fl…
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Rosselle v. Rosselle, 366 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…zing the funds of Eva, Inc. Eva, Inc. was not a party to the present litigation and, therefore, the court lacked authorization and/or jurisdiction to freeze the corporation’s funds. See Friedus v. Friedus, 89 So. 2d 604 (Fla.1956); Turner v. Turner, 175 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). Accordingly, that provision (#8) of the final judgment resolving financial aspects of the marriage is hereby stricken and Rob [*1199] ert Rosselle’s motion for release of those funds is granted. Turning to Eva Rosselle’s cross-a…
Authorities Cited
- Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1956)