POWERS
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

U.S. | 1941-02-03
No. 486
312 U.S. 259 Supreme Court of the United States (1941) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 85 L. Ed. 817 · 61 S. Ct. 509 · SCDB 1940-116 · 1941 U.S. LEXIS 1269
Cited by 101 cases

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Synopsis

A taxpayer who purchased single-premium life insurance policies and irrevocably assigned them as gifts disputed the valuation method for gift-tax purposes, with the Commissioner arguing the value should be the cost of duplicating the policies rather than the cash-surrender value reported by the taxpayer. The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal of the Board of Tax Appeals, holding that the proper criterion for valuing gifts of insurance policies is a question of law that courts may review de novo, and that the Board's reliance on cash-surrender value was incorrect.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Douglas

Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is the same as that in Guggenheim v. Rasquin, ante, p.

254. Petitioner in November and December, 1935, purchased single-premium policies of insurance on her own life and late in December, 1935, irrevocably assigned them as gifts. The Commissioner determined a deficiency, claiming that the value of the policies for gift-tax purposes was the cost of duplicating them at the dates of the gifts, not the cash-surrender value as reported by petitioner. The Board of'.Tax Appeals held that the value of the gifts was their cash-surrender value. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 115 F. 2d 209. That judgment must be affirmed on the authority of Guggenheim v. Rasquin, supra, unless as claimed by petitioner the court below was precluded from substituting its judgment of value for that of the Board. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123, 131. But the question of what criterion should be. employed for determining the “value” of the gifts is a question of law. See Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S.

573.

Accordingly, the Circuit Court of Appeals was justified in reversing the decision of the Board as “not in accordance with law.” Int. Rev. Code 1939, § 1141 (c) (1); 53 Stat. 164.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By (27 total)

  • Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489 (U.S. 1943)
    …. 282, 294; Colorado National Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U. S. 23; Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 30S U. S. 252; Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 355; Helvering v. Kehoe, 309 U. S. 277; Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 212; Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 259; Wilmington Trust Co. v. Helvering, 316 U. S. 164, 168; Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner, ante, p. 256. Compare the foregoing with the eases cited supra note 8. See reports of congressional committees on the Revenue Act of 1926, cited supra…
  • United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (U.S. 1973)
    …reasonably values the “bundle of rights” that is transferred with the ownership of the mutual fund shares.9 For this argument, heavy reliance is placed on this Court’s decisions in Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U. S. 254 (1941); Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 259 (1941); United States v. Ryerson, 312 U. S. 260 (1941), which held that the cash-surrender value of a single-premium life insurance policy did not necessarily represent its only taxable value for federal gift tax purposes [*555].10 In Guggenheim,, t…
  • Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Buck, 120 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1941)
    …evidence, extrinsic to the instrument, which could lead to a different interpretation; at most, such evidence confirms our interpretation.4 Cf. Helvering v. Rankin, 1934, 295 U.S. 123, 131, 55 S.Ct. 732, 79 L.Ed. 1343; Powers v. Commissioner, 1941, 312 U.S. 259, 260, 61 S.Ct. 509, 85 L.Ed. -. The remaining issue is whether any part of the amount paid under the life insurance contract is taxable to respondent. The reasoning of Helvering v. Le Gierse, 1941, 61 S.Ct. 646, 85 L.Ed. -, construing the estate ta…

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