JAMES KELLY MCCOY, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; JAMES MILTON ANDERSON, APPELLANT, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE,

SMITH, Chief Judge.

The defendants in these consolidated appeals were jointly tried on an indictment charging first degree murder. They seek reversal of their convictions for second degree murder on the grounds that the trial court erred (1) in refusing to give the jury certain requested instructions chiefly on self-defense; (2) in admitting into evidence over objection certain incriminating statements; and (3) in refusing to declare a mistrial because members of the jury were afforded an opportunity of seeing the defendants handcuffed together in a courtroom corridor while proceeding to the courtroom on the third day of the trial. We find no error and affirm.

The defendants and others proceeded to a certain gasoline service station with the specific intent, plan and purpose of robbing the attendant. The defendant, McCoy, left the defendant, Anderson, and the others waiting in a car parked behind the service station. With a pistol in his pocket McCoy walked toward the station under some trees overhanging the edge of a road. Subsequent events were described as follows in a statement by McCoy which was admitted in evidence and is relied on as furnishing the1 basis for a claim of self-defense:

“As I came around the corner and into the driveway of the station, I saw the attendant in the center of the driveway and I knew that the robbery could *590not be committed in the open, so I asked the attendant where his payphone was at. I [sic He?] waited a minute and pointed ,to the far corner and said it is over there. At this time I saw' him trying to pull something from his right front pocket and he then grabbed his pants leg with his left hand and brought forth a gun in his right hand and in the moment of panic I ran at him and said drop the gun and at the same time was drawing my gun from my right rear pocket. The attendant fired one shot at me and I thought I was shot and I continued to run to his left, or toward the road and begin firing at him at point blank range. I emptied my gun and he staggered away from me toward 43rd St. but had not fallen and looked as if he was continuing to try and turn to bring his gun to bear in my direction. - I then ran behind him and back to the waiting car on 43rd St.”

A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to his theory of self-defense where evidence is introduced which supports that theory. See Motley v. State, Fla.1945, 155 Fla. 545, 20 So.2d 798; cf. Bagley v. State, Fla.App.1960, 119 So.2d 400. However, where there is no testimony as to self-defense (Daniels v. State, 1909, 57 Fla. 1, 48 So. 747; Cullaro v. State, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 40) or where the testimony relied on does not make out that defense (Stinson v. State, 1918, 76 Fla. 421, 80 So. 506) a-charge on the subject is not required.1 Instructions on the law of self-defense need' not be given, where, as here, the evidence-relied on discloses that the homicide charged was committed in the course of an-attempt to commit a robbery. See State v. Burnett, 1956, 365 Mo. 1060, 293 S.W.2d 335, 343,2 (Cert. denied, 1957, 352 U.S. 976, 77 S.Ct. 367, 1 L.Ed.2d 326); State v. Hamilton, 1935, 337 Mo. 460, 85 S.W.2d 35, 37;3 Spear v. State, 1931, 184 Ark. 1047, 44 S.W.2d 663, 669; 4 4 Warren on Homicide (Permanent Edition) § 338; 40 C.J.S. Flomicide § 119; cf. Stinson v. State, supra, 76 Fla. 421, 440-442, 80 So. 506, 512-513.5 *591Since McCoy did not surrender, flee or otherwise manifest to the deceased an intention of abandoning the attempted robbery, his secret intention to do so is immaterial. See State v. Hamilton, supra, and State v. Stinson, supra. See also Padgett v. State, 1898, 40 Fla. 451, 457, 24 So. 145, 147.6 For this and other reasons apparent on the face of the statement relied on by the appellants the court did not err in refusing to give the instructions requested on self-defense and related matters.

The defendants’ contention that McCoy’s foregoing statement was improperly admitted as evidence cannot be sustained. The trial court committed no error or abuse of discretion in excepting the state’s attorney from the operation of the rule excluding prospective witnesses from the courtroom.7 The defendants’ contention that a previous statement was obtained by improper means raised an issue of fact which was resolved against them on the basis of substantial competent evidence. The fact that McCoy was not expressly advised of his rights respecting consultation with an attorney and the fact that the statement was obtained dúring a period of confinement which preceded his appearance before a committing magistrate do not of themselves render the statement inadmissible. Young v. State, Fla. 1962, 140 So.2d 97; Young v. Wainwright, 5 Cir. 1964, 326 F.2d 255.8

The record indicates that members of the jury may have seen the defendants handcuffed together in a courtroom corridor while being escorted to the courtroom on the third day of the trial. The incident apparently was momentary and inadvertent. Furthermore, members of a jury know that bail is not obtainable as a matter of right in all capital cases 9 and that a sheriff has the right to handcuff persons in custody for murder while bringing them to and from a courtroom. Under the circumstances the trial judge did not abuse' his discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial. 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 132; 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 977. Compare dictum in Shultz v. State, 1938, 131 Fla. 757, 179 So. 764 (where it was alleged that the accused was brought into open court dressed in the garb of a convict and in chains and was required *592to plead to the information in the presence of the venire from which his jury was to be drawn).

Since the points raised by these appeals have been thoroughly and ably briefed by the parties, we dispense with oral argument even though requested by the appellants. Affirmed.

SHANNON and WHITE, JJ., concur.