BOSTON TOW BOAT CO.
v.
UNITED STATES ET AL.

U.S. | 1944-04-03
No. 385
321 U.S. 632 Supreme Court of the United States (1944) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 88 L. Ed. 975 · 64 S. Ct. 776 · 1944 U.S. LEXIS 1238 · SCDB 1943-070
Cited by 71 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Boston Tow Boat Company, which intervened in Interstate Commerce Commission proceedings against Cornell Steamboat Company, sought to appeal the Commission's decision holding that tugboats for hire were subject to ICC jurisdiction under Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Supreme Court dismissed Boston's appeal, holding that its interest in the litigation was insufficient to support an independent appeal, as Boston had no financial interest in Cornell, was not in direct competition with it, and could separately challenge its own status as a carrier in future proceedings.


© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Black

Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, Boston Tow Boat Company, was an intervenor in the proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission leading to the Commission’s decision against the Cornell Steamboat Company which we today have held was properly sustained by the District Court. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, post, p.

634. When Cornell attacked the Commission’s order in the District Court, Boston again intervened. 53 F. Supp.

349. Its petition for intervention, granted by the District Court, alleged that it operated tugboats in and about Boston harbor which rendered services somewhat similar to those rendered by Cornell in New York harbor; that Division 4 of the Commission had held it, Boston, covered by the Act; that it was aggrieved by the Commission’s decision against Cornell “insofar as said decision holds that towers for hire are carriers and subject to the terms and provisions of Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act”; and that it desired to participate in the District Court proceedings “solely for the purpose of asserting ... its said contentions regarding such jurisdictional issue.” Boston’s petition did not allege, and the record fails to show, that it had any financial interest in Cornell, or was engaged in competition with Cornell, or that its interests would be adversely affected by a decision against Cornell except insofar as that decision might establish a precedent holding tugboats subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act. Boston’s brief in this Court asserts that it has pending in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts a suit to enjoin and set aside the Commission’s order holding Boston covered by the Act. In its brief Boston expressly seeks to reserve the right to contend in the Massachusetts proceeding “that the facts underlying its own towing operations are such as to bring the question of its status outside the scope of that of a carrier.”

We are of opinion that Boston’s interest in the outcome of the Cornell litigation is insufficient to entitle it to take a separate appeal. See Judicial Code, §§ 210, 212, as amended, 28 U.

S. C. §§ 47a, 45a. Whether Boston had sufficient interest to intervene as of right before the Commission and in the District Court we need not decide, the issue here being only whether Boston has such an “independent right which is violated” by the decision against Cornell as will support an independent appeal. Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S. 249, 255. Clearly it has not. See Edward Hines Trustees v. United States, 263 U. S. 143; The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 266-269; Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, supra; Pittsburgh & West Virginia Ry. Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 479, 486-488; Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U. S. 113; cf. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 760; L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 U. S. 295.

Appeal dismissed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (18 total)

  • …should not be extended to produce such a result. This case illustrates the wisdom of the practice which permits parties to settle their own lawsuits without intervention by others interested only in precedents. Boston Tow Boat Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 632.…
    1 / 2
  • Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959)
    …r not in the absence of any objection by the government this intervention should have been denied, the fact that it was granted does not add anything fco the standing of the intervenors on this appeal, see Boston Tow Boat Co. v. United States, 1944, 321 U.S. 632, 64 S.Ct. 776, 88 L.Ed. 975; Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 1930, 281 U.S. 249, 255, 50 S.Ct. 315, 74 L.Ed. 832, and I would consequently dismiss their appeal for want of standing. Since the court has decided the merits of the appe…
  • …the sum of rights possessed by an intervenor, even if granted unconditional intervention, is not necessarily equivalent to that of a party in a case and depends upon the nature of the intervenor’s interest. See Boston Tow Boat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 632, 64 S.Ct. 776, 88 L.Ed. 975 (1944); Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Association, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., supra, 573 F. 2d at 964; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, 556 F. 2d at 173; s…

Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw