GLENWOOD FREDERICK PERRY, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1965-06-29
No. 64-935
Before CARROLL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.
177 So. 2d 892 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1965) Positive Treatment
Cited by 22 cases

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Synopsis

Perry was convicted of assault with intent to commit robbery as an aider and abettor to his co-defendant Elliott's assault on a store clerk during an attempted robbery. The court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that Perry's presence and failure to prevent or report the crime constituted aiding and abetting.


Holding

The court affirmed Perry's conviction, holding that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of Perry for aiding and abetting Elliott in the assault with intent to commit robbery. The trial court properly determined that the facts were not consistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.


Key Quotes

“Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted and punished as such, whether he is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense.”

Definition of principal in the first degree under Florida Statutes Section 776.011, establishing that aiding and abetting constitutes criminal responsibility

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Facts & Procedural History

Perry, a Jacksonville resident visiting his sister in Miami for two days, entered a dress shop alone. While Perry was in the back of the store with a …

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Opinion of the Court
SWANN, Judge.

SWANN, Judge.

The appellant was the defendant below and, together with a co-defendant, Elliott, was charged with assault with intent to commit robbery. Both defendants entered pleas of not guilty and waived trial by jury. The appellant was adjudged guilty and sentenced to three years in the State Penitentiary.

Appellant seeks to reverse his conviction of assault with intent to commit robbery on the grounds that the State failed to establish a prima facie case; that he was not a criminal participant in an assault committed by the co-defendant, Elliott, and that the assault was not committed with intent to commit robbery.

The facts are these. The appellant, a resident of Jacksonville, had only been in Miami two days to visit with his sister, and admitted that he did not know anyone else in Miami other than the co-defendant, Elliott. Appellant entered a woman’s dress shop in Miami, alone, allegedly to purchase a skirt for his wife. Upon being told they did not have a size eight as he requested, he asked for a size ten, and the female clerk, who was the only attendant, took him to the back of the store to look at the skirts.

*893While they were there, the clerk heard the cash register ring. She ran to the front of the store and saw the co-defendant, Elliott, leaning around the desk and reaching for the cash drawer. The cash register was equipped with a bell that would ring when the drawer was pulled out and it ordinarily did not go off by itself.

The co-defendant, Elliott, struck the clerk on the jaw, knocked her to the floor, started beating her, and then yelled “Go for the door” twice. The clerk pretended to faint and the co-defendant, Elliott, seized her by the throat and started choking her. During this period of time, appellant came to the front of the store and watched the fight, but did nothing to assist either person and did not leave or attempt to summon assistance.

The parties were on the floor for approximately one minute and a half until an officer from the Miami Police Department came by and saw Elliott choking the clerk. He drew his gun, whereupon Elliott released the clerk who then advised the officer that Elliott and the appellant had attempted to rob her. He thereupon placed them under arrest and the trial followed.

It is apparent that the only theory upon which the appellant could be criminally responsible is that he was a principal who “aided and abetted” the co-defendant, Elliott, in the assault on the clerk with the intent to commit robbery. Section 776.011, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., defines a principal in the first degree as follows:

“Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted and punished as such, whether he is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense.”

The trier of facts could have, and did, in our opinion, properly determine that these facts were not consistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence and that the circumstantial evidence in this case was sufficient to support the conviction of the appellant for aiding and abetting the co-defendant, Elliott, in the assault with intent to commit robbery.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is

Affirmed.

CARROLL, J., dissents.


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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Ruiz v. State, 378 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    ….Ed.2d 91 (1976). We disagree with the contention that the circumstantial evidence against Ruiz was insufficient to justify a conviction for the crime with which he was charged. See Rosson v. State, 319 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Perry v. State, 177 So. 2d 892 [*103] (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). A new trial is therefore required.2 Reversed and remanded. . This view is vastly strengthened by the opinions expressed both by the prosecutor himself and by the trial judge at the very time that the remark was made. Aft…
  • Braxton v. State, 215 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
    …ach count. We have examined his contentions in the light of the evidence in the record and the controlling principles of law and have con-eluded that they are without merit. Luke v. State, Fla.App.1967, 204 So. 2d 359; Perry v. State, Fla.App.1965, 177 So. 2d 892; Bass v. State, Fla.App.1965, 172 So. 2d 614; and Crum v. State, Fla.App.1965, 172 So. 2d 24. Affirmed.…
  • Clinton v. State, 389 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …PER CURIAM. The judgments under review are affirmed on the authority of Rosson v. State, 319 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Groneau v. State, 201 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), cert. denied, 207 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1967), and Perry v. State, 177 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), without prejudice to a motion under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 to correct the sentences so as to give the defendant credit for time served under an earlier probation.1 Affirmed. . We take this course because the record now before…

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