CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
HYMAN KIRSNER AND IDA KIRSNER, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the city's use of parkland for a dump violated a deed restriction and that the injunction was proper.
Property owners sued the city to enjoin its use of a parkway area for a dump, alleging it violated a deed restriction and caused odors and vermin. The…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Injunction cases and more on FLexlaw
The appellant, the city of Miami Beach, who was the defendant below, has appealed from an adverse final decree. At suit of property owners residing on Star Island, a part of Miami Beach located in Biscayne Bay, the city was enjoined to discontinue its designated 100 x 100 foot dump area located in and on a 1,700 x 100 foot central parkway area on the island, previously acquired by the city by a deed containing a restriction against its use for other than park purposes. The decree also directed removal of a hedge surrounding the dump area and that such area be landscaped in conformity to the remaining park area.
It was alleged and shown that although intended for dumping the trim (grass and shrubs) of Star Island residents, the dump *66area was so used by residents of other connected islands and included unsightly debris. There were allegations of resultant odors and attracted vermin. The chancellor held the allegations of the complaint were established and that plaintiffs were entitled to the relief sought; and that the' restriction against use other than as a park was binding and the city’s use of the dump area thereon was in violation of the restriction.
We have considered the several contentions presented by the appellant, including the argument that the decree was too broad, and we find them to be without merit. The record discloses sufficient evidentiary support for the findings and conclusions of the chancellor.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
White v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 563 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…that the property be used for “park purposes”); City of Wilmington v. Lord, 378 A. 2d 635 (Del.1977) (construction of water tower in park violated deed restriction, limiting use of property to “public park purposes”); City of Miami Beach v. Kirsner, 178 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920, 87 S.Ct. 231, 17 L.Ed.2d 144 (1966) (city’s use of part of park for a dump violated deed restricting use of area for park purposes); Village of Crotonon-Hudson v. County of Westchester, 30 N.Y.2d 959,…
-
City OF Miami Beach v. Kline, 189 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…the reversal of paragraph 3(c) which directs the landscaping of the area “in conformity with the rest of the landscaping along the golf course.” We have considered the applicability of the decision in City of Miami Beach v. Kirsner, Fla.App. 1965, 178 So. 2d 65. The trim dump in the Kirsner case was located on a central parkway in the street and was used by residents of other islands for depositing unsightly debris. In the case sub judice, the City deposits trim on a corner of the City golf course for a pe…