SHIRLEY MILLER, TRUSTEE, APPELLANT,
v.
TOWNHOUSE DEVELOPMENT CORP., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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The court held that a party with privity of title to property subject to a replevin action should be allowed to intervene as a defendant.
A plaintiff brought a replevin action against multiple defendants for air-conditioning systems. An appellant, claiming ownership and mortgage interest…
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Appellant, by petition, sought to intervene as a defendant in an action of replevin and this is an appeal from the order denying the petition. We find error and reverse.
*731This replevin action, without writ, was brought by Geiger Distributors, Inc., against seventeen (17) defendants concerning twenty-two (22) central air-conditioning systems. The purchase price was $17,552.00 on which there remains a balance of $5,93.8.00. The balance due on each of the separate systems is not stated. The complaint alleges that the '“defendants wrongfully detained from the plaintiff” the twenty-two systems and that the plaintiff has made demand on the defendant Townhouse Development Corp. for the return of the property.
The appellant-petitioner states in her petition to intervene that she is the owner in fee simple of one house in which is located one of the systems and that she has mortgages on the other properties in which the systems are located. Appellant’s brief states that she is in possession of sixteen (16) of the twenty-two (22) homes involved and has mortgages in process of foreclosure on the other six. No brief has been filed by any appellee.
The plaintiff, by its replevin action, without writ, is seeking a judgment against the defendants for wrongful detention of the systems and a judgment for the return of the property from the defendants, or its value.
Replevin with Writ, § 78.01, F.S.A.,1 provides for an action of replevin by one whose goods and chattels are “wrongfully detained” by a defendant and for the recovery of damages sustained by reason of the “wrongful caption or detention.” Sections 78.05-78.07, F.S.A., provide that the writ of replevin for the property may issue at the commencement of the action upon giving bond to have the property forthcoming if “defendant recover judgment against him in the action;” and § 78.08, F.S.A. provides that the writ shall “command the officer to whom it may be directed to replevy the [specific] goods and chattels in possession of the defendants.”
Replevin with Summons. Section 78.01, F.S.A. also authorizes the commencement and prosecution of a replevin action with summons, without an in limine writ for the seizure of the goods and chattels, but for a writ of replevin to be issued after final judgment “for the property itself and against the defendant” (§ 78.19, F.S.A.). The property replevined must be in the actual or constructive possession of the de-fendani (or one who can be made a defendant as per § 78.11, F.S.A.). The property is not in custodia legis until it is seized by the writ of replevin or like process. ¡
Our replevin statutes combine the common law qualities of both detinue and replevin.' We have two forms of procedure and method prescribed for recovery of a chattel, whether the grievance be the mere wrongful detention or an unlawful taking and wrongful detention; and to this is adopted the action of replevin for seizing the property at the institution of the suit as in replevin at common law or seizure after judgment as in detinue at common law. Detinue and replevin, as they are distinguished each from the other, are, for all practical purposes, superseded by the statutory substitute designed to answer the aims and end of both; and to such combination, the beneficial incidents of either of the *732old remedies will be held to attach to the statutory system.
Ordinarily intervention in actions at law are not permitted since the plaintiff may elect who he wishes to sue at his own risk; however, when, in a possessory action, there is privity of title, as between the petitioner-appellant and the plaintiff, and the plaintiff claims the right to possession of the chattels which are, to a degree, in the possession of the appellant and are held adversely to the plaintiff, we find it was error not to grant the petition and allow the petitioner to intervene as a party defendant. To hold otherwise would be conducive to waste of judicial effort since the plaintiff could have no relief as to the property in possession of the petitioner, when she 'is not a party to the action and her rights as against the plaintiff could not be determined.
Reversed with direction that the appellant be allowed to intervene as a defendant and file her answer.
SHANNON, Acting C. J., and SMITH, J., concur.
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Bush v. Burt Belenke, 381 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…defendant has constructive possession, that is has such control over the property that he may deliver the possession of it, if he so desires, as for example, where an agent holds property for his principal. See Miller v. Townhouse Development Corp., 178 So. 2d 730 (Fla.2d DCA 1965); 66 Am.Jur.2d Replevin § 26 (1973). Although Belenke alleges he was acting as an agent for the House of Diamonds (Belenke Co., Inc.), an issue exists as to whether he has constructive possession of the ring which would preclude the…
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Glenn E. McCORMICK Co., Inc. v. Hill York Broward, Inc., 338 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…t should have been permitted to intervene in the proceedings below in furtherance of its asserted interest in the subject matter. Cf. Wags Transportation System v. City of Miami Beach, 88 So. 2d 751 (Fla.1956); Miller v. Townhouse Development Corp., 178 So. 2d 730 (Fla.2d DCA 1965). Accordingly, the order denying intervention is vacated and set aside and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. MAGER, C. J., DOWNEY, J., and STEWART, JAMES R., Jr., Associate Judge, concur.…