MARRIS

v.

SOCKEY

Citator

Cited By

• Johnston v. Honorable Rabe F. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1955)
  …in this section’s predecessor gave authority to grant a temporary release from confinement when justice required. Ex-parte Lee Fong Fook, D.C.N.D.Cal.1948, 74 F.Supp. 68, 72, reversed on other grounds, 9 Cir., 170 F. 2d 245, certiorari denied, 1949, 336 U.S. 914, 69 S.Ct. 604, 93 L.Ed. 1077; cf. Principe v. Ault, D.C. N.D.Ohio 1945, 62 F.Supp. 279, 283. Moreover, it has been held that under the current provision the court can make an order not involving a final disposition of the petition, Ex parte Sulliva…
• Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1953)
  …not dissent because they knew nothing of the projected settlement prior to its execution. As declared by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in Knowles v. War Damage Corporation, 38 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 171 F. 2d 15, 18, certiorari denied 336 U.S. 914, 69 S.Ct. 604, 93 L.Ed. 1077: “Factors bearing upon adequacy of representation are various and are not specifically enumerated in the law: It is pertinent to consider whether other members of the class have notice, express or constructive, of the pe…
• Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952)
  …several, a common determination is desired. The thought back of the rule creating this sort of class action is that its recognition will avoid a multiplicity of suits. Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 83 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 171 F. 2d 15, certiorari denied 336 U.S. 914, 69 S.Ct. 604, 93 L.Ed. 1077. The specific question presented to us, then, is whether the present cause comes within the class of spurious class -actions defined by the rule. The action is clearly one in which the rights sought to be enforced are s…