W. D. WOODWARD
v.
W. RAWLEIGH PETTEWAY, AS JUDGE OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF RECORD, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY
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Florida Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Woodward to stop his criminal trial in Hillsborough County. The court held that while the Constitution guarantees trial in the county where a crime was committed, when venue may properly lie in multiple counties, a defendant may later plead former acquittal or conviction as a bar to prosecution in another county.
The writ of prohibition should be denied. The Constitution requires trial in the county where the crime was committed, but when a crime can be legally prosecuted in multiple counties under special venue statutes, the defendant does not have an absolute right to prevent trial in any particular county. However, a judgment of acquittal or conviction in one county may be pleaded in bar of prosecution in another county for the same offense.
“The Constitution of Florida accords the unabridgeable right to the accused in any criminal prosecution to a speedy and public "trial" in the county where the crime was committed.”
Establishes the constitutional foundation for the court's analysis of venue rights
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWoodward was facing criminal prosecution on an information filed in Hillsborough County in May 1935. He sought a writ of prohibition to prevent trial …
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The Constitution of Florida accords the unabridgeable right to the accused in any criminal prosecution to a speedy and public “trial” in the county where the crime was committed. Section 11, Bill of Rights. To protect constitutional rights from invasion, or even partial impairment, appropriate judicial writs, prerogative and otherwise, may be availed of by an injured party. Thus the use of the writ of prohibition has been countenanced to enforce the provision of Section 11 of the Bill of Rights, aforesaid, where it was' alleged and shown that a “speedy” trial was being denied petitioner (Feger v. Fish, Judge, 106 Fla. 564, 143 Sou. Rep. 605) and .to enforce the venue requirements of the same section when it was shown that a multitude of criminal prosecutions for libel were being carried on in different counties' for the same crime. Eberhardt v. Barker, Judge, 104 Fla. 535, 140 Sou. Rep. 633.
The constitutional guaranty of Section 11 of the Declaration of Rights in the Florida Constitution is not that the criminal trial of an accused shall take place in the county where the offense is alleged in the accusation to have been *894committed, but that all criminal trials shall be “in the county where the crime was committed.” State v. Moore, 140 La. 281, 72 Sou. Rep. 965, cited with approval by this Court in Eberhardt v. Barker, supra.
If the accused petitioner shall be placed on trial in Hills-borough County on the information filed against him in May, 1935, the resultant judgment of acquittal or conviction can be pleaded in bar of the information for the same offense filed against petitioner in Hernando County at a later date, to-wit: May 23, 1935.
Where a crime can be legally prosecuted in one of several counties in which it may be deemed to' have been committed under our special venue statutes (Section 7121 C. G. L., 5019 R. G. S.) the person indicted or informed against may plead a former conviction or acquittal of the same offense in one county against any other prosecution for the same offense in any of the counties in which the venue might have been laid originally.
The Hillsborough County prosecution sought herein to be prohibited is being lawfully proceeded with, so the writ of prohibition absolute should be denied, subject to the conditions stated in this opinion.
Writ of prohibition absolute denied.
Whitfield, C. J., and Terrell, Brown, Buford and Davis, J. J., concur.
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Melvee Tucker v. State, 459 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1984)
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Gallego v. The Honorable H. Mark Purdy as Judge of the Cir. Court of the 17th Jud. Cir. in & for Broward Cnty., 415 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
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V.C. v. The Honorable Ralph B. Ferguson, Jr., 422 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wm. G. Feger v. Fish, 106 Fla. 564 (Fla. 1932)
- Eberhardt v. Barker, 104 Fla. 535 (Fla. 1932)