REDWINE, REVENUE COMMISSIONER,

v.

DAN RIVER MILLS, INC.

Citator

Cited By (13 total)

• Parrish v. Bd. OF Comm'rs OF the Ala. State BAR, 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975)
  …U.S. 156, 77 S.Ct. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d [*107] 1253 (1957), and by requiring that the bias be directed to the party personally, Cole v. Lowe’s Inc., 76 F.Supp. 872, 876 (S.C.Cal.1948), rev’d on other grounds, 185 F. 2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954, 71 S.Ct. 570, 95 L.Ed. 688 (1951). The Supreme Court has directly approved one such inroad in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 5. Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966), holding that the alleged bias “must stem from an extrajudicial sou…
• Knickerbocker TOY Co., Inc. v. Faultless Starch Co., 467 F.2d 501 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
  …re not granted, it “would be obliged to plead that * * * [appellant’s] purported copyright is invalid10 and that it has not infringed the same.” The board also relied on Merrick v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 185 F. 2d 713, 717, (7th Cir. 1950), cert. den. 340 U.S. 954, 71 S.Ct. 573, 95 L.Ed. 687 (1951), which it characterized as * * " holding that * * * [a trademark infringement action] involves private litigation whereas * * * [a trademark opposition] is an administrative matter that is held in the interest of…
• Int'l Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 315 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1963)
  …der inadmissible evidence which— from a purely logical standpoint — may have a significant probative thrust. See generally, McCormick, Evidence, 315-21 (1954). As was stated in Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F. 2d 641, 661 (9th Cir., 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954, 71 S.Ct. 570, 95 L.Ed. 688 (1951): “ ‘[I]f certain evidential material, having a legitimate probative value, tends nevertheless to produce also, over and above its legitimate effect, an unfair prejudice to the opponent, * * * there is good ground f…