WOODWARD
v.
UNITED STATES ET AL.

U.S. | 1951-04-23
No. 476
341 U.S. 112 Supreme Court of the United States (1951) Caution
Also reported at: 95 L. Ed. 806 · 71 S. Ct. 605 · 1951 U.S. LEXIS 1957 · SCDB 1950-066
Cited by 26 cases

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Holding

An adopted brother is a permissible beneficiary under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940.


Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner, designated as beneficiary by the insured, was the insured's adopted brother. The insured's husband was a conflicting claimant. The Court o…

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Per_curiam
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

Petitioner brought this action against the United States to secure the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance Policy taken out by Evelyn Haizlip, a member of the Women’s Army Corps. Before insured’s death in 1945, petitioner, described by insured as her “brother,” had been designated as beneficiary. The husband of the insured was interpleaded as a conflicting claimant. If petitioner, who was insured’s brother by virtue of an adoption decree, is not within the permissible class of beneficiaries under § 602 (g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940,* the husband is entitled to the proceeds in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court which had held that an adopted brother was not a permissible beneficiary under § 602 (g). 185 F. 2d 134 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1950).

See also the prior opinion of that court in this proceeding, 167 F. 2d 774 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1948).

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had reached a directly contrary conclusion under similar circumstances. Carpenter v. United States, 168 F. 2d 369 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1948).

Our grant of certiorari was limited to the question whether a brother by adoption is within the permissible class of beneficiaries under § 602 (g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940. 340 U. S. 929 (1951).

We have examined the Act, its legislative history and related statutory provisions and have considered the various inferences drawn from the legislative materials by counsel. The short of the matter is that Congress has not expressed itself in regard to the question before us. In resolving the conflict of decisions, we must determine whether the word “brother,” as used in this federal statute, restricts the policyholder’s choice of beneficiaries to brothers of the blood. We are persuaded by the policy against drawing such a distinction in the family relationship. Contemporaneous legal treatment of adopted children as though born into the family is a manifestation of that policy. See Carpenter v. United States, supra; McDonald v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 163 (D.

C. D. Mass. 1950).

Consequently, we hold that a brother by adoption is a permissible beneficiary under § 602 (g) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940.

Reversed.

*

“The insurance shall be payable only to a widow, widower, child . . . , parent, brother or sister of the insured. The insured shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance, but only within the classes herein provided, . . . .” 54 Stat. 1008,1010, as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 802 (g).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Glawe v. Rulon, 284 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1960)
    …se of its business of caring for and attempting to cure the ill and the injured. We think the medical record in its entirety was admissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1732. See: Woodward v. United States, 8 Cir., 185 F. 2d 134, 137, reversed on other grounds 341 U.S. 112, 71 S.Ct. 605, 95 L.Ed. 806; Missouri-K.-T. R. Co. of Texas v. Ridgway, 8 Cir., 191 F. 2d 363, 367, 29 A.L.R.2d 984; Medina v. Erickson, 9 Cir., 226 F. 2d 475, 482, certiorari denied 351 U.S. 912, 76 S.Ct. 702, 100 L.Ed. 1446; Shaffer v. Seas Shipp…
  • Thomas v. United States, 189 F.2d 494 (6th Cir. 1951)
    …, that relationship, in the face of the obvious purpose of Congress, cannot reasonably be limited to minors.” The liberal construction to be accorded the statute is emphasized in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Woodward v. United States, 341 U.S. 112, 71 S.Ct. 605, where it was held that a brother by adoption of a deceased member of the Women’s Army Corps, described in the government insurance policy as her brother, was a permissible beneficiary under the Act. At this point, a concluding observ…
  • Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1952)
    …On April 23, 1951, several months after the judgment in this case, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling in Woodward v. United States, supra, holding that a brother by adoption was a permissible beneficiary under the Act. Woodward v. United States, 341 U.S. 112, 71 S.Ct. 605, 95 L.Ed. 648. On June 28, 1951, the appellant filed in the District Court a motion to set aside the judgment of January 17, 1951 and asked that the Court enter in lieu thereof a judgment in accordance with the prayer of her original…

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