UNITED STATES
v.
FORTIER ET AL.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Court held that the proviso continuing priorities did not impose price restrictions on houses sold after the repeal of the Veterans' Emergency Housing Act.
The United States sued respondents to recover allegedly excessive prices charged for two houses sold after the repeal of the Veterans' Emergency Housi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Repeal Of Statutes cases and more on FLexlaw
Per Curiam.
The United States brought this action under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 19461 to compel restitution of allegedly excessive prices charged by respondents in the sale of two houses. The District Court entered judgment for respondents, 89 F. Supp.708, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, 185 F. 2d 608. We granted certiorari, 341 U. S. 925. Maximum sales prices for the two houses had been stipulated by respondents in securing the permission to build required under Priorities Regulation 33.2 Statutory authority for that regulation had been repealed before the sale of respondents’ houses, except for a proviso continuing in full force and effect priorities for building materials issued under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing’ Act of 1946.3 The Government views the maximum prices stipulated by respondents as a condition of construction authorization and priorities assistance that survived repeal under the proviso. We reject this view.
The 1946 Act contained detailed authorization for price restrictions on houses and for priorities on building materials. When that Act was repealed in 1947, Congress provided for veterans’ preferences in the sale and rental of housing and for rent ceilings on certain accommodations constructed with the assistance of priorities secured under the 1946 Act.4 Congress addressed itself to the problem of veterans’ housing, but refrained from imposing any price restrictions on the sale of houses. Congress having indicated a contrary purpose, we will not impose such restrictions by implication.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
50 U. S. C. App. § 1821 et seq.
10 Fed. Reg. 15301, as amended, 11 Fed. Reg. 6598. Respondents ' were required to comply with this regulation by Veterans’ Housing Program Order No. 1, 11 Fed. Reg. 3190.
50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 1881 (a), in repealing the 1946 Act, provided:
“That any allocations made or committed, or priorities granted for the delivery, of any housing materials or facilities under any regulation or order issued under the authority contained in said Act, and before the date of enactment of this Act [June 30, 1947], with respect to veterans of World War II, their immediate families, and others, shall remain in full force and effect.”
Respondents’ houses were not sold until November and December, 1947, months after repeal of the 1946 Act. As a result, no “penalty, forfeiture, or liability” had been incurred under the 1946 Act which would survive repeal under the general saving clause, 1 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 109. Compare United States v. Carter, 171 F. 2d 530 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1948).
50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 1884 (a); id., § 1892 (c) (1) (B) (3) (A).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bradley v. United States, 214 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1954)…llant claimed below, and claims here, that relief cannot be granted in view of the fact that the complaint was not filed until after the repeal of the Veterans Emergency Housing Act of 1946. In support of this, he relies on United States v. Fortier, 342 U.S. 160, 72 S.Ct. 189, 96 L.Ed. 179, and United States v. Duvarney, 1 Cir., 185 F. 2d 612; but we pass this question and proceed to a consideration of the case on the merits, as raised by appellant’s second point, which is that there was only a technical fa…
-
United States v. SEE, 194 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1952)…rsed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. . 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 631 et seq., 1821 et seq. . 10 Fed.Reg.15,301; 11 Fed.Reg.6,598. . In this respect the case is distinguishable from. United States v. Fortier, 72 S.Ct. 189, where the sales had been made after the statutory authority for the Regulation had been repealed.…
-
Doernhoefer v. United States, 194 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1952)…court the appellant for the first time contends that because the deeds were not. given until after June 30, 1947, the trial court was without jurisdiction. On December 11, 1951, the Supreme Court decided the case of United States v. Fortier et al., 342 U.S. 160, 72 S.Ct. 189. That decision sustains appellant’s contention here; and on January 2, 1952, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 72 S.Ct. 289, in United States v. Duvarney, 1 Cir., 185 F. 2d 612, and in Sedivy v. Superior Home Builders, 7 Cir., 188 F…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Carter, 171 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1948)
- Morissette v. United States, 341 U.S. 925 (U.S. 1951)
- United States v. Fortier, 185 F.2d 608 (1st Cir. 1950)
- Hall v. Scarlett, 341 U.S. 925 (U.S. 1951)