CHARLIE LEE DIXON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The defendant appealed an order denying his motion to vacate a conviction for attempted rape, claiming he was coerced by the sheriff into pleading guilty. The appellate court reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing and take evidence on these serious allegations despite their sufficiency to warrant relief if proven true.
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate without conducting a hearing and taking evidence on the defendant's allegations of coercion. Because the allegations, if proven true, would warrant granting the motion, a full hearing on the record with testimony from both the defendant and the sheriff (through the County Solicitor) was required.
“The motion contained allegations, which if true, would have warranted the same being granted, and even though the trial court may have such intimate acquaintanceship with the sheriff as to discard the charges against the sheriff, we feel that a hearing should be had and evidence taken to determine the truth or falsity of the charges and such evidence made a matter of record”
Establishes that serious allegations of coercion must be heard and recorded even if the trial judge is personally acquainted with the accused official.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn April 4, 1962, the 16-year-old defendant was informed against by the County Solicitor of Escambia County for attempted rape and attempted robbery. …
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This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Record of Escambia County, denying appellant’s motion to vacate and set aside judgment and sentence pursuant to Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix.
The appellant, who will be referred to hereafter in this opinion as the defendant, on April 4, 1962, was informed against by the County Solicitor of Escambia County in two counts: 1st count, attempted rape, 2nd count, attempted robbery. The defendant at the time thereof was 16 years of age. The defendant was accompanied in court by his older sister and he entered a plea of guilty to the first count of the information. The court asked the defendant if he had or wanted counsel and he answered in the negative. The court on April 20, 1962, upon the guilty plea adjudged the defendant guilty under the first count and sentenced him to the state prison for 10 years. The second count was placed on the inactive docket.
On May 26, 1965, the motion to vacate, supra, was filed in which, inter alia, the allegation was made that the sheriff of Escambia County had coerced the defendant into pleading guilty by telling him he, the Sheriff, would make it hard for the defendant, if he did not plead guilty; that if he would plead guilty to attempted rape, he could go home and that fearing the sheriff as well as relying upon his statement that he could go home, he had entered his plea of guilty. He now claims that a fair trial was not given him and that his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had been violated.
The lower court determined and so ordered that the motion to vacate did not warrant the production of the defendant at the hearing. It does not appear that a hearing was had nor even an inquiry made as to the charges against the sheriff laid in the motion to vacate. The motion contained allegations, which if true, would have warranted the same being granted, and even though the trial court may have such intimate acquaintanceship with the sheriff as to discard the charges against the sheriff, we feel that a hearing should be had and evidence taken to determine the truth or falsity of the charges and such evidence made a matter of record, and if the charges are unfounded, the motion can again be denied. The County Solicitor should be directed to answer the motion and attend the hearing on the issues so made. The defendant charges that he was denied the right to confer or consult with counsel, but no request for counsel had been made.
Under authority of Jones v. State, Fla.App., 165 So.2d 191, we reverse the trial court and remand the same for further pro*401ceedings consistent with the provisions of this decision.
Reversed and remanded.
WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and STUR-GIS, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Farrington v. State, 183 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1966)…lorida Rule with the hope that any confusion in regard to the hearing will be dispelled. We particularly examined the cited cases, Jones v. State, Fla.App.1964, 165 So. 2d 191; Lee v. State, Fla.App.1965, 175 So. 2d 95; Dixon v. State, Fla.App.1965, 180 So. 2d 399, and find that there is no conflict of opinion. The petition for writ of certiorari, therefore, is denied. It is so ordered. DREW, CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur. THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS and O’CONNELL, JJ., agree to judgment of dismissal.…
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Tillman v. State, 203 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…nd neither [*48] the state attorney’s answer nor the record refutes these allegations. Although the defendant may have some difficulty in proving these facts, he is entitled to a hearing.” And the 1st District Court in Dixon v. State, Fla.App.1965, 180 So. 2d 399, held to the same effect. The Rule 1 motion in Dixon alleged that the Sheriff “had coerced the defendant in pleading guilty by telling him he, the Sheriff, would make it hard for .the defendant, if he did not plead guilty; that if he would plead gui…
Authorities Cited
- Jones v. State, 165 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)