NELLIE GRAHAM JOHNSON DIXON, ET AL.,
v.
HARRY A. GREGG
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The Florida Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appellants attempted to appeal only from interlocutory orders after a final decree had already been entered and recorded. The court held that once a final decree exists, an appeal must be taken from that decree, not merely from preceding interlocutory orders.
The appeal must be dismissed because once a final decree has been rendered and recorded, any subsequent appeal in the equity cause must be taken from that final decree. An appeal taken solely and expressly from interlocutory orders that does not bring up the final decree for review cannot be considered by the appellate court.
“An appeal in an equity cause taken subsequently to the rendition of a final decree therein, solely and expressly from an interlocutory order therein, that does not bring up such final decree for review, cannot be considered by the appellate court and will be dismissed”
Establishes the foundational rule that appellate jurisdiction in equity cases requires appeal from the final decree, not merely from interlocutory orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiffs sought to amend their bill without notice (May 27, 1935), the defendants' answer was struck (June 10, 1935), and a motion to strike the…
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The appeal in this case as shown by the notice of such appeal is “from that certain order entered in said cause on the 27th day of May, 1935, recorded in Chancery Order Book the 27th day of May, Book No. 38, page 90, allowing the plaintiff to amend his Bill without notice, and that certain Order striking the answer the Defendants entered June 10, 1935, recorded Chancery Order Book 38, page 125, and that certain Order made July 25, 1935, and recorded in Chancery Order Book the 25th day of July, 1935.”
*178Appellants in their brief show that the order of July 25, 1935, from which this appeal was taken was the order on motion of plaintiff to strike addressed to the answer of defendants Crescent Beach Land Company, R. D. Peacock and W. A. Bean. But, since the order appealed from is not so identified in the notice of appeal as to advise this Court, or as to advise the appellee what order is referred to as that certain order of July 25, 1935, recorded in Chancery Order Book the 25th day of July, 1935, this Court cannot consider this notice of appeal as applying to any particular order because the record shows that on July 25, 1935, an order was made on the motion of plaintiff to strike as to answer of Crescent Beach Land Company, R. D. Peacock and W. A. Bean, and also an order of supersedeas was made and entered on that date.
The record shows that the notice of appeal was filed and recorded on July 25, 1935, at 10:30 A. M., and that the final decree was filed and recorded at the same hour on the same date. The final decree appears in the transcript of the record preceding the entry and notice of appeal.
As it was necessary for the Chancellor to make and sign the final decree before it was recorded, it necessarily follows that the appeal was taken when the final decree was in existence and had been filed a matter of record. No appeal having been taken from the final decree, the rule enun-. dated in the case of Banks v. Guinyard, 63 Fla. 334, 58 Sou. 229, as follows: “An appeal in an equity cause taken subsequently to the rendition of a final decree therein, solely and expressly from an interlocutory order therein, that does -not bring up such final decree for review, cannot be considered by the appellate court and will be dismissed,” applies. See also Stanley v. Standard Cypress Co., 54 Fla. 583, 45 Sou. 478; O’Neida Land Co. v. Richards, 72 *179Fla. 116, 72 Sou. 646; Wilder v. Dunne, 45 Fla. 662, 33 Sou. 508; Willey v. Hoggson Corporation, 89 Fla. 446, 105 So. 126.
So this appeal should be dismissed and it is so ordered.
Ellis, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
Whitfield, C. J., and Brown and Davis, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Meeky Cottrell v. Amerkan, 160 Fla. 390 (Fla. 1948)…dismiss the appeal upon the ground that subsequent to the entry of the interlocutory appeal the lower court dismissed the bill of complaint and no appeal was taken from such final decree. The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied. Dixon v. Gregg, 124 Fla. 177, 168 So. 2, was an appeal from an order striking the answers of defendants. The appeal was. taken after the entry of a final decree and was dismissed upon, the authority of each of the foregoing cases. Alderman v. City of New Smyrna, 132 Fla. 74, 1…
Authorities Cited
- Willey v. W. J. Hoggson Corp., 89 Fla. 446 (Fla. 1925)
- Shuron Hester v. State, 312 So. 3d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
- Annie Banks v. Guinyard, 63 Fla. 334 (Fla. 1912)
- Stanley v. Standard Cypress Co., 54 Fla. 583 (Fla. 1907)
- Oneida Land Co. v. Richards, 72 Fla. 116 (Fla. 1916)
- Wilder v. Dunne, 45 Fla. 662 (Fla. 1903)