JAMES HARTNETT AND BLANCHE HARTNETT, PETITIONERS,

v.

SOUTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY, RESPONDENT

DREW, Justice.

After finding that the insured paid premiums for coverage under Coverage “A” of his policy of insurance on his automobile, reading as follows:

“Coverage A — Comprehensive Loss of or Damage to the Automobile, Except by Collision or Upset: To pay for direct and accidental loss of or damage to the automobile, hereinafter called loss, except loss caused by collision of the automobile with another object or by upset of the automobile or by collision of the automobile with a vehicle to which it is' attached. Breakage of glass and loss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or vandalism, riot or civil commotion shall not be deemed loss by collision or upset.”

but did not pay for premiums for Coverage “D” thereof, reading as follows:

“Coverage D — Theft (Broad Form) : To pay for loss of or damage to the automobile, hereinafter called loss, caused by theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage.”

the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held 1 that “ * * * from the face of the policy of insurance, it affirmatively appears that the appellant did not purchase or pay premiums for such coverage [theft].” Such holding is in direct conflict with Firemans Fund Insurace Co. of San Francisco v. Boyd, 45 So.2d 499, where this Court, at page 501, said:

“ ‘ * * * In our opinion, where the word “theft” is used in an insurance policy, without definition, it should be interpreted as liberally as possible to protect the insured.’

“This court is committed to the rule that a contract of insurance prepared and phrased by the insurer is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, where the meaning of the language ttsed is doubtful, uncertain or ambiguous.”

*526The first page of the policy of insurance out of which this suit arises 2 reads as follows

*527

*528Elemental principles in construing these contracts — summarized in the quotation from the Boyd case supra — require a conclusion that theft is included in the coverage. How there could be any doubt of this in view of the plain language showing a premium charge of $35.00 for a three year coverage for “A — Comprehensive—Loss of or damage to the automobile, except by collision or upset bttt including fire, theft and windstorm” escapes us. Moreover, if it were necessary to go further, and read more than the small print, we find the largest print on the page contains the admonition: “This policy does not provide * * * any other coverage for which a specific charge ís not made * * —which is another way of saying that coverage is provided for all items for which a premium is paid.

There is no reason why such policies cannot be phrased so that the average person can clearly understand what he is buying. And so long as these contracts are drawn in such a manner that it requires the proverbial Philadelphia lawyer to comprehend the terms embodied in it, the courts should and will construe them liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer to protect the buying public who rely upon the companies and agencies in such transactions.3

*529The decision of the District Court of Appeal is quashed and this cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views here expressed.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, O’CONNELL and ERVIN, JJ., and JOHNSON, District Judge, concur.

THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS, J., dissent.