STEPHEN PAUL CHILDRESS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate judgments and sentences, finding that the defendant was represented by counsel and that his guilty pleas were voluntary. The court relied on prior case law establishing that such representation and voluntary pleas preclude vacating the sentences.
No, the trial court did not err. The defendant was represented by counsel, and his guilty pleas were voluntarily made, thus the grounds for vacating the judgments and sentences were without merit.
“From the record available to this court, it appears that the defendant was represented by counsel and that his pleas of guilty were voluntarily made”
Establishes the court's finding regarding representation and the voluntariness of the guilty pleas.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was charged with over 40 counts of breaking and entering. He was represented by a public defender, and his mother was present and consen…
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The defendant was charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit misdemeanors and felonies in a series of infor-mations containing more than 40 such charges. The defendant was represented by the Public Defender of Escambia County, who was present at the arraignment and sentencing of the defendant. Defendant’s mother was also present and acknowledged that she had full knowledge of the charges filed against her son and agreed to his arraignment and pleas of guilty. The sentencing was on March 6, 1964.fe On May 7, 1965, defendant filed a motion to vacate and set aside the judgments and sentences on the grounds that he was without counsel and that the guilty pleas were obtained by threats and promises.
The court found that the defendant was represented by counsel and that the other allegations and grounds were without merit
From the record available to this court, it appears that the defendant was represented by counsel and that his pleas of guilty were voluntarily made, and it does not appear that the court considered the confessions complained of when sentencing the defendant. This case falls within the ruling of Williams v. State, 174 So.2d 97 (2d DCA,1965) and Turvey v. State, 174 So.2d 609 (1st DCA, 1965). Also, Thompson v. State, 176 So.2d 564 (3rd DCA, 1965).
*656The other grounds raised by the appellant are without merit.
Therefore the order appealed is
Affirmed.
WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and STURGIS, J., concur.
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Cited By
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Raudabaugh v. State, 197 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Williams v. State, 167 So. 2d 795 (Fla.App.1964) and Childress v. State, 181 So. 2d 655 (Fla.App.1966). RAWLS, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.…
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Camacho v. State, 203 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…ead guilty to second-degree murder rather than face a possible death sentence. Appellant’s contention that his guilty plea was induced solely by his confession is insubstantial and insufficient to require a hearing. Childress v. State, Fla.App.1966, 181 So. 2d 655; Thompson v. State, Fla.App.1965, 176 So. 2d 564, 568; Williams v. State, Fla.App., 174 So. 2d 97, 100, appeal dismissed mem., Fla., 179 So. 2d 211, cert. denied mem., 1965, 382 U.S. 963, 86 S.Ct. 448, 15 L.Ed.2d 366; Taylor v. State, Fla.App.1964,…
Authorities Cited
- Thompson v. State, 176 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Williams v. State, 174 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Turvey v. State, 174 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)