SOL M. ROSS AND ELAINE ROSS, APPELLANTS,
v.
EUGENE M. WHITMAN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ross and Whitman disputed whether two promissory notes contained usurious interest rates. The trial court found no usury despite evidence that 15% annual interest was charged and paid, exceeding Florida's 10% statutory limit. The appellate court reversed, holding that knowing acceptance of interest above the legal rate constitutes usury regardless of the lender's intent or lack of written documentation.
The court held that the loans were usurious because the parties knowingly and intentionally charged and accepted interest at 15% per annum, exceeding the 10% statutory limit. Usury can be established by parol evidence, the lender's innocent intent does not absolve usury liability, and the absence of written documentation does not prevent a finding of usury.
“The wilfull violation mentioned in the statute, and corrupt intent as referred to in: the decisions, consists of knowingly and intentionally charging or accepting interest at a higher rate than the law allows.”
Establishes that usury is defined by knowing acceptance of above-rate interest, not by the lender's motive or intent to commit fraud
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWhitman made two cash loans to Sol Ross: $6,000 on February 14, 1956, and $5,000 on January 14, 1957, both payable three years after date. The first n…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Forfeiture Of Interest cases and more on FLexlaw
The appellee Eugene N. Whitman filed •an action in the circuit court in Dade 'County on two promissory notes made to him by the appellants. The latter, the defendants below, pleaded usury. Trial with-cut a jury resulted in a holding that the notes were not usurious, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the principal with 6% interest. Thereupon the defendants appealed.
The two notes evidenced cash loans by the plaintiff Whitman to the defendant Sol M. Ross. The first note, for $6,000, made on February 14, 1956, contained a promise to pay the principal sum three years after date, “with interest.” That printed form note had no space or blank for insertion of a rate of interest, and none was stated. The second note, for $5,000, was dated January 14, 1957, and contained a promise to pay the principal three years after date. That second note was drawn on a form customarily used in Florida which contained the following printed provision as to the payment of interest: “With interest thereon at the rate of - per cent, per annum, from-date-until fully paid. Interests payable semiannually.”
The defendants averred that at the time the loans were made the lender, Whitman, demanded interest at the rate of 15% per annum and the borrower agreed to proceed on that basis; that pursuant to such agreement the borrower paid interest thereon semi-annually at the rate of 15% per annum; and that said interest was in excess of the amount lawfully permitted under the Florida Usury Statutes1; and defendants counterclaimed for affirmative relief by reason thereof.2
*703Notwithstanding the fact that the record clearly established that the parties understood that 15% per annum would be paid in interest on the loan3, and that interest was paid thereon semi-annually at the rate of 15% per annum before the principal matured4, the trial court was of the opinion that the plaintiff was not guilty of “wilfully violating the provisions of § 687.03 [Fla.Stat., F.S.A.] and was without any corrupt or illegal intent, and was an innocent party in this transaction, and is therefore not subject to any of the penalties provided in § 687.04 F.S.A.” In so holding the trial court was in error and we reverse.
The fact that the suggestion of the usurious rate of interest may have emanated from the borrower did not absolve the lender where the amount or rate of interest thus charged and received was usurious. Lee Const. Corp. v. Newman, Fla.App.1862, 143 So.2d 222. The trial court appears to have attached importance to the feature that there was no written provision for payment of interest at a rate in excess of 10% per annum. But an agreement for or a charging of usurious interest can be established by parol evidence. Wicker v. Trust Co. of Florida, 109 Fla. 411, 147 So. 586, 588. The lender’s professed ignorance of the laws of usury did not render lawful his knowing and intentional acceptance of usurious interest. Shorr v. Skafte, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 604, 607. The wilfull violation mentioned in the statute, and corrupt intent as referred to in: the decisions, consists of knowingly and intentionally charging or accepting interest at a higher rate than the law allows. Shorr v. Skafte, supra, Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321, 179 So. 674; Shaffran v. Holness, Fla.App. 1958, 102 So.2d 35, 39.
The making of the loans following discussion of 15% interest, and the payment of such interest semi-annually thereafter clearly established the knowing and intentional charging and acceptance of interest in excess of 10% per annum. The loan was usurious, and having pleaded usury the borrower was entitled to forfeiture of the interest, under § 687.03 Fla. Stat., F.S.A., and double the amount of the usurious interest which was paid, under § 687.04.
Accordingly the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions-to revise the judgment to exclude the allowance of interest and to reduce the principal by double the amount of interest paid.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Gen. Cap. Corp. v. TEL Serv. Co., Inc., 212 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)…, quoting Justice Drew in Home Credit Co. v. Brown, Fla.1962, 148 So. 2d 257, to “the principle that the vice of usury is one which inheres in the parties’ agreement itself”, which is what the Chancellor held here. In Ross v. Whitman, Fla.App.1966, 181 So. 2d 701, the lender sued upon two notes, one for $6,000 which contained thereon merely the words “with interest”, and the other for $5,000 which left the percentage of interest blank. Certain semi-annual interest payments amounting to 15% of the principal w…
-
River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
-
Curtiss Nat'l Bank OF Miami Springs v. Solomon, 243 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)…, an argument by the lender that it was not shown the lender intended to violate the usury statute is without merit. Shorr v. Skafte, Fla.1956, 90 So. 2d 604, 607; Shaffran v. Holness, Fla. App.1958, 102 So. 2d 35, 39; Ross v. Whitman, Fla.App.1966, 181 So. 2d 701, 703; River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, Fla.App.1966, 190 So. 2d 415, 424. Affirmed.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mrs. Jesse Sewell Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321 (Fla. 1937)
- Shaffran v. Holness, 102 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Shorr v. Skafte, 90 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1956)
- Cyrus H. Wicker v. Tr. Co. of Fla., 109 Fla. 411 (Fla. 1933)
- LEE Constr. Corp. v. Newman, 143 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)