LOUIS PITTS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Pitts challenged his guilty plea conviction for robbery, claiming he was not indicted by grand jury and that his public defender promised probation instead of imprisonment. The court affirmed his conviction, holding that a guilty plea is not invalid merely because counsel advises it or misrepresents the sentence, and that the public defender does not occupy the same legal position as prosecutor or judge regarding sentencing promises.
The court held that a guilty plea is not invalid simply because counsel advises it or makes promises about sentencing, that the public defender does not occupy the same legal position as the prosecutor or judge regarding sentencing promises, and that a defendant cannot vacate a sentence merely because it exceeds his expectations when no promises were made by the prosecutor or judge.
“A plea is not invalid simply because counsel for an accused advises him to plead guilty.”
Establishes the core holding that counsel's advice to plead guilty does not invalidate the plea.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePitts was informed against for robbery on October 21, 1960. On August 26, 1963, he entered a plea of not guilty through counsel, but changed his plea …
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Appellant was informed against on October 21, 1960, for the crime of robbery, and on August 26, 1963, through his counsel entered a plea of not guilty. On the trial date he changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
On February 15, 1965, appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence, alleging that he was not indicted by a grand jury and that he pleaded guilty because his counsel promised that such plea would result in probation instead of imprisonment. He requested a hearing to determine the merits of said allegations. On February 22, 1965, the trial court enter*740ed an order denying said motion, noting that it had previously denied a similar motion filed by appellant, hence this appeal.
Appellant argues that his conviction is unlawful because he was charged by an information rather than by an indictment, that the latter procedure is required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that since the public defender is an officer of the court, his representations to the accused in regard to punishment are binding upon the court when the accused in good faith acts upon them and enters a plea of guilty. He also argues that since the states must comply with the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution regarding appointment of counsel, they are likewise required to comply with the Fifth Amendment, a question not raised in the lower court.
A plea is not invalid simply because counsel for an accused advises him to plead guilty. A sentence imposed upon a voluntary plea of guilty should not be vacated on the ground that defendant’s attorney misled him to plead guilty by promising a lighter sentence or probation. See United States v. Bush, D.C., 135 F.Supp. 3 (1955).
The fact that appellant received a longer sentence than he anticipated is no basis for vacating a sentence when no promises were made to him by the prosecutor or the judge. Taylor v. United States, 4 Cir., 203 F.2d 948 (1953). The public defender does not stand in the same relationship to a defendant as does the prosecutor and the judge merely because said public defender is paid by the state.
The option sought by appellant, i. e., to reject his uncoerced plea of guilty if the sentence fails to accord with his expectations, has never been the law of this state. The sentence imposed following a plea of guilty is solely within the discretion of the trial judge, subject only to the condition that it meets the standards provided by law. Dickinson v. State, 170 So.2d 594 (Fla.App.1965).
Affirmed.
WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and STUR-GIS and CARROLL, DONALD K, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Manning v. State, 203 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…190 So. 2d 605, 606. The fact that a plea of guilty is entered because of the defense [*361] attorney’s promise of a lighter sentence does not render such plea involuntary. Baker v. State, Fla.App.1966, 188 So. 2d 346; Pitts v. State, Fla.App.1966, 181 So. 2d 739, 740; Manning v. State, Fla.App.1965, 176 So. 2d 380, 381. This is equally the law where the defense attorney is court-appointed. Pitts v. State, supra 181 So. 2d at 740. A criminal defendant cannot be given the option of rejecting his uncoerced ple…
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Cuneo v. State, 335 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1976)…LAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur. OVERTON, C. J., dissents. . The sentence imposed by a trial judge following a plea of guilty is solely within his discretion subject only to the condition that it meets the standards provided by law. Pitts v. State, 181 So. 2d 739 (Fla.App. 1st, 1966).…
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Morgan v. State, 414 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…IAM. A criminal defendant does not have the option of withdrawing his uncoerced plea of guilty because the sentence fails to conform to what he was led by his attorney to expect. Manning v. State, 203 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Pitts v. State, 181 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). Affirmed.…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dickinson v. State, 170 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Tabor v. United States, 203 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1953)