BARDIN

v.

UNITED STATES

Citator

Cited By (25 total)

• Schoenbaum v. Bradshaw D. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
  …hould rarely be granted against a plaintiff in a stockholder’s derivative action especially when the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to resort to discovery procedures, See, for example, Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F. 2d 753 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883, 76 S.Ct. 136, 100 L. Ed. 779 (1955); Colby v. Klune, 178 F. 2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F. 2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948). The plaintiff typically has in his possession only the facts which he alleges in his complaint. Having…
• Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (U.S. 1974)
  …946). And it is irrelevant that the shareholders bringing the derivative action own only a small percentage of the total outstanding shares. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 318 (1936); Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F. 2d 753, 761 (CA2), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 883 (1955). According to the complaint, there were 20 individual minority shareholders, many of whom acquired their shares in the 1950’s. App. 6-7, 22-23. It is interesting to note that the majority’s restrictive notions as to the power of a court of…
• AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979)
  …the mark A strong mark is inherently distinctive, for example, an arbitrary or fanciful mark; it will be afforded the widest ambit of protection from infringing uses. See, e. g., National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F. 2d 195, 199 (CA 9), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883, 76 S.Ct. 135, 100 L.Ed. 778 (1955) (Dutch Boy not used geographically or descriptively, but in a “fictitious, arbitrary and fanciful manner”). A descriptive mark tells something about the product; it will be protected only when secondary meaning is…