LOUIS WILLIAM PARKER, APPELLANT,

v.

FLORENCE EDITH PARKER, APPELLEE

WALDEN, Judge.

This interlocutory appeal challenges the correctness of an order permitting discovery under Rules 1.27 and 1.28, Fla.R.Civ.P., 30 F.S.A.

The husband, appellant here, sued for divorce after a marriage of over thirty years. Of the issue one minor child remains for whom provision is required. The complainant asserted that he was able to pay reasonable amounts for the needs and necessities of the wife and child.1

The wife answered making issue and saying that she was without knowledge as to the extent of the husband’s financial resources.2 She also counterclaimed for separate maintenance under the provisions of F.S.A. § 65.09, and specifically prayed for child support, alimony and counsel fees.

The case being then contested with issue joined, we come now to the discovery effort. Via motion to produce under Rule 1.28, Fla.R.Civ.P., 30 F.S.A., the husband was asked to produce his 1964 income tax return and, via Rule 1.27, Fla.R.Civ.P., 30 F.S.A., he was asked to list his assets together with valuations and locations. The husband objected to such discovery solely upon the grounds of relevance and materiality and filed in bar what he chose to call' a Written Admission and Stipulation of Fact signed by his attorney of record wherein he simply asserts that he has a net worth in excess of five million dollars and the ability to supply the needs of the dependents.3

The chancellor granted the motion to produce and overruled the objections to interrogatories, and this appeal ensued.

*500Rule 1.21(b), Fla.R.Civ.P., 30 F.S.A.4, sets forth the proper scope of these -discovery devices and we notice that inquiry may be had as to any matter relevant to the -subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to any claim or defense, and without regard to trial admissibility so long as it seems reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Thus, discovery is not confined solely to pending issues and a party may “fish” within these stated limits. We .are also mindful in approaching this problem that wide discretion is vested in trial •courts in matters of discovery.5 Also of interest is the author’s comment which follows Rule 1.21 in 30 F.S.A. at page 484.6

A dependent wife and child in a divorce ■suit necessarily make the husband’s income .and assets material and relevant to the ■suit’s subject matter, and, in the instant case —relevant to the pending issues, as the "breadwinner’s financial abilities are prime ingredients in the equation used to determine the amount and kind of financial relief to be afforded. The question though in this appeal is whether or not the dependents are entitled to the detailed facts as concerns the husband’s financial position in the face of the husband’s naked assertion as above set forth. We must say, based upon our understanding of the Rules and the philosophy behind them, that we do not look with favor upon the husband’s position in not wishing to reveal any of the details of his financial position and his effort to bridle the dependents’ discovery rights by substituting his secondary non-verifiable conclusion in lieu of primary detailed facts. The adversary and the court are entitled to the whole factual picture to the end that an independent complete understanding and evaluation may be had.

Without undertaking to catalog all instances where the details of the husband’s estate and income would be relevant and material to the suit’s subject matter, the following suppositions are suggested:

A. A determination as to the amount and kind of alimony, and particularly as to whether it is to be awarded as lump sum or in installments.

B. A determination as to whether the husband’s assertion as to his net worth is truthful and accurate.

C. A determination as to whether the husband should post or provide security *501for the future payments of alimony and •child support.

D. A determination as to whether the" wife is entitled to any special equity as to .•assets accumulated during the marriage.

E. A determination as to whether the 'husband has been guilty of misconduct •during the marriage, i. e. by possibly ■spending or giving money to another woman.

F. A determination as to standards of ¡living.

'G. A determination as to whether the husband intends to secrete his assets and possibly defeat the enforcement of the de-scree by so doing and leaving the jurisdiction.

The case of Jacobs v. Jacobs, Fla. 1951, 50 So.2d 169, was proffered in support of the appellant’s position. While it might very well be distinguished upon the facts we ■simply decline its pronouncements as a matter of law upon the ground that its understandings were obtained under the old Equity Rules 48 and 49 7; which rules were abolished upon the adoption of the 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. A comparison of the respective rules discloses fundamental differences. The Equity Rules are read and interpreted to be more limited in application than the comparative 1954 Rules of Civil Procedure. Basically, it appears that the scope of the Equity Rules is limited to matters relevant to the issues made by the pleadings in the case while, as reflected by Rule 1.21(b), Fla.R.Civ.P., supra, the scope under the new rules is specifically related to the suit’s subject matter without limitation by the paper issues made by the respective claims and defenses. In this regard we note in Jacobs v. Jacobs, supra, 50 So.2d at page 173, this reference to Equity Rule 49, “The sole purpose of the rule is to procure evidence pertinent to the issues”, and further, “In light of the issues made by the pleadings, it is our conclusion that the production of the books * * * is not material, relevant or pertinent to the issues and for said reason the order was improper and should be quashed”. We, therefore, conclude that the Jacobs case, supra, has no application to the instant case.

In the interest of obtaining the truth and rendering a just decree based upon the law and facts, a difficult task under the best of conditions, we feel that the wife is entitled to the information she seeks and that the husband cannot handicap his wife and the court by limiting the discovery as he seeks to do.

Affirmed.

SMITH, C. J. and ANDREWS, J., concur.