HARRY J. MCDOWELL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES TALCOTT, INC., A NEW YORK CORPORATION, AND INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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This case involves an appeal from a summary final decree concerning the repossession of personal property. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding the plaintiff's consent to repossession.
No, the lower court did not err in entering a summary final decree for the defendant because the plaintiff consented to the repossession in the signed agreement, and there was no evidence of trespass or breach of the peace.
“The plaintiff consented, in the agreement signed, to a repossession of the equipment "wherever it may be located."”
Establishes the basis for the court's finding that the plaintiff agreed to the repossession terms.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff sued for conversion and trespass after his personal property was repossessed. The plaintiff had signed an agreement that allowed for rep…
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The plaintiff appeals a summary final decree for the defendant in an action for conversion and trespass which allegedly arose as a result of an unlawful repossession of personalty.
Even though there is an issue concerning the nature of the agreement signed by plaintiff and defendant’s assignor (lease or conditional sales contract), and whether or not plaintiff had a right of possession in the premises from which the equipment was taken, there is no genuine issue as to a material fact. The plaintiff consented, in the agreement signed, to a repossession of the equipment “wherever it may be located.” There was no evidence to indicate that this repossession without legal process *593constituted a trespass or a breach of the peace; therefore, the chancellor did not err in entering a summary final decree for the defendant. See C.I.T. Corporation v. Brewer, 146 Fla. 247, 200 So. 910 (1941); Cutler Gate Building Corp. v. United States Leasing Corp., Fla.App.1964, 165 So.2d 207; Martin v. Cook, 237 Miss. 267, 114 So.2d 669 (1959); Morrison v. Galyon Motor Co., 16 Tenn.App. 394, 64 S.W.2d 851 (1932); Annot., 146 A.L.R. 1331, 1341; 99 A.L.R.2d 358; 3 Williston on Sales, § 579a (Rev.Ed.1948).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Raffa v. The Dania Bank & Bruce Fletcher, 321 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…ot even one to a garage, on the Raffa premises was opened, much less broken, we conclude that the way in which the repossession was effected was conclusively shown to have been non-actionable. Cf. also, McDowell v. James Talcott, Inc., Fla.App.1966, 183 So. 2d 592; Westchester National Bank v. Corey, Fla.App.1974, 293 So. 2d 796. Mrs. Raffa also claims, however, that, under the circumstances of this case, and despite the provisions of the agreement to the contrary, she was entitled to notice from the Bank be…
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Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Cote, 351 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…of the thing and removing it from the land. Our Supreme Court recognized this privilege in Percifield v. State, 93 Fla. 247, 111 So. 519 (1927). See also Bank of Jasper v. Tuten, 62 Fla. 423, 57 So. 238 (1911). Cf. McDowell v. James Talcott, Inc., 183 So. 2d 592 (Fla.3d DCA 1966); Westchester Nat’l Bank v. Corey, 293 So. 2d 796 (Fla.3d DCA 1974), app. dism., 303 So. 2d 28 (Fla.1974). Contrast C.I.T. Corp. v. Brewer, 146 Fla. 247, 200 So. 910 (1941), in which a creditor was found liable for trespass when its…
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Thrasher v. First Nat'l Bank OF Miami, 288 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…a wrongful trespass by the appellee in order to repossess the automobile. Earlier Florida cases have recognized the principle that where a repossession involves a trespass or assault, such repossession is illegal. McDowell v. Talcott, Fla.App.1966, 183 So. 2d 592; C. I. T. Corp. v. Brewer, 1941, 146 Fla. 247, 200 So. 910; C. I. T. Corp. v. Reeves, 1933, 112 Fla. 424, 150 So. 638. Also, the Florida Supreme Court in Northside Motors of Florida, Inc. v. Brinkley, supra, recognized that under Fla.Stat. § 679.503…
Authorities Cited
- C. I. T. Corp. v. Brewer, 146 Fla. 247 (Fla. 1941)
- Cutler Gate Bldg. Corp. v. United States Leasing Corp., 165 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)