CITY OF MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
JAFRA STEEL CORPORATION AND THE DIXIE DREDGE CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court resolved a jurisdictional conflict between two procedural rules governing counterclaims in civil court. The City of Miami sued for unpaid taxes in Civil Court of Record, and the defendant filed a counterclaim exceeding that court's jurisdiction, prompting the question of whether the case must be transferred to Circuit Court before the counterclaim could be addressed.
The court held that the original court retains jurisdiction and power to act on the counterclaim motion despite its amount exceeding the court's jurisdiction. The two procedural rules must be read together (in pari materia), with the trial court first determining whether the counterclaim is a sham pleading, and jurisdiction being fixed by that ruling rather than by automatic transfer based solely on the amount claimed.
“In other words, as we understand the ruling, a counterclaim, sham or not, for more than is entertainable by the Civil Court of Record requires the transfer of the cause to the court of larger jurisdiction under Rule 1.13(10), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.”
States the District Court of Appeal's interpretation that any counterclaim exceeding Civil Court jurisdiction mandates transfer, regardless of whether it is a sham pleading.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Miami commenced an action in Civil Court of Record to recover $1,473.63 in taxes from Jafra Steel Corporation and Dixie Dredge Corporation…
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The City of Miami commenced an action in the Civil Court of Record, Dade County, to recover in taxes $1473.63 from Jafra Steel Corporation and The Dixie Dredge-Corporation. The latter corporation filed a counterclaim for damages in excess of $5000. alleged to have been suffered from an attempt by the City to levy upon its tax warrant. The City, under Rule 1.14, Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A., moved to strike the counterclaim on the ground that it was a sham pleading. Evidence was taken, as may be done under the rule, and the motion was granted. Dixie’s motion to transfer the cause to the Circuit Court because its demand exceeded the jurisdiction of the Civil Court of Record, as it is set by Sec. 33.02, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was denied.
Thereafter the Civil Court of Record upon the City’s motion entered a summary judgment for the amount of its claim. An appeal was taken from the judgment as well as the ruling on the counterclaim. The District Court of Appeal declined to rule on the merits in respect of the summary judgment because of the conviction that reversal should be adjudged on the matter of jurisdiction inasmuch as the amount declared placed the question in the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.
In other words, as we understand the ruling, a counterclaim, sham or not, for more than is entertainable by the Civil Court of Record requires the transfer of the cause to the court of larger jurisdiction under Rule 1.13(10), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Taken literally that is what the rule commands. But literal application presents a rather anomalous situation because of the provisions of Rule 1.14, supra.
The Civil Court of Record unquestionably had jurisdiction of the original claim and control of the procedure with reference to it. It was in that court that an adverse party could move to strike any pleading he considered sham. The court, presumably the one to which the motion is pre*180sented, must hear the motion, “taking evidence of the respective parties” and if the motion is sustained the pleading to which it is directed shall be stricken. Furthermore, it is provided that summary judgment “may, in the discretion of the court, be entered, or the court may for good cause shown, permit additional pleadings to be filed.”
Our study of this rule leads us to the belief that while all this goes on the jurisdiction, the power to act, is in the original court and that determination of the ultimate result requires a reading of the two rules in pari materia. To decide the matter solely on the provision of Rule 1.13(10) would require the judge of the first court to hear and determine the feigned plea only to transfer the case to the second court whence conceivably, it might bounce back to court number one. This impracticality should not obtain.
In fine, we think the primary, immediate concern was the nature of the pleading to be determined by the original court, and that the jurisdiction thenceforwards would be fixed by the ruling.
We hasten to say that our conclusion is no reflection on the District Court of Appeal or the learned member who wrote for that court but rather it is a commentary on the ambiguity which inheres in the rules. The court obviously followed meticulously the second rule and perhaps felt that it should not take such liberties with both as we have done.
We think the two rules need study and unification for the benefit of like cases to arise in the future. As for the present controversy we conclude that the District Court of Appeal erred when it reversed the Civil Court of Record’s orders denying the motion to transfer, striking the counterclaim and entering the summary judgment.
We assumed jurisdiction of the case because of an apparent conflict between the ruling of the District Court of Appeal and the decision of this court in State ex rel. Peters v. Hendry, 159 Fla. 210, 31 So. 2d 254.
The decision of the District Court of Appeal is reversed.
THORNAL, C. J., ROBERTS and O’CONNELL, JJ., and MASON, Circuit Judge, concur.
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Davis v. Flato, 210 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)…the cause to the Circuit Court of Broward County for further proceedings. REED, J., and DYKES, ROGER, Associate Judge, concur. . Now Rule 1.170(j) R.O.P., 30 F.S.A. . Fla.Const, art. V, § 6, F.S.A. . City of Miami v. Jafra Steel Corp., Fla.1966, 184 So. 2d 178; State ex rel. Attias v. Blanton, Fla.App.1967, 195 So. 2d 870. . State ex rel. Peters v. Hendry, 1947, 159 Fla. 210, 31 So. 2d 254; Platt v. Kenco Chemical Co., Fla.App.1961, 132 So. 2d 27. . State ex rel. Rosenfeld v. Boyer, Fla.App.1962, 145 So…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Ike Attias v. The Honorable John R. Blanton, 195 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)…f a counterclaim for damages in excess of the jurisdiction of that court, the rule should not be given literal application in an anomalous situation where to do so would lead to impracticality. See City of Miami v. Jafra Steel Corporation, Fla.1966, 184 So. 2d 178. This case presents such a situation, because a literal compliance with the rule would result in transferring from the civil court of record to the circuit court, in addition to the counterclaim, a statutory proceeding for removal of tenant which t…
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Jafra Steel Corp. v. City OF Miami, 184 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…PER CURIAM ■ Pursuant to mandate of the Supreme Court issued on its opinion -and judgment (City of Miami v. Jafr-a Steel Corporation, Fla. 1966, 184 So. 2d 178, filed March 9, 1966), quashing our. decision filed April 20, 1965, (174 So. 2d 624), this court’s said -opinion and judgment is vacated and our mandate previously filed is withdrawn, the Supreme Court’s judgment is made the-judgment of this court,…
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- State v. Honorable Norman Hendry, 159 Fla. 210 (Fla. 1947)