ELMER H. JONES ET AL., PETITIONERS,

v.

JEAN CHRISTINA, RESPONDENT

DREW, Justice.

This cause comes to us by petition for certiorari directed to a decision certified to rus by the District Court of Appeal, Third District, as one which passes upon a question of great public interest.

The trial court, in a common-law action, denied a motion by non-resident defendants, made in reliance on F.S. § 46.01, F.S.A. as amended by Ch. 63-572, Laws of Florida, 1963, to dismiss or transfer for improper venue. The defendants contended that the amendment removed the provision of § 46.-01 F.S.A. which had rendered it inapplicable to non-residents. The denial of the motion was predicated on a holding by the trial court that the amendment in question was unconstitutional inasmuch as the subject of the amendatory statute is not adequately expressed in its title and the statute in question dealt with more than one subject contrary to the provisions of Article III, Section 16, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.1

An interlocutory appeal was taken to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, which affirmed, Jones v. Christina, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 855. Except in chancery matters, this Court’s jurisdiction on appeal is limited to final judgments.2 Interlocutory orders in common law actions 3 may be reviewed only by the District Courts of Appeal. Hence, although the trial court did directly pass on the validity of a state statute on its interlocutory order relating to venue, this appeal was properly lodged in the District Court and is now here on a certificate of that court. This certification gives us complete jurisdiction to finally dispose of all questions properly presented.4 Whether we would have jurisdiction absent the certificate is not decided.

Ch. 63-572, Laws of Florida, 1963 was a revisor’s bill titled:

“An Act correcting, amending and repealing certain Sections of the Florida Statutes pursuant to Section 16.44, Florida Statutes, in accordance with the revisor’s notes attached hereto showing changes made and reason therefor.”

Section 12 read:

“46.01. Where suits may be begun.— Suits shall be begun only in the county (or if the suit is in the justice of the peace court in the justice’s district) where the defendant resides, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.”

This amendment did not include the second paragraph of § 46.01 which had read:

*184“If brought in any county or justice district where the defendant does not reside, the plaintiff, or some person in his behalf, shall make and file with the complaint, an affidavit that the suit is brought in good faith, and with no intention to annoy the defendant. This section shall not apply to suits against non-residents.”

The revisor’s note for § 12 was:

“Section 46.01, Florida Statutes, is amended to eliminate the second paragraph which requires an affidavit of good faith. This requirement is obsolete and superfluous in view of rule 1.5(a) 5 of the rules of civil procedure [30 F.S.A.].”

The statutory revision power given to the attorney general was intended only for the purification of the statutory law;6 and not to make changes in the substantive law without express legislative action.7 The revisor’s notes which must, by statute,8 accompany his bills, give his reason for each recommended change and are an integral part of a revisor’s bill and must be considered in any interpretation of it.9 The revisor’s note here clearly established that the intent of the legislature in accepting the amendment proposed by the revisor to F.S. § 46.01, F.S.A. and passing it as Ch. 63-572, Laws of Florida, 1963 was to eliminate the affidavit requirement, not to make this section applicable to non-resident defendants. This interpretation of legislative intent is reinforced by the revisor’s bill enacted by the next-ensuing session of the legislature as Ch. 65-1, Laws of 1965, which added to F.S. § 46.01, F.S.A. the following:

“This section shall not apply to suits against non-residents.”

Since the clear legislative intent was merely to eliminate the required affidavit and we are bound to effectuate that demonstrated intent, all other portions of § 46.01 remained unchanged by Ch. 63-572 and the section is of no avail to non-residents.

The judgment of the trial court and the decision of the District Court were predicated on the proposition that the questioned act violated Art. Ill, Section 16, of the Florida Constitution because “the subject of the statute is not adequately expressed in the title and the statute dealt with more than one subject.” The quoted language is from the judgment of the trial court which language was approved in the decision and judgment of the District Court which added the additional reason that said act *185“ * * * constituted, in part, the actual repeal of an important rule of procedural law without giving notice of such repeal or the particular subject in the title of the act.”

Our conclusion that, construing the act with the revisor’s notes, the only change made was the elimination of the required affidavit — leaving the act in all other respects intact, effectively disposes of the concluding observation of the District Court quoted above.

As to the other point, viz. that the mandatory requirements of Art. Ill, Section 16, Florida Constitution, were not observed, this provision is inapplicable to re-visor’s bills where, necessarily, many subjects must be dealt with in one bill at regular intervals if the basic purpose of continuing revision is to be accomplished. The •revisor’s notes are essentially a part of each such bill and each must he construed in the light of such notes which are the explanation for deletions, purification, rearrangements, consolidations and matters of that nature which enable the legislature to keep the statute laws of this State constantly up to date in books of reasonable size. This system has worked well for the past quarter century and has been of the greatest contributions to the effective administration of justice in this State.

There may be — as suggested by the District Court — some difference in the enactment of an entire code and a revisor’s bill but the difference is not of substance so far as this question is concerned. This Court has long held that Art. Ill, Sec. 16, is not applicable to complete revisions.10 The reasons stated in these decisions are even more cogent when applied to revisors bills. We hold that Chapter 63-572 was validly enacted.

That portion of the decision of the District Court of Appeal holding the subject statute unconstitutional is reversed but, for the reasons herein set forth, the judgment of that court affirming the trial court’s action is

Affirmed.

THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS, ERVIN and HOBSON (Retired), JJ., concur.