CORAK CONSTRUCTION CORP., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
JACK L. SCOTT AND PAULINE J. SCOTT, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A builder contracted to sell purchasers a house substantially similar to a model home. When the purchasers refused to accept the completed house on the day before closing, claiming defects, the trial court awarded them rescission and return of their down payment. The appellate court reversed, holding that rescission is an equitable remedy that must be pursued in equity court, not law court.
A trial court sitting in law court lacks jurisdiction to decree rescission and return of a down payment. Rescission and cancellation of contracts is an equitable remedy that must be pursued in equity court, not law court. The case must be transferred to the circuit court's equity side.
“the trial court correctly recognized that the purchasers could not recover damages for defects in construction where they had renounced the contract and refused to accept the house”
Establishes that rejection of a house precludes damages recovery for construction defects
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCorak Construction contracted with the Scotts to sell them a lot and construct a house substantially similar to model #260. The purchasers observed co…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Caveat Emptor cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant contracted with the appellees for sale to them of a lot, and of a house to be constructed thereon by appellant. The contract did not contain plans and specifications but provided that the house was to be "substantially similar to model #260” in a designated subdivision, and was to be constructed “substantially similar to the model house.”
The purchasers observed the construction of the house as it progressed, and moved their furniture into the house when it was completed. Later, on the day before the scheduled closing the purchasers announced their refusal to complete the contract, for the reason that the house was considered by them to be defective in a number of respects. The cost to the purchasers was to be approximately $32,000. They had delivered a deposit or down payment of $4,500 to the seller. After rejection of the house by the purchasers the seller sold it to another, for a price somewhat less than the contract figure.
Action was filed by plaintiff purchasers in the civil court of record in Dade County, alleging defective workmanship in seventeen instances, causing a depreciation in value of $4,458; that defendant had refused to remedy the defects, and had refused to return plaintiffs’ $4,500 deposit; and plaintiffs sought damages in the amount of $4,990.
On the trial, which was held without a jury, the plaintiffs did not present evidence that the house failed to conform substantially to the model house referred to in the contract, but submitted evidence (most of which was contradicted) relating to the alleged defects in construction, and certain opinion evidence (also contradicted) that the cost of correcting the defects and departures from workmanlike construction would be $4,458. The record discloses the trial court correctly recognized that the purchasers could not recover damages for defects in construction where they had renounced the contract and refused to accept the house (17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 516). Instead, the trial court granted judgment against the seller for the amount of the purchasers’ $4,500 deposit,. on the theory that the purchasers had established a right to rescission. The defendant then prosecuted this appeal.
Appellant contends, and we agree, that the common law court did not have jurisdiction to decree rescission and return of the down payment. A right in the purchasers to recover their down payment necessarily required a determination that the seller had materially breached the contract *462and that the purchasers were entitled to rescission. However, jurisdiction for rescission and cancellation of contracts is reposed in equity. S Fla.Jur., Cancellation, Reformation and Rescission of Instruments, § 5.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to transfer the cause to the circuit court, equity side, as provided for in such instances by rule 1.39, Fla.R.C.P.1 30 F.S.A.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Davis v. McGAHEE, 257 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)…viewed herein is affirmed, the writ discharged and the petition dismissed. CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting Chief Judge, and RAWLS, J., concur. . 5 Fla.Jur. 199, Cancellation, Reformation, etc., §§ 2, 3; Corak Construction Corp. v. Scott (Fla.App.1966), 184 So. 2d 460. . 12 Fla.Jur. 190, Equity, § 43. . 12 Fla.Jur. 194, Equity, § 44.…
-
Patricia (Clark) Foster and Brent Foster v. Stein, 534 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…in paternity and adoption proceedings, Art. Y, § 5(b), Fla. Const., the order and judgment were entered without jurisdiction over the subject matter1 and are totally void. Caudell v. Leventis, 43 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1950); Corak Constr. Corp. v. Scott, 184 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), cert. denied, 189 So. 2d 633 (Fla.1966). On that ground,2 the appellants’ motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4) for relief from the order and judgment as void should have been granted. See Gelhop v. Gelkop, 384…
-
Scott v. Corak Constr. Co., 189 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1966)…Certiorari denied without opinion. 184 So. 2d 460.…