JIMMIE MCCLAIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Jimmie McClain appealed his conviction for breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a misdemeanor, challenging the admissibility of stolen property exhibits and a jury instruction regarding possession of stolen property. The court affirmed his conviction, finding the evidence properly admitted and the jury instruction constitutional.
The court held that the stolen property exhibits were relevant, material, and sufficiently identified; and that the jury instruction regarding possession of stolen property does not violate constitutional protections against self-incrimination because it permits only the consideration of possession as circumstantial evidence without requiring the defendant to explain possession at trial.
“This proscription prohibits a person in a criminal case from being compelled to be a witness against himself. It does not go so far as to prohibit a jury from considering as circumstantial evidence the possession of stolen property, for which possession the defendant, at a time prior to trial, had offered no explanation.”
Establishes the court's holding that considering possession of stolen property as circumstantial evidence does not violate self-incrimination protections.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcClain was charged with breaking and entering a building and larceny. Stolen property allegedly taken from the building was found in McClain's posses…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Presumption Of Guilt cases and more on FLexlaw
This is an appeal by a defendant from a judgment of guilty of breaking and entering a building other than a dwelling house with intent to commit a misdemeanor, entered upon a jury verdict. Two points are raised on appeal.
Appellant first contends that certain exhibits, being property allegedly stolen from the building entered, should not have been admitted into evidence. Upon an examination of the transcript, we conclude that the evidence was relevant, material and sufficiently identified. See Tavalaccio v. State, Fla.1952, 59 So.2d 247; Kearson v. State, 1936, 123 Fla. 324, 166 So. 832.
Appellant’s second point is that the trial judge erred in giving the following instruction:
“ * * * [I]t is the law when a building has been broken and entered without the consent of the owner and personal property is stolen therefrom and the property stolen or some portion thereof is found in the possession of the person charged with the breaking and entering with intent to commit a larceny therein, such possession without a reasonable and plausible explanation of lawful possession of the property or any portion thereof may be sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty of breaking and entering a building with intent to commit larceny therein, but the guilt of the accused doesn’t follow as a presumption of law from the unexplained possession of the property stolen. The presumption of guilt in such a case is one which you may infer as a matter of fact which you, the jury, are the sole judges of, and it is another circumstance which you may consider in connection with all the other facts and circumstances in the case which you believe to be true.”
It is contended that this charge violates both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Section 12, Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., which provide in part that:
“No person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself * *
This proscription prohibits a person in a criminal case from being compelled to be a witness against himself. It does not go so far as to prohibit a jury from considering as circumstantial evidence the possession of stolen property, for which possession the defendant, at a time prior to trial, had offered no explanation.
“ * * * The ‘explanation’ of possession thus referred to is that given by the accused when he is first under duty to speak after such recently stolen property *709is discovered m his possession. There is no burden upon the defendant to take the stand and explain such possession at the trial * * Romanello v. State, Fla.App.1964, 160 So.2d 529, 534, cert. denied 381 U.S. 915, 85 S.Ct. 1541, 14 L.Ed.2d 436.
See Kearson v. State, supra; Collier v. State, 1908, 55 Fla. 7, 45 So. 752. Moreover, this instruction is not construed as a comment on the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf. Romanello v. State, supra. Compare Ard v. State, Fla. 1959, 108 So.2d 38.
Having found no error, we affirm the decision appealed.
Affirmed.
HOBSON, J., and BRUTON, JAMES D., Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1968)…here review on direct conflict certiorari á decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Young v. State, Fla.App.1967, 203 So. 2d 650. The decision is in direct conflict on the same point of law with McClain v. State, Fla.App.1966, 185 So. 2d 707, and a long line of decisions of this court upon which the decision in McClain was based. Hence we have jurisdiction under Section 4(2) of Article V, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. The point of law upon which the case turned in the appellate court…
-
Palmer v. State, 323 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…case was approved long ago, 2 Wharton, Evidence in Criminal Issues, § 758, at 1509-11 (10th ed., 1912),3 and recently. Romanello v. State, 160 So. 2d 529 (Fla.App.1st, 1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 915, 85 S.Ct. 1541, 14 L.Ed.2d 436; McClain v. State, 185 So. 2d 707 (Fla.App.2d, 1966), cert. den. 192 So. 2d 498 (Fla.1966); State v. Young, supra. Although the formulation of the inference remains much as stated in the trial court’s charge in this case, its rationale has been remarkably transformed in response to…
-
Gamble v. State, 210 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)…la. 324, 25 So. 2d 799; Ard v. State, Fla.1959, 108 So. 2d 38; Cameron v. State, Fla.App.1959, 112 So. 2d 864; Romanello v. State, Fla.App.1964, 160 So. 2d 529 (cert. den. 381 U.S. 915, 85 S.Ct. 1541, 14 L.Ed.2d 436); McClain v. State, Fla.App.1966, 185 So. 2d 707; Miley v. State, Fla.App.1966, 186 So. 2d 299. However, in the recent case of Young v. State, Fla.App.1967, 203 So. 2d 650, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida noted that the above cited cases were decided prior to the decision of Mirand…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Harrington v. Texaco, Inc., 381 U.S. 915 (U.S. 1965)
- Romanello v. State, 160 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Kearson v. State, 123 Fla. 324 (Fla. 1936)
- Dusky ARD v. State, 108 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1959)
- Collier v. State, 55 Fla. 7 (Fla. 1908)