H. E. PATTON
v.
THE CITY OF PANAMA CITY, C. P. RUSS, ET AL., AS CITY COMMISSIONERS, ET AL.

Fla. | 1936-08-03
Whitfield, C. J., and Terrell, Brown, Buford and Davis, J. J., concur.
125 Fla. 140 Florida Supreme Court (1936) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 169 So. 638
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Patton sought to enjoin Panama City from issuing waterworks revenue certificates, arguing the city lacked authority to issue them. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that revenue certificates payable solely from waterworks revenues do not constitute bonds requiring voter approval under the city charter or state constitution.


Holding

Revenue certificates payable solely from revenues of a municipal utility and imposing no pledge of the city's taxing power do not constitute bonds within the meaning of the city charter or the Florida Constitution, and therefore do not require voter approval. The city has statutory authority to issue such certificates for necessary waterworks improvements.


Key Quotes

“That the revenue certificates proposed to be issued, principal and interest thereof, are payable solely from the revenue received by the City of Panama City from the continued operation of its waterworks system and that said revenue certificates which issued will constitute no direct or contingent pledge of the taxing power of the City of Panama City”

Establishes the critical distinction that revenue certificates pledging only utility revenues, not taxing power, fall outside constitutional bond restrictions

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Facts & Procedural History

Panama City proposed to issue revenue certificates to fund waterworks system improvements. The certificates were to be payable solely from revenues de…

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Opinion of the Court
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

— The appeal brings for review a decree of the Circuit Court in and for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Bay County, denying injunction and dismissing bill of complaint by which bill of complaint it was sought to enjoin the City of Panama City, a municipal corporation, and its officers from issuing certain waterworks certificates.

The decree was as follows:

“1. That the municipality, City of Panama City, has statutory authority to construct, operate, maintain, extend and improve a waterworks system for supplying water to the inhabitants of said municipality and so has authority to construct the project described in the bill' of complaint.

“2. That it appears from the face of the bill of complaint filed and exhibits attached that the project described therein is a necessary improvement or betterment to the waterworks system owned and operated by the City of Panama City.

“3. That it appears from the fact of the bill of complaint that the City of Panama City has been deriving annually from its waterworks system sufficient revenues to pay the cost of operation of the same, as the same shall be extended and improved by the proposed project, and also the interest upon and provide for the sinking fund of the Revenue Certificates proposed to be issued.

*142 “4. That the revenue certificates proposed to be issued, principal and interest thereof, are payable solely from the revenue received by the City of Panama City from the continued operation of its waterworks system and that said revenue certificates which issued will constitute no direct or contingent pledge of the taxing power of the City of Panama City, nor impose any legal or moral duty or obligation, directly or indirectly, upon said municipality to exercise the power of taxation to pay the same.

“5. That the revenue certificates proposed to be issued, as described in the bill of complaint, do not constitute bonds, and thus pledge the taxing power of the City of Panama City for the payment of principal and interest thereof, in the meaning of Section 126 of Chapter 11678, Laws of Florida, Acts of the Legislature of the Extraordinary session of 1925, which is the charter of the City, nor in the meaning of Section 6, Article 9 of the Constitution of Florida by a vote of the freeholders of the City.

“6. The court further finds, therefore, that there is no equity in the bill:

“It is ordered that the application of the plaintiff for an injunction herein be, and the same is hereby denied:

“The plaintiff declaring that time for amendment is not desired and that no amendment to the bill would be made;

“It Is Considered, Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed by the Court that the bill of complaint herein be, and the same is hereby, dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff.”

The issues presented by the bill of' complaint, the exhibits attached thereto and by apt language made a part thereof, and the motion to dismiss present the identical legal questions which were presented for our determination in the case of E. H. Boykin v. Town of River Junction, in which opinion and judgment was filed on July 17th, 1936. *143The same legal principles are discussed and the law applicable thereto enunciated in the very able opinion prepared by Mr. Chief Justice Whitfield in the case of. E. L. Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, et al., opinion filed at this Term of Court and on authority of the opinions and judgments in those cases, the decree and order appealed from in this case should be, and the same are, affirmed.

Whitfield, C. J., and Terrell, Brown, Buford and Davis, J. J., concur.

Ellis, P. J.,

concurs upon the principle announced in his specially concurring opinion in the case of State, ex rel. City of Vero Beach, v. MacConnell, this day filed.

Concurrence
Ellis, P. J.,

Ellis, P. J.,

concurs upon the principle announced in his specially concurring opinion in the case of State, ex rel. City of Vero Beach, v. MacConnell, this day filed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. City of Pensacola, 135 Fla. 239 (Fla. 1938)
    …. City of Fort Pierce, Fla. 182 So. 774; Williams v. Town of Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114, 169 So. 631; State, ex rel. City of Vero Beach, v. McConnell, 125 Fla. 130, 169 So. 628. The following cases also support this view: Patton v. Panama City, et al., 125 Fla. 140, 169 So. 638; Teachy v. City of Wauchula, 125 Fla. 150, 169 So. 640; Voorhees v. City of Moore Haven, 125 Fla. 149, 169 So. 641; May Land Co. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 125 Fla. 146, 169 So. 642; State, ex rel. City of Sarasota, v. Richards, 125 Fla…
  • State v. City of DeLand, 135 Fla. 540 (Fla. 1938)
    …es through their counsel is revealed by the record. It is accordingly die judgment of this Court that the final decree appealed from was correct and is supported by the following decisions of this Court: Patton v. Panama City, et al., 125 Fla. 140, 169 So. 638; Teachy v. City of Wauchula, 125 Fla. 150, 169 So. 640; Vorhees v. City of Moore Haven, 125 Fla. 149, 169 So. 641; May Land Co. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 125 Fla. 146, 169 So. 642; State, ex rel. City of Sarasota v. Richards, 125 Fla. 145, 169 So.…
  • City of Panama City v. State, 135 Fla. 687 (Fla. 1938)
    …g vote of the taxpayers as contemplated by Section 6 of Article IX of the Constitution. The power of the City of Panama City to- issue such certificates appears to have been settled in the affirmative in Patton v. Panama City, et al., 125 Fla. 140, 169 So. 638. At any rate, -we have examined Chapter 11678, Acts of [*689] 1925, and other applicable provisions of the law and find ample authority for the City to issue the certificates.' The certificates are not bonds or other obligations requiring an approv…

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