ANNE MARLOWE SALOMON, APPELLANT,
v.
MORRIS S. SALOMON, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this divorce appeal, the court reversed a chancellor's modification of a property settlement agreement and remanded for reinstatement of the original terms. The court held that a property settlement agreement incorporating mutual release of property rights cannot be modified absent conditions specified in established Florida case law, and that attorney's fees are awardable to a former spouse defending established rights under such an agreement.
The court held that the chancellor lacked authority to modify the property settlement agreement because none of the conditions laid down in controlling Florida authorities were present in the record. The court further held that the chancellor erred in denying attorney's fees, as a former wife is entitled to fees for protecting rights established by a prior agreement or decree when she is defending (rather than attempting to increase) the provisions thereof.
“any attempt to modify the provisions thereof would be subject to the conditions laid down in the following authorities : Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128; Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722, 7 So.2d 9; Underwood v. Underwood, Fla. 1953, 64 So.2d 281; Haynes v. Haynes, Fla. 1954, 71 So.2d 491; Cowen v. Cowen, Fla. 1957, 95 So.2d 584”
Establishes the legal standard that property settlement agreements can only be modified upon meeting specific conditions recognized by Florida law
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnne Marlowe Salomon and Morris S. Salomon entered into a property settlement agreement that was ratified and confirmed by a final divorce decree. The…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Modification Of Property Settlement Agreement cases and more on FLexlaw
This appeal involves the correctness of an order entered by the chancellor modifying provisions of a “property settlement agreement”, ratified and confirmed by a final decree of divorce.
We find that the agreement in question, which recited that it was a “property settlement agreement”, had incorporated therein mutual release of respective rights in the property of each other to be, in fact, a property settlement agreement and, therefore, any attempt to modify the provisions thereof would be subject to the conditions laid down in the following authorities : Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128; Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722, 7 So.2d 9; Underwood v. Underwood, Fla. 1953, 64 So.2d 281; Haynes v. Haynes, Fla. 1954, 71 So.2d 491; Cowen v. Cowen, Fla. 1957, 95 So.2d 584. None of the conditions laid down in the above authorities appearing from the record in this cause, the chancellor was without the authorization to interfere with the contract arrived at between the parties.
Counsel for the former wife applied for attorney’s fees in the trial court in defending her right under the property settlement agreement, and the chancellor denied any such allegedly on the ground that he was without jurisdiction to award same. In this connection, we find he committed error. See: McNeill v. McNeill, Fla. 1952, 59 So.2d 57; Metz v. Metz, Fla.App.1959, 108 So.2d 512; Wilner v. Wilner, Fla.App. 1964, 167 So.2d 234. Counsel for the husband has cited the following authorities for the proposition that attorney’s fees are not allowable: Gullette v. Ochoa, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 799; Graves v. Graves, Fla.App. 1959, 115 So.2d 451; Terry v. Terry, Fla. App.1961, 126 So.2d 890. These cases are all distinguishable from the case at bar iri that these were the actions wherein the former wife attempted to increase the amount provided for in the agreement. This is not the case at bar, and' the right to fees in this cause should be governed by those authorities which recognize that a former wife is entitled to fees to protect her rights, established by a prior agreement or decree. See: Simpson v. Simpson, Fla. 1953, 63 So.2d 764; Blunda v. Blunda, Fla. 1958, 101 So.2d 41; Teply v. Key, Fla.App. 1963, 158 So.2d 549; Wilner v. Wilner, supra.
Counsel for the appellant has filed a petition in this court for attorney’s fees for services rendered in perfecting and prosecuting this appeal. Because of the fact that this cause will be returned to the circuit court with directions to reestablish the appellant’s right to receive the full periodic payments contained in the original property settlement agreement, and for a determination of attorney’s fees to be awarded her counsel for representation in the trial court, we likewise direct the chancellor to determine [in addition to the trial court fees] such fees as would be allowable for services rendered in this court.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Salomon v. Salomon, 196 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1967)…ERVIN, Justice. We are asked by petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Salomon v. Salomon, 186 So. 2d 39. The Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida on February 9, 1960 entered a final decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing between the Petitioner and the Respondent. Said decree, inter alia, confirmed a property settlement agreement between t…
-
Gilbert v. Gilbert, 312 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…ieu of all claims for support. See Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513, 197 So. 128; Underwood v. Underwood, Fla.1953, 64 So. 2d 281; Fort v. Fort, Fla. 1956, 90 So. 2d 313; Howell v. Howell, Fla.App. 1964, 164 So. 2d 231; Salomon v. Salomon, Fla.App.1966, 186 So. 2d 39; Salomon v. Salomon, Fla. 1967, 196 So. 2d 111; McKenna v. McKenna, Fla.App.1969, 220 So. 2d 433. For the reasons stated, the order appealed from is reversed.…
-
McKENNA v. McKENNA, 220 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…nently correct in holding that this property settlement agreement (adopted in the divorce decree) was not subject to modification under the cited statute. See Salomon v. Salomon, Fla.1967, 196 So. 2d 111, approving Salomon v. Salomon, Fla. App.1966, 186 So. 2d 39. A second contention presented on this appeal is that the increase in child support granted by the trial court was insufficient and inadequate on the eviden-tiary showing made by the wife. Gauged by the amount previously agreed upon by the parties…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1953)
- Miller v. Miller, 149 Fla. 722 (Fla. 1942)
- Vance v. Vance, 143 Fla. 513 (Fla. 1940)
- Isabel M. Cowen (Papert) v. Cowen, 95 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1957)
- Simpson v. Simpson, 63 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1953)
- Haynes v. Haynes, 71 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1954)
- McNeill v. McNeill, 59 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1952)
- Gullette v. Ochoa, 104 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- Metz v. Metz, 108 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Terry v. Gertrude S. Terry, 126 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)