TAYLOR ET AL.
v.
LOUISIANA
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Convictions for violating a state breach-of-peace statute are reversed because the conduct involved was merely entering a waiting room segregated by race, which is impermissible under federal law.
Petitioners, six Black individuals, were convicted under Louisiana's breach-of-peace statute for entering a waiting room designated for white passenge…
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Per Curiam.
Petitioners, six Negroes, were convicted of violating Louisiana’s breach-of-the-peace statute, La. Rev. Stat., 1950, § 14:103.1,1 and were given fines and jail terms by the state court. The Louisiana Supreme Court declined to review their convictions, and the case is here on petition for a writ of certiorari which we have granted.
Four of the six petitioners went into the waiting room customarily reserved for white people at the Trailways Bus Depot in Shreveport, Louisiana, in order to take a bus to Jackson, Mississippi. The Chief of Police of Shreveport approached the four and asked them why they were in the station. They told him they were interstate passengers and wished to purchase tickets and obtain travel information. The Chief told them they could do this in the colored waiting room and ordered them to move on. When the four refused to leave, stating again that they were interstate passengers and asserting their rights under federal law, they were ordered to leave or be arrested. The spokesman of the group then said, “We have no choice; go ahead and arrest us.” The police thereupon arrested the four of them. The other two petitioners were then arrested, while sitting nearby in the automobile which had brought the six to the bus station.
At the trial there was testimony that immediately upon petitioners’ entry into the waiting room many of the people therein became restless and that some onlookers climbed onto seats to get a better view. Nevertheless, respondent admits these persons moved on when ordered to do so by the police. There was no evidence of violence. The record shows that the petitioners were quiet, orderly, and polite. The trial court said, however, that the mere presence of Negroes in a white waiting room was likely to give rise to a breach of the peace. It held the mere presence of the Negroes in the waiting room, as part of a preconceived plan, was sufficient evidence of guilt. It accordingly held that the four had violated the state breach-of-the-peace statute and that the other two had counseled and procured the others to commit the crime.
Here, as in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, the only evidence to support the charge was that petitioners were violating a custom that segregated people in waiting rooms according to their race, a practice not allowed in interstate transportation facilities by reason of federal law.2 Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454, 459-460. And see Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U. S. 877 (public beaches); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (municipal golf courses); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903 (bus); New Orleans Park Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U. S. 54 (municipal golf course and park). The judgments of conviction must therefore be
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Harlan would grant certiorari and set the case for argument.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
In relevant part, §14:103.1 provides: "A. Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby: (1) crowds or congregates with others ... in or upon . . . any . . . public place or building . . . and who fails or refuses to disperse and move on, or disperse or move on, when ordered so to do by any law enforcement officer of any municipality ... in which such act or acts are committed, or by any law enforcement officer of the state of Louisiana . .. shall be guilty of disturbing the peace.”
“That there exists a serious and difficult problem arising from a feeling of race hostility which the law is powerless to control, and to which it must give a measure of consideration, may be freely admitted. But its solution cannot be promoted by depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges.” Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 80-81.
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Cited By (13 total)
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Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (U.S. 1963)…bsence of any evidence of the commission of this offense, and that they were thus denied one of the most basic elements [*235] of due process of law. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199; see Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157; Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154. Whatever the merits of this contention, we need not pass upon it in the present case. The state courts have held that the petitioners’ conduct constituted breach of the peace under state law, and we may accept their decision as binding upon us to t…
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Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (U.S. 1966)…State’s breach of the peace statute. In the three preceding cases the convictions were reversed. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, decided in December 1961, involved sitins by Negroes at lunch counters catering only to whites. Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154, decided in June 1962, concerned a sit-in by Negroes in a waiting room at a bus depot, reserved “for whites only.” Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, decided in January 1965, involved the leader of some 2,000 Negroes who demonstrated in the vicinity o…1 / 3
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Watson v. City OF Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (U.S. 1963)…ling answer to this contention is that constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise. See Wright v. Georgia, ante, p. 284; Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300. Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154. As declared in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 16, “law and order are not ... to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights.” This is really no more than an application of a principle enunciated much earlier in Buchan…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (U.S. 1917)
- Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (U.S. 1961)
- Holophane Co., Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (U.S. 1956)
- Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1960)
- Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (U.S. 1955)
- Gianfala v. Tex. Co., 350 U.S. 879 (U.S. 1955)
- Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (U.S. 1956)
- Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (U.S. 1955)
- Pender v. Clark Cnty., 350 U.S. 877 (U.S. 1955)
- New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (U.S. 1958)