TROPICAL ATTRACTIONS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
FRANCIS J. COPPINGER, ADMINISTRATOR, C.T.A., OF THE ESTATE OF MARIE COPPINGER, DECEASED, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1966-05-31
No. 65-796
Before HENDRY, C. J., and PEARSON and SWANN, JJ.
187 So. 2d 395 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1966) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Tropical Attractions, Inc., as assignee of a commercial lease, was sued by the estate administrator of the deceased lessor for unpaid rent, taxes, and possession. The Florida District Court of Appeal held that by accepting continuous monthly rent payments after the lessor's death, the estate waived its right to forfeit the lease for default, making a judgment for possession inconsistent with the lease's continued performance.


Holding

The court affirmed the judgment in part regarding arrearages and taxes but reversed the judgment awarding possession because by accepting continuous monthly rent payments after the lessor's death, the estate waived its right to enforce a forfeiture for default. A judgment ordering performance of the lease is inconsistent with a judgment for recovery of possession for non-performance.


Key Quotes

“It is the general rule that a lessor may, by accepting the benefits of a lease after its breach, be estopped from asserting a forfeiture because of that breach.”

Establishes the legal principle that acceptance of lease benefits constitutes waiver of forfeiture rights for breach.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Marie Coppinger leased realty to Tri-Boat Co., Inc. for five years with extensions, at $5,500 annual rent payable monthly in advance, with a provision…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Chief Judge.

HENDRY, Chief Judge.

Appellee, as administrator of the estate of Marie Coppinger, deceased, filed a complaint against the appellant, as the assignee of a lease on certain real property, seeking arrearages in rent, advance rent, contribution to taxes and possession of the premises.

*396The deceased leased to Tri-Boat Co., Inc., certain realty in Miami for a term of five years ending October 1, 1962. The term was extended to August 14, 1967 with an option to renew to August 14,1977. Annual rental was in the sum of $5,500 payable monthly in advance. Lessee agreed to pay one-half of the city and county taxes in any year in excess of $2,500.

' The lessor maintained a home on the leased property and the lease provided that if she removed herself permanently from the premises the rental would be $6,500 per year. In such event, the lessee agreed to advance to the lessor $5,500 to be applied against the last year’s rental to be used toward the purchase of a home for the lessor. The lessor died on July 27, 1963.

■^ On September 24, 1963, the appellant, as a prospective purchaser of the lessee’s interest requested and received a letter from the executor of the decedent’s estate designating the total amount of the rent due as of September 1, 1963.

The appellant purchased the lessee’s interest paying the full amount of rent due (which had been computed by the executor on a basis of $5,500 per year) and has thereafter continuously paid the monthly installment at the rate of $5,500 per year.

Subsequently, the executor was succeeded by the appellee, as administrator, who demanded that the appellant pay retroactively and thenceforth rental at the rate of $6,500 per year, as well as the sum of $5,500 to be applied against the rent for the last year of the term. Upon refusal of said demand, the present suit was instituted.

At the conclusion of a non-jury trial, the trial judge entered a final judgment in favor of the appellee which provided that the appellant: pay the sum of $1,833.26 for ar-rearages in rent due from October 1, 1963 through July 1, 1965 at the rate of $83.33 per month; pay the sum of $132.80 as a contribution toward taxes for the years of 1963 and 1964; pay the sum of $200 as attorney’s fees; and vacate the premises. The trial judge also found that the appellant was in default of the sum of $5,500 designated as advance rental to be applied toward the last year’s rent. However, judgment was not entered for that amount because the appellee was awarded possession of the premises.

We have carefully reviewed all of the appellant’s contentions and find them to be without merit except for the contention that a judgment ordering performance of the lease is inconsistent with a judgment for recovery of possession for non-performance. - ’

It is the general rule that a lessor may, by accepting the benefits of a lease after its breach, be estopped from asserting a forfeiture because of that breach.1 The appellant has continuously paid the monthly rent as it came due. As these payments were accepted under the lease, the lessor has waived the right to enforce a forfeiture of the lease for default in rent.

We have therefore determined that the trial judge erred in awarding possession of the premises to the appellee. In view of this holding, the trial judge may now enter judgment for $5,500 for appellee as advance rental to be applied toward the last year’s rent

Accordingly, the judgment appealed is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with directions to enter an appropriate judgment in accordance with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Gosta Tollius v. Dutch Inns OF Am., Inc., 244 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
  • Moskos v. Hand, 247 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
    …to such a forfeiture, where after the breach he accepts rent from his tenant with knowledge or full notice thereof. See U. S. Properties, Inc. v. Marwin Corp., Fla.App.1960, 123 So. 2d 371, and Tropical Attractions, Inc. v. Coppinger, Fla.App.1966, 187 So. 2d 395. The tenant’s plaint that he did not receive the three days notice provided in Section 83.20(2), F.S.1969, F.S.A., is without merit. Here the notice was not necessary because the tenant in the lease expressly waived all notice required by law. Such…
  • Palm Corp. v. 183RD St. Theatre Corp., 309 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
    …the provision of the lease relative to written consent, and therefore is estopped to assert a breach of the lease. See Farmers’ Bank & Trust Co. v. Palms Pub. Co., 1923, 86 Fla. 371, 98 So. 143; Tropical Attractions, Inc. v. Coppinger, Fla.App.1966, 187 So. 2d 395. The record shows that Mr. Milton Sir-kin, the plaintiff’s president, was aware more than a month before his company purchased the lessor’s interest in the property of the possible existence of a sublease. In addition, the plaintiff accepted rental…

Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw