WHITE
v.
MARYLAND
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A defendant sentenced to death in Maryland challenged his conviction after entering a guilty plea at a preliminary hearing without counsel, which was later introduced as evidence at trial. The Supreme Court held that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage in the criminal proceeding under Maryland law where the right to counsel attached, and therefore reversed the conviction, applying the same reasoning established in Hamilton v. Alabama regarding the necessity of counsel at critical stages to ensure intelligent plea entry.
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Per Curiam.
Petitioner, who was sentenced to death while his co-defendant was given life, appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. 227 Md. 615, 177 A. 2d 877. We granted certiorari “limited to the point of law raised in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52.” See 371 U. S. 909.
Petitioner was arrested on May 27, 1960, and brought before a magistrate on May 31, 1960, for a preliminary hearing. But that hearing was. postponed and not actually held until August 9,1960. At that time petitioner was not yet represented by a lawyer. When arraigned at that preliminary hearing he pleaded guilty. What Mary land calls the “arraignment” was first held September 8, 1960; but since petitioner was not represented by counsel, his arraignment was postponed and counsel appointed for him on September 9, 1960. He was finally arraigned on November 25,1960, and entered'pleas of “not guilty” and “not guilty by reason of insanity.” At his trial the plea of .guilty made at the preliminary hearing on' August 9, 1960, was introduced in evidence.* Since he did not have counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing, he argued that Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, applied. The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying that arraignment in Alabama is “a critical stage in a criminal proceeding” where rights' are preserved or lost (368 U. S. 53-54), while.under Maryland law there was “no requirement (nor. any practical possibility under our present criminal procedure) to appoint counsel” for petitioner at the “preliminary hearing . . . nor was it necessary for appellant to enter a plea at that time.” 227 Md., at 625, 177 A. 2d, at 882.
Whatever may be the normal function of the “preliminary hearing” under Maryland law, it was in this case as “critical” a stage as arraignment under Alabama law. For petitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel.
Wé repeat what we said in Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, at 55, that we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted: “Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to-plead intelligently.” We therefore hold that Hamilton v. Alabama governs and that the judgment below must be and is.
Reversed.
*
Although petitioner did not object to the introduction of this evidence at the trial (227 Md., at 619-620, 177 A. 2d, at 879), the rationale of Hamilton v. Alabama, supra/does not rest, as we shall see, on a showing of prejudice.
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Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2008)…ritical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963).” His reliance is misplaced, however, for Holloway, Gideon, Hamilton, and White were all cases in which the deprivation of the right to counsel affected — and contaminated— the entire criminal proceeding. In thi…
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State v. Youngblood, 217 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1968)…nwright, 153 So. 2d 299 (Fla.1963). See also, Harris v. State, 162 So. 2d 262 (Fla.1964), where we discussed the deprivation of counsel impact reflected by Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961), and White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963). The matter of joint or separate counsel for jointly tried co-defendants is an aspect of the broader problem involving t.he effective assistance of counsel. Baker v. State, supra, 202 So. 2d at 565. In Glasser v…
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Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965)…is, a for-tiori, not “a critical stage” — although events that occur there may be of such a nature that the lack of counsel may result in a denial of due process of law. See Harris v. State, supra, 162 So. 2d 262, citing White v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193. Here, the preliminary examination of the appellant was of a routine nature, and nothing transpired to transform it into a “critical stage” in the proceedings. Accordingly, no denial of due process in this respect has…
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- Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1961)
- United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 909 (U.S. 1962)
- Waksmundzka v. Terry, 371 U.S. 909 (U.S. 1962)