THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANT,
v.
MARWIN S. CASSEL, AS TRUSTEE, APPELLEE
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Equitable Life Assurance Society, as garnishee, appeals a summary judgment in favor of judgment creditor Cassel for funds owed by judgment debtors the Lamars. The court held that cashier's checks held by the insurance company should be treated as cash/indebtedness subject to garnishment, even though they were held under a condition subsequent that had not occurred.
Cashier's checks representing an indebtedness should be treated the same as cash by the garnishee. Since the condition subsequent upon which the checks were delivered had not occurred, the funds represented by the checks were held for the benefit of the Lamars, and the insurance company as custodian controlled the indebtedness represented by the checks and was liable to the judgment creditor.
“The cashier's checks, representing an "indebtedness", should have been considered the same as cash by the garnishee.”
Establishes the court's core holding that cashier's checks are to be treated equivalently to cash for garnishment purposes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCassel obtained a judgment against Mario Lamar and Sylvia B. Lamar. Cassel then served a writ of garnishment on Equitable Life Assurance Society. At t…
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The appellant, garnishee in the trial court, seeks review of a final summary judgment.
The appellee was the judgment creditor of Mario Lamar and Sylvia B. Lamar, his wife. *352Subsequent to the entry of the judgment, the appellee caused a writ of garnishment to be served on the appellant. At the time of service of the writ, the appellant was then holding two cashier’s checks payable to its order. Said checks were delivered to the appellant by Mario Lamar, who was indebted to the appellant on a note and mortgage. These checks were never accepted by the appellant as payment on the mortgage debt, but were held under an agreement which was subject to a condition subsequent. The checks were neither endorsed, cashed, deposited, nor otherwise used, and were returned to Lamar between the date of the service of the writ and the answer. Thereafter, the appellant filed its answer to the writ of garnishment, admitting it had $49.15 belonging to the judgment debtors. The appellant further answered the writ saying that at the time of service of said writ and at the time of answer thereto or any time between, it did not have in its hands possession or control of any goods, monies, chattels or effects of the Lamars. The parties moved for summary judgments and the trial court, after hearing thereon, entered the order appealed denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment and .awarding the appellee a final summary judgment in the amount of $1,341.83. This appeal ensued.
The cashier’s checks, representing an “indebtedness”, should have been considered the same as cash by the garnishee. See: §§ 676.01, 676.50, 676.52, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.; Goshen Nat. Bank v. State, 141 N.Y. 379, 36 N.E. 316; Tarrant Wholesale Drug Co. v. Kendall, Tex.Civ.App.1949, 223 S.W.2d 964; 10 Am.Jur.2d, Banks, § 544. The condition subsequent, upon which they were delivered, had not occurred and therefore the funds represented by said checks were held for the benefit of the Lamars. The insurance company, as custodian of the -cashier’s checks, controlled the “indebtedness” represented thereby.
The final summary judgment here under •review is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Bank OF Hallandale v. Joe W. Sullivan's Concrete Serv., 216 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)…this rule the place of performance (payment) in the present case is the drawee-appellee’s place of business; the cause of action, if any, therefore accrued in Broward County. In Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Cassel, Fla.App.1966, 188 So. 2d 351, we held that “cashier’s checks * * * should have been considered the same as cash by [a] garnishee.” But the fact that a cashier’s check must be regarded as the equivalent of cash in some circumstances does not change the law regarding the place wh…