MEEKER ET UX.

v.

AMBASSADOR OIL CORP.

Citator

Cited By (14 total)

• Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (U.S. 1979)
  …ion should not stand in the way.” 85 Harv. L. Rev., at 455-456. This common-law rule is adopted in the Restatement of Judgments § 68, Comment j (1942). Similarly, in both Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, and Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Cory., 375 U. S. 160, the Court held that legal claims should ordinarily be tried before equitable claims to preserve the right to a jury trial. The petitioners’ reliance on Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, is misplaced. In the Dimick case the Court held that an incre…
• Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545 (U.S. 1990)
  …ues. In such cases, we have never accorded collateral-estoppel effect to the trial court’s factual [*553] determinations. Instead, we have reversed and remanded each case in its entirety for a trial before a jury. See Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Corp., 375 U. S. 160 (1963) (per curiam) (reversing trial court’s decision to try equitable claims first and thereby to bar jury trial on legal claims that relied on the same facts); Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412 (1987) (reversing and remanding claims for monetar…
• United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986)
  …remaining capital offenses within the discretion of federal judges. See, e.g., United States v. Egorov, 319 F. 2d 817 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (bail for espionage offense denied as a matter of discretion), cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 926, 84 S.Ct. 329, 11 L.Ed.2d 261 (1963); Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(a)(1) (1946). The historical question is whether the discretionary authority of judges to deny bail in capital cases could be exercised because of the dangerousness of the defendant or only because of a risk of flight, a ri…

Authorities Cited

• Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (U.S. 1959)
• Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (U.S. 1962)