GIANT FOOD INC.

v.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Citator

Cited By

• Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1969)
  …idate the entry of a guilty plea. We are aware of the inclinations of some courts to suggest that the ineligibility for parole should be similarly categorized. In Smith v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 404, 324 F. 2d 436, 441 (1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 967, 84 S.Ct. 978, 11 L.Ed.2d 975 (1964), the court held that “eligibility for parole is not a ‘consequence’ of a plea of guilty, but a matter of legislative grace.” The same conclusion was reached in Trujillo v. United States, 377 F. 2d 266 (5 Cir. 196…
• Pac. Molasses Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 356 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1966)
  …dice which might have resulted was overcome by the 40-day continuance and the right to recall witnesses for further cross-examination. Giant Food, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 322 F. 2d 977 (1963), cert. dismissed Rule 60, 376 U.S. 967, 84 S.Ct. 1121, 12 L.Ed. 2d 82 (1964), and E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 142 F. 2d 511 (6 Cir. 1944), are cited as authority. However, these cases were not instances where the petitioner had requested and been granted before the st…
• Nees v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969)
  …n an administrative proceeding is not as stringent as that enforced by courts of law, so long as fundamental fairness is observed. See, e. g., Hansen v. SEC, supra; Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 322 F. 2d 977 (1963), cert. dismissed, 376 U.S. 967, 84 S.Ct. 1121, 12 L.Ed.2d 82 (1964). Second, the fact petitioner did not receive the notice of the initial proceeding was, at least in part, his own fault since he had been notified of the pendency of the proceedings but failed to inform the Commis…